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Summary 
in the following thesis, I argue for an interpretation of relationality on the basis of the 
opacity that separates perceiving subjects. Although a great deal has been written 
about relationality, my own project tries to demonstrate that paying close attention to 
the role of language and fitne in the explication of separation can provide us with 
fiwher kLsigý -into The conditions upon which relationality 
is based. 
The structure of the thesis directly supports, at a formal level, my interpreta 
' 
tign of 
subjectii, ity as that which, because it revolves around the absence of a unifi6d identity 
"I" could call its own true self, is always in the process of arriving out of obscurity. 
The link between the structure of the thesis and its thematic development is in cribed 
in the question that guides my interpretation of relationality: How to name tVý. 
anonymous? My invocation of this long-standing and recurring question in the 
disciplines of philosophy and the practice of narrative is intended to highlight the 
important role signification plays in the explication of opacity as itself a name 
appropriate to the discussion of relationality. 
in the first section I provide an introduction to terms that -, Nrill figlire prominently 
throughout the thesis against the background of Emmanuel Levinas' critique of the 
Other and Jean-FranVois Lyotards critique of the suhlime. In the Interlude I provide 
an argument supporting the inclusion of a number of Latin American authors in the 
thesis (namely, Alejo Carpentier, Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez, Carlos Fuentes, Juan 
Ruy'o and Octai, io Paz) on the basis of their relation to absence. It is this relation that 
helps to clarify the terms introduced in the first section and which provides a close 
analysis of duplicity in the explication of the separation of relation. 
Finally, in section five, I take the reader back to the middle, to the very temporality of 
the between, the separation which conditions relationality, in an explication of 
postponement, a term I employ in varying degrees throughout the thesis. My critique 
of postponement is based on Carlos Fuentes' reading of Denis Diderot and Nikolai 
Gogol and Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth's Sequel To Histoly: Postmodernism and the 
Crisis ofRepresentational Time, both of which provide us with a language by which to 
conceptualise the role of postponement in the approach to the question'How to name 
the anonymousT. In this way, I hope to construct, through the tight linkage between 
form and content in the thesis itself, the very thing which the language and the 
temporality of the thesis are seeking to name. 
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'Now to sum up', Bernard said. 'Now to explain to you the meaning of my lifeitSince 
we do not know each other (though I met you once, on board a ship, going to kffica), 
we can talk freely. The illusion is upon me that something adheres for a moment, has 
roundness, weight, depth, is completed. This, for the moment, seems to be my fife. If it 
were possible, I would hand it to you entire. I would break it off as one breaks off a 
bunch of grapes. I would say, "Take it. This is my life". 
But unfortunately, what I see (this globe, full of figures) you do not see. You see me, 
sitting at a table opposite you, a rather heavy, elderly man, grey at the temples. You 
see me take my napkin and unfold it. You see me pour myself a glass of wine. And you 
see behind me the door opening, and people passing. But in order to make you 
understand, to give you my life, I must tell you a story - and there are so many, and so 
many - stories of childhood, stories of school, of love, marriage, death and so on; and 
none of them are true. Yet like children we tell each other stories, and to decorate 
them we make up these ridiculous, flamboyant, beautiful phrases. How tired I am of 
stories, how tired I am of phrases that come down beautifully with all their feet on the 
ground! Also, how I distrust neat designs of life that are drawn upon half-sheets of 
note-paper. I begin to long for some little language such as lovers use, broken words, 
inarticulate words, like the shuffling of feet on the pavement... 
'But meanwhile, while we eat, let us turn over these scenes as children turn over the 
pages of a picture-book and the nurse says, pointing: "That's a cow. That's a boat". Let 
us turn over the pages, and I will add, for your amusement, a comment in the margirf. 
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In the following thesis, I argue for an interpretation of relationality based on the 
interrelation between various concepts that receive treatment throughout the thesis as a 
whole. Inscribing linkages between these concepts is indeed the primary work of the 
thesýis in its attempt not only to offer an interpretation of relationaffity but also to attend 
to the question from which this interpretation arises: how to name the anonymous? 
My own approach to this question is grounded on the conceptual network thygh 
which the thesis is developed because it is in the very activity of inscribing linkages 
between concepts that the question of anonymity, as a question, will remain possible 
and not be foreclosed by a presignification of the field in which I place the question for 
investigation (the field of relationality). If there is a prior possibility for naming the 
anonymous and thereby of prefiguring it before we attend to its nature, then it seems to 
me that that possibility is going to be difficult to grasp conceptually because any 
conceptual system invoked to perform the task of an exemplary model would employ 
relations between concepts as a methodology. These relations would then serve as the 
nexus around which the unnameable would 'appear'. But it is precisely these relations 
that do not have a name. Therefore, I am prepared to take us into the field of 
relationality as ajustifiably head-on approach to the question of anonymity. In this 
respect, the question requires us to remain hesitant, for it is the hesitation between the 
annunciation of the question (as we now have it) and its being answered that the 
inscription of these linkages will take place. In short, I do not seek an answer to the 
question of anonymity through an interpretation of relationality. Rather, I seek a 
process that prioritises the passage between the asking and the answering of the 
I 
question as a central operative mechanism in my effort io attend to anonyinity. 
Two central concepts that help to organise the network of concepts deployed in 
the thesis are 'opacity' and 'extimacy', both of which I introduce in the first section 
against the background of Emmanuel Levinas' critique of the Other and Jean-Franqois 
Lyotard's critique of the sublime. In the case of my critique of Levinas' discourse, 
which figures more prominently than Lyotar&s in my overall aims, I am not so much 
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concerned with clarifying, denigrating or spurning the conclusions offered by Levinas 
as with providing an accentuation of his claims in order to vivify what others have 
occluded in their own clarifications, denigrations and inflections on Levinas' 
arguments. Hence, Levinas is important here not because of his delineation of 
otherness per se, but -because of the relation -between self and other that subtends much 
of Levinas' own formulations. Since many approaches to the question of anonymity 
have turned toward the inadequacy of language in its attempt to reveal its putqtive t.. 
referential objects in all their fullness, employing the term 'the ineffable' as a focal point 
for discussion, and because I read most of these arguments as failing to comprehend 
what is central to language as a referential system, I unpack my own introductory 
terms against a reinterpretation of ineffability. This reinterpretatiop is not principally a 
corrective to misconstruals about just what 'the ineffable' really is, but more 
importantly a reinterpretation of the role language plays in our apprehension of the 
unnameable itself. I will argue later in the thesis that an understanding of anonymity 
must not turn towards the failure of language because language itself is implicated in 
the very impossibility embodied by the unnameable. Our attention must therefore turn 
towards the condition which makes the very relation between word and thing possible. 
In the Interlude I provide an argument supporting the inclusion of a number of 
Latin American texts in the thesis on the basis of their relation to absence. It is this 
relation that helps to clarify the terms introduced in the first section and wl-kh 
provides a close analysis of duplicity in the explication of the separation of relation. 
Once I have set these terms in motion through the first two sections it then 
becomes possible to return, in the third section, to a further elaboration of opacity as a 
significant term in the thesis as a whole. This elaboration is offered in a close analysis 
of two works by Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez that concentrates on the role of death and 
absence in the development of their central themes. But it is also a section wh&h 
structurally highlights the importance temporality - that is, the structure of time - plays 
in my overall aims. Hence, in section four - Ae Time of the Betueen -I concentrate 
specifically on temporality as it evolves in the-work of Octavio Paz and Juan Rulfo. 
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My interpretations in this section inevitably lead to a reconsideration of linearity and 
the role simultaneity play in my approach to relationality and the question of 
anonymity. Therefore, although a great deal has been written about relationality, my 
own project tries to demonstrate that paying close attention to the role of language and 
finie-in the expTication of separation can pr6fide us vAth further-insights into the 
conditions upon which relationality is based. 
Finally, in section five, I take the reader back to the middle, to the very 
temporality of the between, the separation which conditions relationality, in an 
explication of postponement, a term I employ in varying degrees throughout the thesis. 
My critique of postponement is based on Carlos Fuentesreading of Denis Diderot and 
Nikolai Gogol and Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth's Sequel To Histoty: Postmodernism and 
the Crisis ofRepresentational Time, both of which provide us with a language by 
which to conceptualise the role of postponement in attending to the question of 
anonymity. 
In addition to the attention given to concepts I have also given specific attention 
to the structure of the thesis as is evident by the Table of Contents. This has a direct 
and, I would like to believe, important correlation to the thematic development of my 
argument. Because the thesis eschews beginnings and endings it is always in the 
process of arriving as something to which a unified identity could be attributed. This 
structure directly supports, at a formal level, my interpretation of subjectivity as that 
which, because it revolves around the absence of a unified identity "I" could call its 
own true self, is always in the process of arriving out of obscurity. In this way, I hope 
to construct, through the tight linkage between form and content in the thesis itself, the 
very 'object' which the language and the temporality of the thesis are seeking to name. 
Hence, a point which I hope is becoming clearer, my intention in this thesis has been to 
mobilise concepts over and against any primary philosophic or literary author(s). If I 
seem to be prioritising various texts from Latin America that is because they embody, 
in a particularly clear way, a number of key concepts I employ to advance my own 
claims. Notwithstanding this, there will be those who feel that certain authors, whose 
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work has been instrumental in the continuation of specific philosophic projects and 
traditions, are excluded from this thesis vvithout justification. A few clarifications here 
will, I hope, help to explain these exclusions. 
My intention throughout the thesis has been to include authors whose work pays 
specific attention to concepts which either receive a different inflection in my own 
work or which are used as contrary cases of concepts I invoke to elaborate my central 
theme. Hence, the reason for invoking Wolfgang Isees latest work lies in lsedý use of 
absence as a concept central to his own formulations of the fictive and the imaginary. 
As we will see, absence is a central concept in my argument as well, but one which 
takes on a radically different tone than that offered by Iser. His use of the concept is 
therefore a good way into my own use because it offers a clear and contrary 
understanding of absence than the one I am offering. And while similar claims about 
the importance of, say, Heidegger's work, or that of the existential theologians (Buber, 
Feuerbach, Jaspers, Barth, Tillich ... ) may seem legitimate here, there 
is a further 
requirement upon which the choice of texts has been based that made inclusion of their 
work very difficult. The industry that now surrounds Heidegger's work, for example, 
calls to be assessed in any response a writer might want to give to Heidegger's work in 
light of their own. However, filtering through this industrial smog in order merely to 
justify the importance of Heidegger's work in relation to problems in my own seems 
not only unnecessary to the advancement of my own claims but far too repetitive to be 
original. This does not mean that everything has been said. It only means that what is 
said here does not require Heidegger's work for its legitimation or for its successful 
articulation. My work does not suffer because Heidegger is excluded from it though it 
would suffer, I believe, if either the Heidegger industry was allowed to become a 
demarcation point for my own thinking or if any justification for the exclusion of his 
work was raised to the level of a critical perspective on the concepts I deploy 
throughout my own work. In the latter case, the action would only reinscribe those 
concepts back into the proble rn of attributing concepts to proper names, a problem I 
have tried earnestly to avoid. Other authors have presented themselves in my research 
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with key conceptual elaborations that required attention, and those are the authors that 
hold out against the requirement to maintain scholastic agendas and traditions. And in 
the case of the existential theologians, it has been my intention throughout this thesis to 
place the theology of language (and the language of theology) decidedly in abeyance 
since I have not wanted to immediately weigh my arguments down in any authorising 
language that would, once again, presignify or preordain the field of study. 
This apparently abrupt dismissal of membership in 'the' tradition, or even, 9f the 
applicability of certain projects within that or any other tradition, does not imply 
anything about the status that critical work receives in my own work. On the contrary, 
I am no more interested in denigrating 'the' tradition then I am in upholding it. Rather, 
in order to open the thesis to its own possibility, I have often had to avoid becoming 
embroiled in flxing it and its subject to a class of proper names whose identity would 
serve to strip the thesis of its own. This is not merely an anxiety of influence. It is a 
critical necessity. Readers who feel alienated by this strategic manoeuvre should 
consider the difficulty in attending to the question of anonymity through an invocation 
of proper names who have become synonymous with speciflc names attributable to the 
anonymous as such, that is, as something. which is unnameable. In order to attend to 
the question of anonymity that maintains it as a question it is critically necessary to 
maintain an important distance from a tradition that has thoroughly delineated 
anonymity, thereby giving it a name. I have attempted, very early on in the thesis, to 
raise concepts that provide a critical perspective on this question by placing these 
names in abeyance. At the moment we realise that this strategy delivers us to a field of 
critical thinking that is not foregrounded in the proper names of 'the' tradition we are 
then able to begin an analysis of anonymity that is proper to it; that is, an analysis that 
does not know in advance of its own work what the name and therefbýre the identity of 
its'object'are. If Heidegger has appeared to employ such a strategy in his own critical 
approach, how could naming him benefit my own attempt to stand at the boundary of a 
field I do not yet recognise? As we will see, the confrontation with the unrecognisable, 
. Xii 
with the foreign, is central to my own approach to anonymity and helps to underscore 
once again how the form and strategic unravelling of the thesis merges with its content. 
I realise that these clarifications about my choice of texts do not settle the issue of 
- my exclusions. 
However, as we will -see. as the study moves 
forward, many of the 
reasons I have offered above for those exclusions drive to the heart of what this thesis 
attempts to argue. 
ýdii 
4: Terms of Ineffability 
Terms of Ineffability 
Oth ern ess and In effa bility 
Common conceptions of ineffability place it at the border between what 
language is capable of representing and what it fails to represent, as "that which ... 
cannot be adequately verbalised" (AIN, 5), and as a moment experienced in a particular 
silence. As we will see, this definition immediately opens the problem of anonymity 
for us by prioritising language, and silence, in the construal of a putative Outside that 
is beyond expression, and our attention to it here will help to provide a frame. 1vork for 
exploring that problem throughout the thesis. 
Bruce F. Kawin argues, referring to mystical experiences, that "In the presence 
of the ineffable Oneness, there would be no "other" to mandate terminology, and no 
question of diff9rance. If this experience is possible, it is not linguistic" (Aflv, 233). 1 
The relationshýip between ineffability and thefailure of language is therefore seen as an 
essential one. In Emmanuel Levinas it is the analysis of this relationship that allows 
him to say that "the ego is ineffable, above all because it speaks, it responds and is 
responsible" (CPP, 36). Levinas' assertion seems to proffer the most damaging 
equivocation: the ego cannot be represented by language because of language and, 
precisely, speech. Furthermore, as we will see shortly, Levinas argues that the other is 
beyond conceptuality, beyond representation and, therefore, necessarily beyond lan- 
guage. In some sense the other is ineffable as well. In order to approach the question 
of anonymity, of the possibility of its being named, communicated, brought forward 
out of its own silence, in such a way that the approach did not merely reinstate 
otherness at its core, we need to problematise the notion of the failure of language, for 
it is this notion which underlines the conceptualisation of otherness. in Levinas' 
arguments: to move away from the discourse of the Oiher, we need to move away 
from the failure of language. In order to approach the question of anonymity we must, 
therefore, abandon the notion that anonymity's name lies behind its own apparent lack 
I KaiNin continues: "When a text pays attention to the limits of its means of expression and the limits 
of its being - when its self-consciousness attempts self-expression - then the ineffable is most 
certainly at issue" (AN, 229). 
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of communication. I propose to engender this movement through a set of concepts 
which are vital to the general questions this thesis asks. In many respects, it is the 
ideological force of the discourse on otherness to effect political and social policy that 
has allowed it to bury the central theme from which it developed through philosophers 
such as Levinas: how can we allow the other to speak for itself? How can we affirm 
differences without reducing them, by virtue of our very language, to mirror images of 
ourselves? As we will see, Levinas'work has provided others with the matery by 
which to subdue difference under the banner of social, political and religious freedom. 
What the alternative conceptual network offered throughout this thesis attempts to 
open then is precisely what a normalised discourse on otherness has occluded. 
How are we to comprehend the differences between the ego and the other if 
both are conceptualised in relation to the ineffable? Any serious attempt to treat this 
question must first approach the face-to-face encounter, since it is in this encounter 
that the ego, by being drawn from a first order, inward-turning externality to the more 
radical, second order exteriority of otherness and alterity, is distinguished from the 
other. 
"A face enters into our world from an absolutely foreign sphere, that is, 
precisely, from an absolute, that which in fact is the very name for ultimate strange- 
ness. The signifyingness of a face in its absoluteness is in the literal sense of the term 
extraordinary, outside of every order, every world" (CPP, 96). 2 For Levinas the 
movement from a first to a second order exteriority is accomplished in the ego's 
recognition of an other whose alterity cannot be recuperated into the ego's own self- 
representations. The separation between the ego and ihe other is one. 'filled' by 
language and, precisely, the command to speak. There is a tendency on first reading 
2 On the question of the absolute andjustice, LeNinas writes: "The absolute which supportsjustice is 
the absolute status of the interlocutor. His modality of being and of manifesting himself consist in 
turning his face to me, in being a face. This is why the absolute is a person" (CPP, 32-33). 1 will 
refer to this again near the end of this discussion. 
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Levinas' argument to see in it a mere disposing of oneself to this command. Levinas 
tells us however, that recognition of the other is not merely submitting oneself to the 
other, for such submission "would take all its worth away from my recognition; 
recpSnition by submission would annul my dignity, through which recognition has 
validity. The face which looks at me affirms Me" (CPP, 43). In this respect, both one 
and other are affirmed in the speech, the expressivity that erupts in the face-to-face 
encounter (CPP, 43). And yet, "the other does command me" (CPP, 43). 1 aln faced 
by the other such that "the command I receive must also be a command to command 
him who commands me" (CPP, 43). Recognition of the other, respect for the other, 
submission and commandment become meaningful only in the reciprocal relationship 
between the ego and the other, this shallow rift. 
Exteriority, Expression, Opacity 
To understand the face-to-face encounter we first need to understand how 
exteriority sets the framework for Levinas' arguments as a whole. Exteriority arises at 
the intersection of two important relationships in Levinas'oemTe: the relationships 
between the ego and the totality and the ego and the other. The distinction between 
these two relationships is not one of opposition. Rather, they are distinguished on the 
basis of an exteriority that appears in the first but finds its fulfilment in the second. 
This fulfilment is found in the recognition of commandment, responsibility and 
obligation in the face-to-face encounter with alterity. 
In "The Ego and the Totality", Levinas tells us that "thought begins at the very 
point that consciousness becomes conscious of its particularity, that is, conceives of 
the exteriority which lies beyond its nature qua living 6eing and encloses it" (CPP, 27). 
This first order exteriority represents the ego's inward-turning self-referentiality. "The 
individuality of the ego is distinguished from every given individuality by the fact that 
its identity is not constituted by what distinguishes it from others, but by its self 
reference" (CPP, 28). Levinas argues that this "inwardness which, for a thinking 
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being, is opposed to exteriority, occurs in a living being as an absence of exteriority. 
There is nothing mysterious in the identity of a living being throughout its history: it is 
essentially the same, the same determining every other, without the other determining 
it" (CPP, 26). Thought becomes possible as the consciousness of an exteriority the 
ego nonetheless encloseS. 3 
In addition to self-referentiality, Levinas argues that the ego is also "exterior to 
itself, but with an exteriority which is not that of a body ... Here we 
have really an 
exteriority of the inward" (CPP, 4). Levinas' comments here follow a discussion of 
rhythm in its relation to a "poetic order" where Levinas argues that rhythm is "not so 
much an inner law of the poetic order as the way the poetic order affects us" (CPP, 4). 
This analysis suggests to Levinas that the "closed wholes" of rhythm and the "poetic 
order" "impose themselves upon us without our assuming them. Or rather our 
consenting to them is inverted into a participation" (CPP, 4). To recognise in the 
"poetic order" that the ego becomes cognisant of an exteriority "not assumed" by it is 
not to suggest that the ego is simply confronted with an alterity that commands it. 
Rather, the ego, in its "participation" with the "closed wholes" of the "poetic order" 
and rhythm, is still involved in "its own representation" (CPP, 4), and thus with "an 
exteriority of the inward". 
The ego's exteriority to itself is established by Levinas in terms of resemblance. 
Levinas argues that resemblance is not "a result of a comparison between an image and 
the original, but as the very movement that engenders the image. Reality would not 
only be what it is, what is disclosed to be in truth, but would be also its double, its 
-1 Levinas argues that "thought begins with the possibility of conceiving a freedom extcrnal to my 
own" (CPP, 28). Such a conception is "the first thought. It marks myvery presence in the world" 
(CPP, 28). But this conception, indeed thought itself, cannot begin unless there LO a conscience (CPP, 
29). What this suggests to Levinas is that "the problem of the relationship betwedn the ego and the 
totality thus comes down to that of describing the moral conditions for thought" (CPP, 29). Without 
such conditions thought remains bound within the self-referentiality of an ego reducing all exteriority 
to itself and thus remains "opposed to exteriority". And while "the moral conditions for thought ... 
are realized ... 
in the work of economic justice" (CPP, 29), they arc essentially worked out in terms of 
a second order exteriority; that is, in the relationship between the ego and the other. Nonetheless, 
what is fundamental to the analysis of "economic justice" is the participation-separation structure that 
figures prominently at the beginning of "Reality and its Shadow", a structure I will deal with shortly. 
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shadow, its image" (CPP, 6). Hence, insofar as an ego is concerned, 
there is ... a 
duality in this person, this thing [among things], a 
duality in its being. It is what it is and it is a stranger to ifsetr'4 and 
there is a relationship between these two moments. We will say that 
the thing is itself and is its image. And that the relationship between 
the-tbi: qg and its image is resemblance (CPP, 6). 
Both the ego's exteriority to itself in its image (the ego which is exterior to it$elf and 
which is therefore its own double) and the self-referentiality that allows the ego to 
position itself within the totality, a positioning which is "simultaneously a po41on in 
the totality, and a reserve with respect to it or a separation" (CPP, 27), are what 
constitute the participation-separation structure central to this first order exteriority, a 
structure that "marks the advent of... thought, in which the bonds between the parts 
[of the totality] are constituted only by the freedom of the parts" (CPP, 28). It is also 
this structure that constitutes "a society", a totality of "beings that speak, that face one 
another" (CPP, 28). The second order exteriority confronts this structure in an 
attempt to radicalise it by pursuing the ego beyond itself, beyond its inward self- 
referentiality, in the face-to-face encounter with alterity. This alterity is the central 
feature of the second order exteriority. 
In "Meaning and Sense", Levinas asks: "Does not sense as orientation indicate 
a leap, an outside-of-oneself toward the other-than-oneself, whereas philosophy means 
to reabsorb every Other into the Same and neutralize alterity? " (CPP, 90). Under- 
standing "sense as orientation" reflec ts what Adrian Peperzak says about the meaning 
of the French "sens". "In French "sens" designates both "meaning" and "direction"" 
(CPP, 76, n. 4). Levinas' "sens" is orientation toward an exterior, the "other than 
4 Being a stranger to oneself is not, presumably, the 'Utimate strangeness" spoken of earlier since 
that would suggest that the ego or the ego's double is this absolutcfrom which the'. face enters into our 
world. (See above, pg 13). This would be entirely antithetical to Levinas' project and begs an 
important question about what he means by these two different uses of 'the strange'. InsomesenseNve 
see just how shallow the rift is that separates the ego and the other, since the foreignness of the 
absolute appears to be the radicalisation of the cgo! s own exteriority to itself. And yet, Levinas leaves 
us with no method of differentiating between these two employments of the term 'strange', especially 
with respect to 'the foreign'. Again, in some sense the ego is foreign to itself, and yet it is not the 
radical foreignness which situates the other beyond the ego's self-represcritations. 
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oneself', "a movement going outside the identical, toward an other which is absolutely 
other" (CPP, 9 1). The differences between this and the first order exteriority 
described above are telling. In the first order exteriority there is no movement outside 
of oneself but a cycling back into oneself as image and double - the image as doubling 
the ego. Such resemblance allows the ego to say that it is identical with beings in the 
world, except when it is confronted by the alterity of the other. The other refuses to 
be recuperated into the same via the identical. This also gives sense to Levinaý' later 
argument that "we call aface the epiphany of what can thus present itself directly, and 
therefore also exteriorly, to an F (CPP, 55). In the second order exteriority the ego 
cannot simply enclose the exteriority, the other within itself, within its own representa- 
tion. Rather, the ego is commanded to respond, to speak, obliged insofar as the other 
is concerned, an obligation which is delineated in terms of a specific notion of 
transcendence. Commandment and transcendence are intricately linked, for it is the 
transcendence of the ego and the other "with respect to each other" that creates a dis- 
tance between them (CPP, 43). 5 This distance is the space "in which language occurs" 
and prevents either the same or the other from being "reducible to a relation between 
concepts that limit one another" (CPP, 4 1). In tl-ýs respect, "the other is not invoked 
as a concept, but as a person" (CPP, 41). And it is this aconceptuality that allows 
Levinas to "situate" the other "beyond every attribute" which would "reduce him to 
what he has in common with other beings" (CPP, 4 1). In the absence of such concept- 
ual reduction, we encounter a "self-identical being that [Levinas calls] the presence of 
the face" (CPP, 4 1). The other must be self-identical if it is to remain other - radical 
exteriority. 6 The other is not merely the ego's double as the iinvard-turning 
externality of the image iiasfor the ego. 
5 This reciprocity between the ego and the other, expressed in tenns of commandment and 
transcendence, is precisely a reaffirmation of the participation-separation structure outlined above. 
6 And yet, "the epiphany of a face is wholly language" (CPP, 55). This points us back to my earlier 
reservation about the use of the term 'ineffable' in relation to language. How is an epiphany, which 
must be exterior if it is to remain the face it is, related to language such that it is "wholly language"? 
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Levinas' version of the othemess-alterity axis cashes itself out in a discourse on 
ethics that centralises, amongst other things, notions of exteriority, expression, 
conunandment (responsibility) and transcendence. Alternatively, the reconceptudlis- 
ation of the ineffable, offered here as a way of problematising the notion of the failure 
of language and thereby of opening a different conceptual network than that offered by 
Levinas and the discourse of the Other, will delineate ineffability in terms of opacity 
structured by extimacy. 7 By opacity I mean the distance shared by individuals, the 
mediation point that makes their relation possible, the very between that, at one and 
the same time, allows them to approach each other by holding them apart; that is, 
opacity is the impossibility of unification and the condition that makes intimacy 
possible. In this sense, opacity subtends exteriority; it is the point at which the outside 
is intimate with an inside that appears to deny it. Opacity is therefore structured by 
extimacy, the intimate exteriority of the outside. Consequently, opacity is not 
exteriority's opposite and it would be pernicious to weigh it down with a term=inology 
of'theinside'. Even Levinas'exteriority is an outside that is on the near-side of the 
ego, loorning on a horizon the ego participates in in its "commanding a being to 
command" it (CPP, 43): exteriority is not a "simple spatial or temporal remoteness" 
(CPP, XIII). Similarly, opacity is not localised inside a psyche as the prior possibility 
of the psyche or the gap over which the psyche must leap in order to encounter itself in 
the fullness of its being. 8 But again, this does not leave us with one alternative alone, 
that opacity is outside the psyche, outside the ego making itself felt or present to the 
7 While BAR be dealing with this shortly, it is important to indicate here that e'xtimacy is based upon 
the intimacy of the relation between the inside and the outside, an intimacy that important to 
Le,, inas'o, Am arguments. 
8 In Postinodernity In Latin America: The Argentine Paradigm, Santiago Colds' close reading of 
Julio Cortdzar's Rayuela [Hopscotch] pays specific attention to the main character's leap from a third 
story Nvindow near the end of the novel's first narrative sequence. While I %vill be paying closer 
attention to Colds' text later, it is important to point out that the relation between the notion of a leap 
and that of a gap is fundamental to the broader issues explored in my closer reading of various texts 
from Latin America. 
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ego, since that would place it prior to the unfolding of that psychic life: it would place 
opacity back before us as the origin of our desires and motivations or above and 
beyond us as a type of progenitor. Clearly this is where the task becomes difficult. If 
opacity is not (an) inside nor (an) outside where and what is it? What the analysis of 
opacity aims to prevent in answering tMs question are any ýimple reductions to 
ontological categories based on hasty definitions. Opacity is not a being-in-tfie-world 
nor a being-outside-the-subject (as some prior truth of the subject covered ovpr by the 
subject's own confusions about itself or some truth to come which, nonetheless, is 
constantly deferred by the subject's language). Hence, the analysis of opacity, seeking 
to subdue the temptation of ontology, also seeks to pinpoint opacity in everyday life, 
as the fabric of life and its events. 9 Opacity, and indeed subjectivity, cannot be 
conceived in terms of frescos, as walls infused with levels of meaning. The suggestion 
is not that subjectivity is not stratified, but that it is not a palimpsest, that the quality of 
it being stratified is better understood not in terms of a tiered edifice we descend as if 
towards hidden truths, but of voices whose simultaneous vocality does not suggest a 
true identity buried beneath articulation. 10 When Levinas argues that "the relationship 
between the thing and its image is resemblance" we must immediately ask how Levinas 
is able to conceptualise this resemblance without saying something about the nature of 
the between resemblance traverses or bridges. The concept of opacity responds to this 
9 An awkward terminology: daily living, the ordinary, the day-to-day! A terminology that seems to 
slide so easily towards the pedantic. Again the labour is in demonstrating the importance of this 
terminology in the abeyance of the otherness-alterity axis, an axiological force catching every 
discourse within its gravity. The importance is not a centralising one, as if the attempt here were to 
propose an '-ism' of the market-place, a back-to-basics communitarianism founded on a McCarthy- 
like moralism. Not that, above all not that. 
10 Recent work in the analysis of communication has had to take this seriously or, where that analysis 
has seemed weak, it should have taken it seriously. It is no longer viable to conceive cornmumcation, 
as so many psychiatrists, philosophers and psychologists had, as the transportation of encoded 
messages to a receiving decoder. Such a notion grounds itself in what Godfrey Vesey has called "the 
myth of the sense behind the sentence" (Godfrey Vesey, "Foreward", Communication and Under- 
standing (New Jersey: Harvester P., 1977): xii). We need to critique the employment of this myth in 
the analyses of subjectivity; the myth that behind the actions, expressions and appearances of the 
subject there exists the true kernel (or the kernel of truth) of the subjecVs identity - that these actions, 
expressions and appearances are only variegated manifestations of a unity yet to be discovered. I will 
explore this in greater detail later. 
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Levinasian portrayal of relation by redirecting the problems and concepts Levinas 
raises away from exteriority, alternatively underscoring the notion of impossibility and, 
precisely, the impossibility of experiencing the experiences of others, as a central motif 
in any analysis that concentrates on the between; that is, on the space which governs 
relaftonýl B6ing exposed to an exterior makes a detour around t1fis-imposs-ibility and, 
while it does not suggest a transparency at the heart of our experiences of others, our 
experiences in their lives, it nonetheless obfuscates the importance this impos*ibility 
plays in any movement an ego makes beyond itself in view of another. Furthermore, 
the exteriority of the ego to itself, its own doubling of itself, cannot but find in this 
'outward' mobility an 'inner' reflection: that the ego's 'outward' impasse reflects a 
similar impasse in its own experiences of itself insofar as the articulation of those 
experiences is concerned. Not only am I not able to experience the experiences of 
others, but I am also unable to determine which voice in my own psyche is the voice 
that marks out or defines my authentic and singular identity. My own psyche is a wall 
mortared with ineffability in the same manner in which relations between others are 
and, therefore, neither my identity nor those relations can be said to be singular. This 
is why ineffability is not merely a lack of experience but an impossibility. The voices 
of subjectivity resist conformity with a language that would make their identities 
transparent to an 'ego'. The contrast between opacity and geotemporal distance is 
informative here. 12 Geotemporal distance is the distance that stretches out between 
our tables - here I am at this table across from you while you cry. The opaque is not 
simply a lack of experience -I have never experienced such sorrow - but the impos- 
sibility of experiencing the experiences of others. Empathy or sympathy belong to 
geotemporal distance, to the active participation in a s6t of representations 
communally distributed across the stitching of society. The opaque iý the impossibility 
II The concept of impossibility is central to what I am offering throughout the thesis in my general 
response to the question of anonymity and will receive a more detailed appraisal further on. However, 
it is -vital to introduce the concept here in order to prepare us for what follows. 
12 As we will see, there is a significant difference between geotcmporal distance and separation. 
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of experiencing your tears even with these representations, this language in hand. In 
this sense, ineffability is an experiential limit; ineffability fails, fails to conform to the 
language of the commune. 
Transcendence and E&macy-(7h4ýTx-rimate-Re7afion) 
The reciprocal relationship between the ego and the other, founded on the 
other's affirmation of the ego vis-A-vis commandment and obligation realised in 
expression, can only be guaranteed in a strict maintenance of the transcendence of the 
ego and the other. As such transcendence is vital to the whole configuration whereby 
the ego's exteriority is radicalised or'undonein terms of recognition. 13 Consequently, 
any affirmation can only arise where both the ego and the other are "transcendent with 
respect to each other". Transcendence here means that the ego and the other are not 
intimate with each other, "for any intimacy, any affection would already alter the pure 
vis-A-vis position characteristic of an interlocutor" (CPP, 43). 14 This transcendence, 
Levinas writes, "is characteristic of speech" (CPP, 41), specifically the commanding 
speech of the interlocutor, and recalls his affirmation that "the epiphany of a face is 
wholly language". 
In Levinas' lexicon the interlocutor is the "unimpeachable and severe witness 
[who inserts] himself "between-us"" (CPP, 43), between the intimate and "closed 
society" of the couple (CPP, 32). Such an insertion "awakens in me and in the other 
what is common to us" (CPP, 36). As the "third man", the interlocutor "essentially 
disturbs [the] intimacy" which excludes it (CPP, 30). This disturbance is enacted by 
the interlocutor's "speech making public [the couple's] clandestinity (CPP, 33). Here 
k 
13 Mark C. Taylor points out that Levinas'conccption of the'undoing'of the ego "is brought about by 
what Levinas describes as ""good violence" ... As a result of this violence, the subject is always sub- jectuni, i. e., is always "throiim under" by an Other more powerful than itself' (Mark C. Taylor, 
Altarity (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987): 207. 
14 Recall here my parenthetical remark concerning the relationship bcW-cen the absolute andjustice 
in Letrinas' text (see above pg. 13, n. 2). The "absolute status of the interlocutor" is a status 
maintained in transcendence. 
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we confront the centrality of language in the progression of Levinas' argument. Not 
only does language disturb the intimacy that excludes the "third man" by giving "access 
to the other" (CPP, 36) - "Language in its expressive function is addressed to, and 
invokes the other" (CPP, 41) - language also conceptually 'secures' the "transcendence 
of the interlocutor" (CPP, 36) - "The interlocutor appears as though without a history, 
outside of systems. I can neither grant nor deny his claims; in expression he remains 
transcendent" (CPP, 43). Such an interlocutor "affect[s] me" in the reciprocal 
relationship of recognition, affirmation and cornmandment I outlined earlier, a 
relationship which depends upon the transcendence of "freedoms" (CPP, 43). "Speech 
is thus a relationship between freedoms which neither limit nor negate, but affinn one 
another" (CPP, 43). 
The being of the interlocutor must remain "self-identical" in order to remain 
"beyond every attribute" (CPP, 4 1). Self-identicality is that inability I treated above to 
"reduce [the interlocutor] to what he has in common with other beings, to make of him 
a concept". Language then, in the face-to-face encounter with a "hard and substantial 
interlocutor" (CPP, 41), severs intimacy in the maintenance of self-identicality. But 
what is common for self-identical beings? Is Levinas not forced into the uncomfort- 
able position of segregating individuals such that alterity would refuse to make itself 
heard? Is this not what forces Levinas to say, at one and the same time, that the 
aconceptuality of the interlocutor is the interlocutor's self-identicality, that self- 
identicality which makes it impossible to "reduce him to what he has in common with 
other beings", and that the interlocutor's insertion "between-us" "awakens in me and in 
the other what is common to us"? To argue that opacity is structured by extimacy is 
to suggest that what is common between subjects is the radical unknowing at the heart 
of their relation, an unknowing which is not reducible to language but resides in excess 
of it. Is this not what is really at stake in Levinas' argument? A radical unknowability 
that is not reducible to the endorsements and successes of language? And does 
Levinas refuse to approach such unknowability directly because of his indebtedness to 
25 
The Unknown Tongue 
language? The analyses of ineffability and opacity avoid this equivocation by placing 
Levinas' lexicon in abeyance. And in order to fully set that lexicon aside in preparation 
for what follows in the next few sections, it is important to explicate what is meant by 
the concept of extimacy and the ex-timate relation. 
Extimacy, by which'I mean the intimate outside, is not the in§ide on the 
outside; that is, not the subject's perceptions transmuted to or singularised in the 
perceptions of others. Nor is it the perceptions of others transmuted to the sb. ect. 
Keep in mind that we are talking about a subject for whom the experiences of others 
are removed from the purview of their gaze; that is, experiences that exist, as 
totalities, on the otherside of opacity. And yet something strikes through, penetrates 
the mist of opacity and gives us a glimpse of that otherside. What is this something 
and what is the nature of opacity such that it permits of these breaches of the between? 
At the moment of the insertion through the opaque, at the moment a collision occurs 
between two horizons of experience, at that moment we become fully aware of the ex- 
timate relation. This does not mean that the subject has some direct access to the 
perceptions of others: the ex-timate relation is not a means by which to overstep 
opacity. Ae exterior can never he intimate to a mthject unless hy itay of the opacity 
that stnictures relatiom Hence, ineffability, conceived witl-ýn the axiological 
coordinates of opacity and the ex-timate relation, is embedded in relation itself The 
imbeddedness of ineffability makes the distinction between geotemporal distance and 
separation an important one, To be aware of separation is to be aware of opacity. 
Opacity is the distance that separates me from your tears; it cleaves me in the approach 
ofyoursorrow. Such cleaving should be understood in all the nuances of the verb 'to 
cleave'. Thus not only as division or splitting but also'as adhering, sticking and 
clinging: "Cleaving, therefore, simultaneously divides and joins". 15 Hence, it is not the 
case that an increase in the distance between us will increase our intimacy. There is 
never an exponential relationship between separation and intimacy such that an 
15 SceAltarity, 48. 
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increase in the former would multiply (even the'quality') of the latter. Proposing such 
fulguration of intimacy in the growth of geotemporal distance would be puerile. 
Separation is not a phenomenal distance, a measurable space, but an opaque surface 
through which any passage must remain incomplete, that is, completely postponed. 16 
As such, cleaving opposes itself to geotemporal distance, - Affirming separation in all its 
duplicity: I am separated from you in the approach of your tears, tears whichý cling to 
me in the most profound way. This profundity brings us into contact with an ýtimacy 
more fecund than any exteriority, more fecund than any alterity making its command 
bear upon me from an absolute exterior. Recognising opacity as a cleaving opens us 
to an intimate sharing of the unknown that we are. In the encounter with this 
unknown we experience an intimate refusal17 to be subjugated one onto the other, a 
refusal to be ... thrown under" by an Other more powerful than" ourselves; our being 
intimate in an irrefragable separation as this refusal. 
While intimacy is marked by separation, it is precisely this separation that 
provides the condition for our intimate encounter. Such an encounter does not erase 
the separation we share18 but exposes us to it. Separation gives us the possibility for 
intimacy, for it is separation, founded on our experience of ineffability and opacity, 
which we cannot experience alone. We do not experience a radical exteriority in 
withdrawal: we are separated in an intimacy that exposes us to each other. 
Ineffability, Language, Ontology 
I have tried to differentiate ineffability from Levinas' notion of otherness and 
alterity through the development of an alternative lexicon and I have made the claim 
16 The notion of postponement Niill receive fuller treatment later 
17 A refusal that is mutually asserted because of the recognition that separation keeps subjects in 
contact with each other. 
Is Separation cannot continue to be thought as a negative setting apart by some force which, 
otherwise absent, would allow people to unify themselves. We are irredeemably held apart in the 
most fecund way, an argument I %vill develop more fully in the next two sections. 
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that this lexicon resists the temptations of ontology. The terms of ineffability gesture 
towards an encounter, that is the encounter with nothing we know. These terms 
inevitably remain tied to the endorsements and successes of language. But the affili- 
ation with language approaches a liminal space by a refrain these terms commit against 
language and, necessarily, against themselves. One primary condition of the ineffable 
is that it cannot be talked about or represented. This, at least, seems to be Kawin's 
argument when he writes that "secondary first-person narration ... allows the 
ipeffable 
to be framed and, within that frame, examined; this is the case whether or not the 
ineffable! s manifestation is a fiction" (MV, 79). Kawin ultimately wants to argue for a 
sense of the failure of language to represent that portion of reality that is beyond or 
outside normal ways of perceiving and knowing. Kawin, therefore, is in search of an 
outside or a beyond only attainable outside normal epistemic frameworks. He argues 
that "the ineffable is a category of extrasysterriic awareness and that the limits of the 
personal and textual systems are analogous. The ineffable is the All, both of holistic 
intuition and of the universe - an All that is regularly identified as God, but that can 
easily be considered an irreducible Oneness" (MM, 102). Kawin is thus after a 
"different kind of knowing (intuition or direct experience) that can render the other 
side accessible but still leave it undiscussable" (MM, 83). Kawin's argument suggests 
two directions for him: one, an immersion in pure existence and two, an immersion in a 
firagmentarý time. In the first, where one simply exists, "there is no need for language, 
and in fact, no language. Everything exists; nothing requires expression" (MN, 106). 
In the second, a fragmentary time, a time of divisible moments set off from a unity or 
simultaneity of temporal segments, engenders "partial perception" and "the illusion of 
separate personal identity, death and so forth" (AM, 106). For Kawin then, the 
ineffable is linked to language and time vis-A-vis the act of speaking. "In the world of 
time, then, the way to deal with the ineffable is to speak" (MM, 106). Language is akin 
to God's immersion in time "in order to discover himself behind all the masks and so 
return to atemporal oneness", but language "cannot achieve insights or return to its 
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own original nature" (AM, 107). The problem with this is clear: by framing the 
ineffable in order to examine it, Kawin implicitly puts his faith in language's ability to 
point beyond itself "Often one proceeds by using language against itself, making it 
aware of its boundaries - trying to get words to see past themselves or the 
listener to 
join th6ir baffle on that level until he or she can jump levels ... and see the world 
correctly" (MN, 106). The failure of language is turned into a productive force: it 
allows us to apprehend the unspeakable in an exacerbation of the limits of lanpage. 
The real problem with KawiWs approach is that he seeks to frame the ineffable: 
what is the ineffable? This question singularly dictates the whole process by which 
Kawin will interpret the novels he sees as particularly good examples of reflexive 
fiction. But the question already implies that the ineffable can be. ontologically 
grounded, a ground Kawin seems to deny, at least in any concrete sense. Why then 
ask the question if he has already done away with the ground? Even this would be too 
simplistic. For Kawin, it appears that the ineffable may constantly change in relation to 
the "frames of reference set up for its definition" (AN, 22). But this implies that it has 
a fleeting ontological ground. Contrary to a definition of the ineffable that supports an 
ontological reference point, I am arguing that the ineffable never achieves a position 
within any ontological framework. This is precisely why any discussion about the 
ineffable is extremely difficult and why linking the ineffable to language is problematic. 
In this respect, it is vital to assert that the ineffable is itself ineffable; that is, it refuses 
itself, postpones itself in any of our attempts to ground it ontologically, even when that 
ground remains temporary. Constructing terms of ineffability gets us as close as we 
can to the ineffable by exposing us to the impossibility of identifying a linguistic 
construction with any'real'object or condition in the world. 19 In this sense, ineffability 
is the active transgression of language, the refusal to be reduced to an'y ontological 
ground or category vis-A-vis language. This does not mean that we avoid ontology but 
that we confront ineffability; that is, the act of transgressing language. Hence, the 
19 In my analysis of Juan Rulfb's Pedro P6raino I vvill develop this argument more fully. 
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terms of ineffability are not constructed ex Whilo but in absentia. They are not 
definitional (that is, they do not belong to an order of correspondence and 
referentiality) but erupt out of the passage through ineffability itself As we pass 
through ineffability, through the transgression of language - which, as we will see, is 
not merely the stagjng'of some new battle against the hegemony -of literature as both 
an academic discipline and a cultural, ideological construct - the terms of ineffability 
begin to unfold. 20 
Sublimity and Ineffability 
In the early stages of his analysis of D. H. Lawrence, Michael Bell argues that 
Lawrence's attempt to move "towards a confident use of... a symbolic representation 
of feeling", a representation Bell labels "emotional symbolism", leads Lawrence to 
underscore the ontological obscurity that exists not only between self and world but 
between individuals as well (LAB, 19). Bell argues that this movement represents the 
beginning of Lawrence's mature articulation of the problematic relation between 
language, being and the representation and communication of inner states of self- 
awareness. Bell points out that Lawrenc&s concern with self-consciousness and the 
obscurity of self and other, an other which for Lawrence is located particularly in 
nature, does not lead Lawrence to conclude "that individual feeling cannot be 
communicated within this mode of self-consciousness; only that there is something else 
seeking to get expressed as well" (L4B, 19). The attempt to redirect our thinking 
about ineffability beyond its equivalence to a failure in language is an attempt to 
20 Similarly, Levinas wants to argue that the other is not a concept but a person and that the 
'personness'of the other cannot be reduced to a subjectivist description. Yet, thisý'argument is cashed 
out in strict conceptual terms, terms which differentiate themselves from each other in a systematic 
way. This criticism would be puerile if itwere not for the aconceptuality of otherness. Hence, the 
analysis of an aconceptual difference indebted to a rigorous conceptual lexicon. Is this not an 
inevitable contradiction? is contradiction not the site of the most intimate separation? That is, the 
copresence of mutually exclusive orders which are brought together vis-A--Os the separation of 
relation? And does this not encourage the very discourse Levinas constructs insofar as the grasping of 
the ungraspable is concerned? These questions expose us to the demands of our next task - the 
differentiation of ineffability from sublimity. 
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approach the question of this "something else" and, specifically, the notion that 
expression is central to our perception or communication of it. Jean-Frangois Lyotard, 
noteworthy for his attempts to rethink the avant-garde within the problematic of the 
sublime and, more generally, to propose alternative readings of Western culture 
agýmst the problematic of legitimation and pefformafMity vAthin'capitalisms regime 
of pseudorationality" (PEC, 86), is an important figure for such a redirection since he 
situates both these problematics within a more generalised notion of the para4oxical 
relation between expression and the inexpressible. Lyotard argues, for example, that 
Barnett Newman's artistic success in respect of this "something else" is not only his 
ability to bear witness to the inexpressible but the ability to provoke "the advent of an 
'unheard of phrase" (LR, 245). This provocation is essential to Lyotard's reading of 
the avant-garde as heir to a Kant-Burke axis which, according to Lyotard, privileges 
art as the vehicle for the "vocation of the sublime" (PC, 79). Such a vocation is 
grounded in the notion of incommensurability that is developed in the "allusion to the 
unpresentable by means of visual presentations" (PC, 79). While Lyotard sees such a 
vocation and its relation to incommensurability "implied in the Kantian philosophy of 
the sublime" (PC, 79), he also locates it squarely within the experimentation of the 
avant-gardes, an experimentation which eschews unity - of self, of communityj of 
discourse - in favour of dissipation. 
Rather than foster in the addressee a lamentable turning back to self 
or in the commentator the morbid jubilation of having proved with 
examples that his system 'works' in every case, [the avant-garde 
artist) instead breaks his discourse, and those to whom it is directed, 
into the discipline of incommensurables, which is the discipline of the 
infinite (LR, 185). 
1 
Such a discipline makes its moves in a field that does not maintain the 
narratives of self or emancipation, narratives which delimit the purpose of art on the 
basis of a "horizon of universality" and "the Idea that rationality and freedom are prog- 
ressing" towards some ultimate telos or finality that would represent the end of a long 
linear (chronological) order (PE C, 89-90). For Lyotard, postmodernity, at least in the 
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arts, is a turn away from the "idea of a possible, probable or necessary progress ... 
rooted in the belief that developments in the arts, technology, knowledge and freedoms 
would benefit humanity as a whole"; the "belief that initiatives, discoveries and institu- 
tions only had legitimacy insofar as they contributed to the emancipation of humanity" 
(PEC, 91 
In an important essay, Bill Readings takes up Lyotard's notion of 
incommensurability in his reading of Werner Herzog! s film "ere 77le Green /its 
Dream. Readings argues that the closure of commensurability employed by Western 
imperialism, evidenced in the relation between the Ayers Nfinýing Company and the 
Australian Aborigines in Herzog's film, could never erase the untranslatability and 
therefore incommensurability of the Aborigine identity (JL, 172)., Such an identity 
remains in that the very energy required for its extinction bears mute 
witness to a non-identity, to the imperialist terror inherent in the 
western notions ofjustice and humanity as universal abstractions. It 
remains as the encounter that Herzogs film evokes, aij encounter 
which lacks a language that might phrase it adequately, an en- 
counter in which language encounters silence rather than silence 
being simply language! s absence (or visa versa) (JL, 172; my 
emphasis). 
The centrality of language and, specifically, of expression in the complementary 
notions of incommensurability and the sublime will be the focus of my distinction 
between ineffability and sublimity. As in the analysis of Levinas' notion of otherness 
and alterity, the demand here is to demonstrate how any equivalence made between 
ineffability and the "failure of the word" (LR, 245) or the "failure of expression" (LR, 
203), failures which are intimately connected to a pleasure-pain axis that helps to 
ground both a Kantian and a Burkian notion of the sublime, can only serve to hinder 
any understanding of the terms of ineffability especially as they lay the groundwork for 
our approach to the question of anonymity vis-A-vis an analysis of the between of 
relation, the latter of which will concern us in the next section. 
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Creation, Shock, Experimentation 
As I intimated, Lyotard situates Newman alongside the Kant-Burke axis as heir 
to an implied notion of the experimentation which, Lyotard argues, leads Newman to 
confront the limits of the perceptible. This confrontation takes the form of a "flash", 
th6, tiImtzum" or '01Y' ff"artisfic creatidri-ifself" (LR, -243-246). As such, (artistic) 
creation becomes the central subject-matter of Newman! s art. And yet, as Lýotard 
quickly points out, while "subject-matter is not ... eliminated from Newman's, ýainting" 
(LR, 243) as the result of disrupting the organisation of space "around a sender, a 
receiver and a referent" (LR, 242), it is nonetheless a subject-matter that must be 
understood beyond the simple transmission of "a message to a viewer .... Any 
commentary must be guided by the principle that these-works arexon-figurative, even 
in a symbolic sense" (LR, 244). According to Lyotard, it is this sense of the non-figu- 
rative that must adjudicate our understanding of creation in Newman's work. Creation 
is not a message sent from an individual for a receiver: "creation is not an act 
performed by someone; it is what happens (this) in the midst of the indeterminate" 
(LR, 243). Creation is the moment of the immediate, the "it happens here and now" 
(LR, 243). Creation is an annunciation, announcing the "instant itself' (LR, 240), the 
fact that there is "something happening, rather than nothing, suspended privation" (LR, 
205). The notion of privation is Burke's and is central to his analysis of the sublime as 
the "secondary privation" that suspends the "threat of nothing further happening" (LR, 
204-205). For Burke this threat comes in the form of a privation mixed with terror: 
privation of light, terror of darkness; privation of others, terror of 
solitude; privation of language, terror of silence; privation of objects, 
terror of emptiness; privation of life, terror of death. What is 
terrifying is that the Ithappens that does not happen, that. it stops 
happening. What is sublime is not only the occurrence, this rather 
than nothing, but, in Burke, the suspension of the "terror-causing 
threat" (LR, 204). 
As Lyotard tells us, "This suspension, this lessening of a threat or a danger, provokes a 
kind of pleasure that is certainly not that of a positive satisfaction, but is, rather, that of 
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relief "(LR, 204). For Burke, relief is the privation of being "deprived of light, 
language, life" (LR, 205). What is central in Burke's analysis then, is the fear or terror 
of nothing happening and the suspension of the agent of that fear or terror. 
Newmarfs place alongside this Burkian configuration rests in the'here and noV 
oTcreafton; the occurrence, the instant? ' 'What is siiblime is the feeling that 
something will happen, despite everything, within the threatening void, that'something 
will take'place! and will announce that everything is not over. That place is T ere 
'here', the most minimal occurrence" (LR, 245). And yet, such an affinity between 
Burke and Newman would be too simplistic if it did not take into account Burk&s 
reservation about the possibilities open to painting in the exercise of this annunciation. 
For Burke, painting was "incapable of fulfilling" the "twofold and thwarted finality of 
inspiring terror (or threatening that language will cease, as we would put it) and of 
meeting the challenge posed by this failure of the word" (LR, 245) because it could not 
"escape the figurative prison" (LR, 246). Such an escape was impossible because 
painting "can never be in excess of what the eye can recognize" (LR, 245). In poetry, 
or "what we would now call writing" (LR, 245), Burke found the arena for such excess 
21 1 have not dealt with Lyotard's treatment of temporality in Newmatfs notion of the instant because 
it has seemed to go outside the bounds of thisfirst section. Essentially, Lyotard argues that Newman's 
creation implies a time which is not the "'present instant', the one that tries to hold itself between the 
future and the past, and gets devoured by them ... Neivnian's noiv which 
is no more than noiv is a 
stranger to consciousness and cannot be constituted by it. Rather, it is what dismantles consciousness, 
what disposes consciousness, it is what consciousness cannot formulate, and even what consciousness 
forgets in order to constitute itself. Whatwe do not manage to formulate is that something happens" 
(LR, 197). Lyotard wants to demonstrate that the avant-gardes do not seek the "technological 
manipulation of time" on the basis of the "calculation of profitability, the satisfaction. of needs, [and] 
self affirmation through success", three tiers in the late modernist valorisation of "the availability of 
information" against the "disappearance of the temporal continuum through which the experience of 
generations used to be transmitted" (LR, 209-211). According to Lyotard, Newman's avant-gardist 
paintings make witness to an inexpressible which simultaneously bears witness to the temporality of 
the immediate. The notion of the immediate extends out of Lyotards efforts to rPadjust our perception 
of the synchronicity of time: "there is no single time; a society (or a soul) is not ! ýynchronous with 
itself, nor a sector of society, or an institution like art, or even ... a segment of an 
institution like 
sculpture or film. There are only parachronisms all around; it is the observer's timepiece that judges 
what is present-day" (LR, 186). In my analysis of Octavio Pazs El laherinto de la soledad [The 
Labyrinth ofSolitudel and Juan Rulfo's Pedro P6ranio I will provide a critique of the notion of 'the 
now'and'the instant! which helps to support my own particular approach to the question of 
anonymity in connection to the Mv. -een of relation, a between, as I will argue, which is not that of 
'the present' conceived within a ternary time system. 
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in "the power of language in all its sufficiency" (LR, 245). 
How then, can Lyotard claim that Newman effectively invokes the "vocation of 
the sublime"? Precisely in Newman's combination of both plastic and linguistic 
elements in his painting. For Burke, "figuration by means of images is a lin-ýiting 
constraint on the power 6Temofive expres§ion since it works by recognition. In the 
arts of language, particularly in poetry ... the power to move 
is free from the* 
verisimilitude of figuration" (LR, 205). Language has a priority over visual irp, ages 
because "words enjoy several privileges when it comes to expressing feelings" not the 
least of which is the "power to effect... combinations that would be impossible by any 
other means" (LR, 205). For Burke, and even more for Lyotard, "the arts, whatever 
their materials, pressed forward by the aesthetics of the sublime in search of intense 
effectS, 22 can and must give up the imýitation of models that are merely beautiful, and 
try out surprising, strange, shocking combinations. Shock is, par excellence, the 
evidence of (something) happening, rather than nothing, suspended privation" (LR, 
205). According to Lyotard, this is precisely what Newman accomplishes. Hence, in 
viewing Newman's art, "if we examine only the plastic presentation which offers itself 
to our gaze without the help of the connotations suggested by the titles, we feel not 
only that we are being held back from giving any interpretation, but that we are held 
back from deciphering the painting itself' (LR, 244). 23 In Newman's "determination of 
pictorial art, the indeterminate, the'it happens' is the paint, the picture. 24 The paint, 
the picture as occurrence or event, is not expressible, and it is to this it has to witness" 
22 As Lyotard tells us, "for Burke, the sublime was no longer a matter of elevation ... but of intensification" (LR, 205). 
23 1 would be remiss if I didn't mention the work of Rend Magritte as an exemplary case of the 
combination of plastic and linguistic elements in the production of shocking, intense effects. See 
Michel Foucault's delightful essay This Is Not A Pipe for a discussion of Magritte. 
24 In his treatment of temporality in Newman, Lyotard also argues that Newmans question 
concerning time leads to "an unexpected answer ... that time 
is the picture itselr'(LR, 240). Not only 
is the picture the indeterminate of a'here and noW but the immediate time which transgresses that 
"Opresent instant... which is constantly consumed by the future and (lie past. Newman's paintings, 
according to Lyotard's interpretation, transgress the ternary time system in the indeterminacy of their 
own temporality. 
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(LR, 199). For Lyotard, the sublime is this very indeterminacy: "Here and now there is 
this painting, rather than nothing, and that is what is sublime" (LR, 199). 
In Lyotard's understanding of the sublime, the Burkian problematic is shored 
up by a Kantian notion of the incommensurability between Ideas and the imagination's 
(failed) attempt to present an example of those Ideas, an example that would satisfy 
the strictures of a representational or figurative model. In Kant, "an Idea of reason" 
cannot be adequately represented by the "faculty of presentation, the imagingion" (LR, 
203): "while we have an Idea of the world (the totality of what is) ... we 
do not have 
the capacity to show an example of it ... we cannot 
illustrate it with a sensible object 
which would be a "case" of it" (PC, 78). Lyotard argues that this 
failure of expression gives rise to a pain, a kind of cleavage within 
the subject between what can be conceived and what can be 
imagined or presented. But this pain in turn engenders a pleasure, in 
fact a double pleasure: the impotence of the imagination attests a 
contrario to an imagination striving to figure even that which cannot 
be figured, and that imagination thus aims to harmonize its object 
with that of reason (LR, 203). 
The pleasure-pain axis in Burke, as the "secondary privation" of threat, is seen in Kant 
as the incommensurability between perception and reality. In Newman, this axis takes 
its shape, as Lyotard sees it, in the confrontation between creation and chaos, a 
confrontation indebted to language. For Newman, the'there is', the Is it happening of 
artistic creation is the "instant which interrupts the chaos of history and which recalls, 
or simply calls out that 'there is', even before that which is has any signification" (LR, 
247). If "like a flash of lightning in the darkness or a line on an empty surface, the 
Word separates, divides, institutes a difference, minimal though it may be, and 
therefore inaugurates a world" (LR, 243), and if, as Newman writes, "'the subject 
matter of creation is chaos"', then, in accordance with Burke's notiorl Of "suspended 
privation", Newman's "flash of tzimtzum, the zip, takes place, divides the shadows [of 
a threatening chaos], breaks down the light into colors like a prism, and arranges them 
across the surface like a universe" (LR, 246). All this is accomplished by the 
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combination of both pictorial and linguistic elements such that the intense effect could 
not be achievedwith the omission of either. This means that Newman is indebted, if 
we take Lyotard at his word, to a Burkian notion of the "power of language in all its 
sufficiency". And while Lyotard is correct in arguing that Newman's sublime "is still 
the suMime-in the sense that-Burke and-Kant described and yet it iswt their sublime 
anymore" (LR, 199), we must still recognise the centrality language and expiession 
play in this 'neV sublime. 
For Lyotard then, the combination of plastic and linguistic elements in 
NewmaWs art suggests that "the powers of sensing and phrasing are being probed to 
the limits of what is possible, and thus the domain of the perceptible-sensing and the 
speakable-speaking is being extended. Experiments are being made. This is our 
postmodernity's entire vocation, and commentary has infinite opportunities open to it" 
(LR, 190). Postmodernity represents a break with a "classical aesthetics" that 
understood being (subjects) as substitutive manifestations of Being, the One, a unity 
that "speaks only one language" (LR, 190). Experimentation becomes that vocation 
which asserts dissipation, "permutability" - aesthetics as "paraesthetics", commentary 
as "paralogy", the work as "parapoetics" (LR, 191). This experimentation avoids 
collapsing into a notion of experience that determines the world, the socius, the self as 
a unified totality that art can make cognisant to us. If the artist has any responsibility 
in the awareness that "we have been abandoned by meaning", it is to "bear witness that 
there is, to respond to the order to be" (LR, 248). Philosophy enters the experimental 
laboratory of the avant-gardes by refusing to "head towards the unity of meaning or 
the unity of being ... but towards the multiplicity and the 
incominensurability of works. 
A philosophical task doubtless exists, which is to refldct according to opacity" (LR, 
193; my emphasis). 
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Encountering and Ineffability 
With this we return to the concerns Bell clearly articulates as central concerns 
for Lawrence as he came closer to his mature writing. Broadly speaking, the concerns 
Bell highlights in Lawrence are similar, if not identical, to those Lyotard explores in his 
analysis of Newman and the sublime: language, expression of feeling, the 'unheard of 
phrase" - Bell's "something else" trying to get expressed - and opacity. The odd man 
out in this respect is Readings since he underscores the insufficiency of languýge 
evidenced in the encounter between the Ayers Mining Company and the Australian 
Aborigines. Recall Readings' remarks: the Aborigine identity "remains as the 
encounter that Herzog's film evokes, an encounter which lacks a language that might 
phrase it adequately, an encounter in which language encounters silence ...... Not only 
is language insufficient to capture or fully expose the Aborigine identity, but the very 
encounter itself fails to be reduced to the strictures of a representational model. Once 
again, opacity can assist us in the explanation of this notion of encountering. Opacity 
is the separation that structures the relation beAveen the mining company and the 
Aborigines. The mining company accomplishes the oppression of the Aborigine by 
attempting to smooth over this opacity with a linguistic imperative, an imperative to 
speak the language of the West. 25 As Readings points out, such an imperative 
nonetheless fails in its mission because it "bears mute witness to a non-identity". As 
such, language only serves to highlight the very opacity that separates the world of the 
mining company and the world of the Aborigine, an opacity language vainly attempts 
to circumvent, an opacity evidenced in the encounter in which "language encounters 
silence". 
Bell has written in another context that Lawrefice 
used the image of the stranger, or'foreignee, to enforce an intuition 
of the radical, and proper, otherness of " all 
human beings, where that 
intuition of a radically different centre of life is lacking, other beings 
become merely opaque or, more commonly, they are unwittingly 
25 Recall Lc, %rinas' notion that the other, in the face-to-face encounter, commands the ego to speak. 
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absorbed into our own emotional perception as we fail to see their 
separateness at all (GGM, 15). 26 
Bell's remarks create some confusion about the relation between opacity and 
separateness and, laterally, about the relation between language and the inexpressible. 
Whw we siicceed in recogniSing the se4WateneSSof ojh"Sý27 -we simultaneously 
recognise their opacity. The failure to recognise separateness is a failure to recognise 
this opacity not, as Bell argues, that these others become "merely opaque". Opacity 
and separateness cannot be contrasted. 211 On the contrary, they announce cac4 other 
by signalling the arrival of the outside, of the very allusiveness. of our own subjectivity. 
The confusion Bell's remarks evoke can be unpacked in the following manner. 
We believe, 'in the beginning', that language is transparent or offers a 
transparent view of the world 'at large', thereby capturing it in all its fullness. The 
move beyond this initial conception, offered in varying forms by post-structuralism and 
some deconstructionist and postmodernist narratives, towards the recognition of the 
limits of language really doesn't clear up the confusion. Recognising that language 
fails to provide us with a clear, transparent and universal perception of the world only 
serves to smooth over the question of opacity by giving us the vain pretence that we 
can get on with life's opaqueness by merely making a humble recognition of language's 
insufficiency in the face of such opacity. A more radical response would suggest that 
there can be no adequate representation of the 'world' since such a totality could not 
reasonably exist. The evidence of this dual impossibility lies in the failure to achieve a 
totalising, epistemic criterion that would satisfy those partial perceptions of what 
constitutes the 'world' in the first place; a criterion that would unify all those 
perceptions into a universal image. A reconceptualisation of the inpffable as 
26 Bell seems to approach a Levinasian perspective here. See above pp. Uff reording my analysis of 
the first order exteriority in Levinas. i 
27 Bear in mind what has already been said about Levinas'otherness and alterity. 
28 Similarly, opacity and isolation cannot be contrasted once %ve get beyond thinking isolation as 
removal; that is, once we start thinking isolation as solitude and solitude as a being in community 
absently - the foreigner -sNithin, what Bell calls the "opacity of solitude" (GGM, 17). We %,, ill return to 
this in more detail later. 
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ineffability, as opacity and extimacY, allows us to recognise that the ineffable is not a 
condition languagefails to circumvent but that language itself belongs to this very 
opacity. Contrary to the ordinary analysis, the failure or limit of language produces no 
insights into what structures those limitations and failings. In contrast to this claim, 
in6ffibMity makes an affirmative gesture: -ineffib-ility does not seek to circumvent 
opacity but upholds opacity as the very fabric of relation. 
The notion Readings offers, that Herzog's film evokes an encounter wych 
lacks a language, further underscores the affirmative character of ineffability. This 
affirmation is best explored in the notion of encountering rather than the problematic 
notion of expression. It doesn't seem sufficient to talk about the limitations, 
inadequacy or outright failure of language to represent 'reality, without asking 
ourselves what an adequate representation would look like and, further, how we 
would latow that such a representation was in fact adequate in the first place. As we 
have seen, expression, especially in its relation to the inexpressible, tells us very little 
about the opacity that structures the very relations that constitute the expressed. On 
the other hand, encountering pinpoints that opacity, bears witness to it and suggests 
that what is central to ineffability is the invocation of an encounter which is itself 
opaque. Ineffability, therefore, underscores an encounter with an unknown, a 
foreigner. But we need to ask what conditions make an encounter with this foreigner 
possible? It would almost require something like a complete forgetting29 of what we 
knew in order that this ... unheard of ", this "something else" could resound in our cars. 
29 Lyotard takes up the notion of an "initial forgetting" in his "Note on the Meaning of "Post-" as a 
way of confronting some confusions about the use of "postmodemism" in his writing. Lyotard wants 
to make clear that the modernist claim that "it is both possible and necessary tobreak with tradition 
and institute absolutely nciv ways of living and t1iinking" is not lo be equated with his sense of the 
"post-" in "postmodemism" (PEC, 90). For Lyotard, the "post-" of "postmodcmfým" needs to relieve 
itself of this connotation by elaborating an "initial forgetting" in the form of "a "Oerlaboration" 
(durcharbeiten) performed by modernity on its own meaning" (PEC, 93). The intimate link between 
modernity and postmodemity - what Lyotard describes as the postmodcm in the modem (PEC, 8 1) - 
should not therefore be confused with modernity's efforts to uphold a sense of linear development or 
progress within the self or society. Instead, the "initial forgetting" would represent this inmard 
turning anamnesis modernity would perform on itself. In this sense, Lyotard argues, postmodernity is 
"not a movement of repetition but a procedure in "ana-": a procedure of analysis, anamnesis, anagogy 
and anamorphosis which elaborates an "initial forgetting" (PEC, 93). 
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But how could such a forgetting be accomplished hi view of an absence our epistemic 
'condition' nonetheless suggests? There appears to be no way out of the circular 
repetition of shared perception. 30 But it has never been the intention here to suggest 
such vulgar departures. Rather, the intention has been to explore what Lyotard calls 
the exten! ýion of percept-Mility. I want to suggest that that extension, to be an 
extension, must face opacity directly and not attempt to circumvent it. While Lyotard 
is forthright in his conviction that this is exactly what constitutes the vocation, of the 
sublime within the 'project' of the avant-gardes, indeed what constitutes postmodernity 
as the assault on metanarratives, his attempts to maintain the paradox of expressing the 
inexpressible suggest a slipping back into the, albeit unwanted, effort to smooth over 
opacity. Ineffability doesn't provide us with a way out of shared perception but 
indicates that such a perception is first and foremost opaque. 
30 1 take this to be, roughly, Derrida's claim in "Sending: On Representation". There are significant 
problems with Derrida's thesis, not the least of which is the attempt to read representation rcpresenta- 
tionally. See Vcronique Foti's essay "Representation and the Image: Between Heidegger, Derrida and 




The relationship between society and literature is not one of cause and effect. The link 
between the two is at once necessary, contradictory, and unpredictable. Literature expresýes 
society; by expressing it, it changes, contradicts, or denies it. By portraying it, it invents it; hy 
inventing it, it reveals it. Though society does not recognize itself in the portrait that literature 
puts before it, this fantastic portrait is nonetheless real: it is that of the stranger who walks at 
our side from our earliest infancy and whom we know nothing, except that he is our shadow 
(or are we his? ). 
Octavio Paz 
One Earth, Four or Five Worlds 
Interlude 
Writing the Behveen: Latin American Fiction' and the Separation ofRelation 
I argued above that Levinas' employment of resemblance requires for its fulfilment 
an attentiveness to the between. In preparation for the closer readings I will provide of 
-some Latin American fiction throughout the next section, it will be valuable to offer a 
sense of the importance the question of the between holds. for'the thesis as a whole 
and, more specifically, how that fiction offers us a particularly valuable conceptual 
network by which to investigate this question. 
In one of the most recent and comprehensive texts to come out of Latin American 
studies, Santiago Colds'Postmodenifty in Latin America: 7he Argentine Paradigm 
argues for a rereading of contemporary Latin American fiction, and especially that of 
Julio CortLar, within a substantive analysis of a specifically Latin American 
modernity. The shift from this modernity to a notion of postmodernity in Latin 
I It is important to point out immediately that my analyses throughout this section are not intended to 
represent Latin America as a totality, as if the Latin American text could be described irrespective of 
the various cultures out of which Latin American writing arises. As Octavio Paz has written: "For 
almost two centuries now, misapprehensions about the historical reality of Latin America have been 
accumulating. Even the names used to designate it are inexact: Latin America, Hispanic America, 
lberoamerica, Indioamerica. Each of these names leaves out apart of reality .... 
We Latin Americans 
speak Spanish or Portuguese; we are or have been Christians; our customs, institutions, arts, and 
literatures descend directly from those of Spain and Portugal. For all these reasons we arc one 
American border of the West; the United States and Canada are the other. But we can hardly claim 
thatwe are an overseas extension of Europe; the differences are obvious, numerous, and, above all, 
decisive" (OE, 159-160). While it is important for Paz to distinguish Latin America from European 
ideologies, especially those ideologies which lead to Western modernity, and the ideologies of the 
United States and Canada, it needs to be said that Canada and Mexico share some important simi- 
larities with respect to the United States. First and foremost Canada is not simply an extension of the 
United States. Secondly, the variety of experiences and perceptions that make up the Canadian 
psyche, a variety created out of differing responses to differing geographic and historical realities 
which make up the 10 provinces and two territories of our enormous country, prevents any easy 
reduction of that psyche to any one category. The imminent creation of a third territory, stretching 
from Northern Quebec through the Hudson Bay islands and into The Northwest Territories, whose 
political influence has already been felt in the 1995 Quebec referendum on separation, testifies to a 
continuing and positive response to difrerentiation. As we Canadians have known for some time, it is 
impossible to determine exactly what'the Canadian'is. And, in fact, only when we realise that'the 
Canadian' does not exist mill we be able to overcome the internal divisions that kave caused and 
continue to cause us so many hardships. We must affirm our particularisms against the totalizing 
notion of a fixed, stable, unilýing identity in much the sameway that Paz argues Latin America must 
affirm its own against the incursions of a monopolising United States. Our relationship, "ith the 
United States carries similar anxieties as does Mexico's relation, and it would benefit both our coun- 
tries toengage in dialogue on this issue. Even the United States can no longer achieve its ill-fated 
desire for unity of identity and purpose. The regional, local differences seem to disrupt any attempt at 
homogenising a particular area or a particular people. In short, we are experiencing everyday in 
greater and greater degrees that'we'are a multiplicity. The arguments that follow are a means of 
critically exploring what this might mean. 
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America allows Colds to explicate the complex relation Latin America has had with 
Europe, an explication which exposes the limitations of popular readings of Latin 
American fiction that isolate it from its cultural and political context. Colds singles out 
Linda Hutcheon's A Poetics ofPostinodemism here principally because her portrayal 
ofLatin Am6fican-fiction outsMe the specific cultural and political exigencies to which 
that fiction responds greatly limits her employment of that fiction as an example of "an 
international literary trend" in the 60's that fonus the basis of her claim that literary 
postmodernism prioritises questions of historical revisionism. For similar reasons, I 
would single out Brian McHale's cursory treatment of Latin American fiction in his 
Postmodernist Rctioii primarily because his "incidental interpretation[s] " and his 
attempt to "construct the repertory of motifs and devices ... shared 
by a particular class 
of texts" (PF, xi) completely ignores the singularity at work in Latin American fiction. 
Of particular note here are McHale's references to Alejo Carpentier that reduce 
Carpentier's writing to a localised example of a European notion of the fantastic 
derived from Todorov. McHale tends to mortify the singularity of Carpentier's lo real 
mara-villoso (that is, marvellous reality) by coupling Carpentier with other writers from 
Europe under the general sign of the "fantastic genre" (ff, 16). 2 McHale's attention 
to the incidental blinds him to the fact that Carpentier had abandoned the notion of lo 
real marmilloso by the time he had finished Lospasosperdidos [771e Lost Steps] in 
1953 and certainly well before he began writing El siglo de las luces [&plosion in a 
Cathedral] in 1962, the latter of which McHale still sees as standing within the general 
category of "magical realism". 3 In short, McHale never really approaches the problems 
2 Carpentier introduced the term lo real maravilloso into the general serniotic economy of Latin 
America in the Prologue to his El reino de este mundo [The Kingdom of this Morl(l]. 
3 The extent to which the explication of lo real maravilloso offered in the Prologue to El reino de 
este mundo marks out Carpentier's writing in the 1940's is clearly articulated in Roberto Gorv-dlez 
Echevarria's Alejo Carpentier., The Pilgilm At Home, a text I have depended upon in charting the 
emerging significance of certain terms which arise in Carpentier's writing during this period. (See, in 
particular, PH, 107-129 for Echevarria's discussion of 16 real mara-villoso). Echevarria's text, whose 
breadth testifies to that of its subject, explores in an intricate and complex manner what I will be 
offering on a microscopic level. Echcvarria's charting of the influences which have helped to shape 
Carpentier's writing between the early 1920's to the late 1970's cannot be substituted by this 
microscopic analysis. However, because the nature of my project is to locate terms which can be of 
assistance in the elaboration of the separation of relation, of that between within which an adequate 
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opened by Carpentier's novels. Rather, he only seems to bring to light the 
characteristics that mark out the avant-garde in a very broad sense as a movement, and 
labelling a contemporary expression of these characteristics'postmodernism' without 
distinguishing how it differs ftom the avant-garde generally seems pointless. 
-In both-Hutcheon and McHale, Latin American fiction appears as a local example 
of European movements. Even if the notion of a literary postmodernism could be 
applied to the work of authors such as Alejo Carpentier, Gabriel Garcia Mdr luez, or 
Julio Cortdzar, both Hutcheon and McHale would need to clearly articulate just 
exactly what modernism they see these authors responding to. Both Hutcheon and 
McHale assume that that modernism is straightforwardly European, that even a 
European modernism remains unambiguously evident to their readers and, as Colds 
points out, in Hutcheon's case that the notion of a 'literary postmodernism' has been 
sufficiently and clearly articulated. Without these important clarifications we are left 
with the impression that Latin American fiction merely responds to European 
modernist preoccupations; principal among these the desire for inu-nediacy as the most 
legitimate response to the alienation of technological advancement and the ensuing 
dislocation of self and society. And Colds will tell us that the notion of alienation is 
central to CortLar's RTuela [Hopscotch], a novel Colds sees as marking the high 
point in and crystallisation of Latin American modernity. So it is essential for Colds to 
develop in what sense European preoccupations are not merely taken on board by 
Latin American authors, otherwise the whole assumption of a Latin American 
response to anonymity can be pursued, I have had to relegate a good deal of Echevarria's superb 
analysis to a number of marginal citations. The reason for denigrating McHale here is only to suggest 
that the status of Latin American fiction within my own text must not be seen ýs forwarding any 
reductive affiliations between that fiction and any of a number of literary and theoretical texts from 
Europe and North America. While a careful reading of these latter texts may prove valuable in 
relation to the question of anonymity and the between, I have concentrated on a number of Latin 
American texts because they embody, in a particularly clearway, the concepts I will argue arevrital in 
understanding the notion of the between of relation and its value in a discourse on anonymity. 
Nonetheless, what is of equal importance is the very question of a reductivity at the heart of McHale's 
analysis, a question which drives to the heart of what Carpentier and others in Latin America have 
accomplished in their continuing appreciation of their relationship with Europe and North America 
and their attempts to achieve self-realisation. McHal&s attention to the incidental seems to blind him 
to the importance of this larger issue. 
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modernity and postmodernity will seem misplaced. This development is pursued by 
Colds in a crucial observation that the concepts of Latin American modernity and 
postmodernity really only exist in relation to a European and North American model. 
This is crucial for more than obvious reasons. Latin America is not only concerned 
Mth the problematics of colonisation as such but, more importantly, with the 
conditions which make transformation towards the postcolonial possible. Such 
transformation does not proffer the discovery of an authentic identity buried beneath 
the contours of a dominating and oppressive outside. Rather, it offers Latin 
Americans, especially in the wake of the Cuban revolution and the success of narrative 
in the early 60's, the possibility of constnicting their own identity. It is that possibility 
that essentially marks the transition from Latin American modernity to Lqtin American 
postmodernity. It was only in actively pursuing "issues of political and cultural purity 
and impurity ... [the] questions of revolution, utopia, subversion, and democracy ... of 
high and mass culture, of vanguardism and the role of the writer and of historical 
knowledge and representation" (PL, 24), elements Colds sees as endemic to Latin 
American postmodemity, that Latin American's were able to construct a sense of their 
own modernity. What this retrospective analysis revealed to many theorists in Latin 
America was that, in fact, much of the boom narrative of the 60's was constituted by a 
whole "modernising, utopian and totalizing aesthetic" (PL, 26) in much the same way 
the Cuban revolution was, and that that aesthetic rested upon the very "same Western 
philosophical and political soil" both the narrative and the revolution "had intended ... 
finally to cast off from" (PL, 27). Latin American modernity, Colds argues, is 
therefore marked by the attempt to ground Latin America in the purity of the Latin 
American soil through the impure language of Europe. This contradiction would 
ultimately dissolve Latin American modernity. As a result, however, theorists realised 
that the "inability to acknowledge and live with contradiction, this intolerance to 
impurity, this radical utopian impulse ... marks Latin American modernity. And, more 
than anything, the realisation that such impurities are not only inevitable but can also 
be fruitful marks Latin American postmodernity" (PL, 27). For Colds, Rayuela marks 
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the high point of Latin American modernity because it opens the floodgates through 
which the questions and problems take shape that make this transition possible. 
Transformation towards the postcolonial is therefore marked not by a search for 
what Latin America authentically is beyond or, even better, behind the fagades of a 
Europeariliterary or philosophic tradition: -Rather; transffirmation is marked-by the 
constant redistribution of those fagades within the context of a tradition alwayý in the 
process of being created. 4 Latin America does not say 'No'to Europe. Rather, it takes 
the harder line that hybridisation is the principal path by which the affirmation oftatin 
America can be achieved: that is, Latin America places the discussion of identity within 
a different register than that posited by this European tradition. 
Alejo Carpentier's Los pasosperdidos provides us with a clear. example of this 
sense of transformation embodied in the tension of contradiction. The protagonist of 
Lospasosperdidos, a composer and musicologist, after reluctantly accepting a 
museum curator's invitation to travel to the Orinoco in search of rare musical 
instruments, once in the presence of the Venezuelan landscape and people becomes 
aware of a way of life he feels he has abandoned. His return to this life is marked by a 
renewed sense of a past at once his own and simultaneously the deep past of human 
history and time. Everything begins to change for him. Where before, at the 
instigation of his mistress who has travelled with him, he would have agreed to pay a 
forger to make fake instruments from the drawings he could supply on his return from 
the jungle, now he feels so completely enveloped in a pure immediacy as to make such 
simulation and fakery utterly detestable to him. The protagonist tells us that "little by 
little [his mistress] was turning into something foreign, incongruous" while, by 
contrast, Rosario, a woman he meets in a village at the -mouth of the Orinoco river, one 
who erupts in him the sense of a telluric world he has buried within hi k "grew more 
4 That is, a tradition whose identity is always postponed by the active inclusion of an outside that 
appears to deny it. Givenwhat I argued above, that opacity is the point at which the inside is intimate 
with an outside (see above, pg. 18), it should be clear that the connection between opacity, extimacy 
and postponement is central to our understanding of the response I am offering to the question of 
anonymity, a connection I will develop throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
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authentic, more real, more clearly outlined against a background that affirmed its 
constants as we approached the [Orinoco]. Relationships became established between 
her flesh and the ground ... relationships proclaimed ... 
by a unity of forms giving the 
common stamp of works from the same potter's wheel to the waists, shoulders, thighs 
-that were praCtsed therd'(ps, 170-171; LS, 97). 1 know of few works-that-could 
embody the desires of such romanticism with such passion and conviction as Lospasbs 
perdidos. And yet, all is not what the protagonist takes it to be, and while his desires 
are truly Romantic, the object of those desires is not. 
Shortly after his colourful ruminations on the unity between Rosario and the 
Venezuelan jungle, the protagonýist has occasion to witness a festival of dance "on the 
feast of Corpus ChristP (ps, 18 1; LS, 107) in a ruined city along the banks. of the 
Orinoco river. The protagonist tells us that "A kind of fear came over me at the sight 
of those faceless [aborigine dancers], as though they were wearing the veil of 
parricides; at those masks, out of the mystery of time, perpetuating m&s eternal love 
of the False Face, the disguise, the pretence of being an animal, a monster, or a malign 
spirit" (ps, 180; LS, 105-106). And, later still, as he and the company he is travelling 
with enter into the remotest part of the Venezuelan jungle, the protagonist fully 
awakens to a fundamental duplicity at the heart of virgin America. "What amazed me 
most was the inexhaustible mimetism of virgin nature. Everything here seemed 
something else, thus creating a world of appearances that concealed reality, casting 
doubt on many truths ... 
The jungle is the world of deceit, subterfuge, duplicity; 
everything there is disguise, stratagem, artifice, metamorphosis" (ps, 227-229; LS, 
149). What can we make of this praise of pretence and duplicity? This is still 
Romanticism to be sure, for the protagonist believes himself to be in the imrniediate 
presence of a pure and singular existence; fully in awe of the slippage of time'and 
history, of the emptying of the years, of his approach, as he nears the absolute centre 
of the jungle, towards "the year 0" (ps, 240; LS, 161). 5 But there is something subtly 
5 "But dates were still losing figures. In headlong flight the years emptied, ran backwards, were 
erased, restoring calendars, changing centuries numbered in three figures to those of single numbers. 
The glcam of the Grail has disappeared, the nails have fallen-from the Cross, the money-changers 
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at work within this Romantic vision, making it aberrant. This aberration becomes 
evident in the protagonist's inability to separate his concepts of temporality and 
historicity and his need of the written work from his involvement in the community of 
aborigines he meets on the other side of the vegetal threshold he crosses in order to 
-flaffy rentm -the zt; i -moment -of creation, -the M-Aey-Where Timeifad -Stopped. 
Immersed within the purity and immediacy of virginal America, a purity and' an 
immediacy, mind you, that is marked by the very duplicity and artifice the Romantics 
believed could be eliminated through the marriage of "nature and creative 
consciousness" (PH, 190), such immersion reveals to the protagonist his need for the 
tools and the conditions of his life "back there". In order to fully explore the 
possibilities opened to him by the subtleties and intricacies of tone. gleaned from the 
new instruments he finally comes into contact with, he realises that he will need to 
acquire a great many more notebooks than the few he has brought with him, for they 
alone would not satisfy his need to compose the countless scores that were 
germinating in his imagination. 6 "I could not do without paper and ink, without things 
expressed or to be expressed by these mediums" (ps, 292; LS, 211). And so, the 
have returned to the temple, the Star of Bethlehem has faded, and it is the year 0, when the Angel of 
the Annunciation returned to Heaven" (ps, 240; LS, 161). 
6 In an interview with Ennio Morricone, undoubtedly one of the greatest composers of the twentieth 
century, in which Morricone is asked to reflect upon the composition of the music for Roland Joffd's 
monumental film The 1fission, Morricone has these important words to say: "[Thekfissionj is set in 
South America, in 1750. The Jesuits had gone to America to spread Christianity. But they also 
brought their musical experience and their liturgy. The music of the Post-Renaissance. The theme 
that I wrote was conditioned by Jeremy Irons'fingers on the oboe; the native music and Western 
music taught by the Jesuits had to be combined into a whole. The union of these elements is very 
important. In them I see myself, spiritually and technically. These three ideas, unified in one idea 
clearly symbolize a new spirituality. These two spiritual forces [that is, Jeremy Irons and Robert De 
Niro, the latter of which is a converted slave herder] are very different but find It way of 
communicating. And finally they die together - the ultimate sadrifice". In his response to the score of 
The Mission, the musicologist Sergio Miceli tells us: "In this relationship bem, e+ spiritual and 
musical values, Morricone, in his own words, saw enacted something he had always believed in: 
Music as a means of salvation. It is very significant that a young girl among the survivors [after the 
slaughter of the missions by the Portuguese and Spanish annies] should rescue something from this 
moment of civilization. She sees a violin and a candlestick. Without hesitation, she takes the violin. 
At this moment we hear one of the loveliest themes ever written by Morricone". (A BBC2 Production, 
tr. Amanda Malia, 1995). The parallel between Morricone and Carpentier, as we will see as the rest 
of this study unfolds, is intimate, and we would do well to hold Morricone's words close at hand as we 
progress ahead. 
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protagonist returns to the world he thought he had left behind. But it is this return to 
his life "back there" which, in securing the possibility of writing sirailarly secures the 
impossibility of following the steps back to the purity of the origin. When he finally 
finds his way back to the village, at the centre of the jungle7 he has become fully aware 
*that the contradiction of belonging to both the jungle and -to the world "back there" 
would annul any choice he made to remain in that virginal space. I would sail [the 
next day] towards the burden awaiting me", we are told. 
Within two days the century would have rounded out another year, 
and this would be of no importance to those around me. There the 
year in which we live can be forgotten, and they lie who say man 
cannot escape his epoch. The Stone Age, like the Mddle Ages, is 
still within our reach. The gloomy mansions of romanticism, with its 
doomed loves, are still open. But none of this was for me, because 
the only human race to which it is forbidden to sever the bonds of 
time is that race of those who create art, and who not only must 
move ahead of the inu-nediate yesterday, represented by tangible 
witness, but must anticipate the song and the form of others who will 
follow them, creating new tangible witness with the full awareness of 
what has been done up to the moment" (ps, 329-330; LS, 249). 
And yet, the protagonist seems to be claiming that the immediacy which is founded 
upon a vision of purity is, in some sense, beyond the perception of the artist. How 
then, can the artist appear within the immediacy that, by definition of his craft, 
excludes him? To put it another way, how can the artist, who is bound to time, even 
appear within the timelessness of immediacy9 What the protagonist demonstrates to us 
is that the steps back to primeval purity are, at one and the same time, made possible 
because of his artistic pursuits and lost because those pursuits will inevitably alienate 
him from the immediacy the temporality of those pursuits denies, a temporality which 
is completely ternary in nature. Lospasosperdidos, therefore, embodies what I 
referred to earlier as the ex-timate relation, one which we now see is based uýon 
contradiction. The possibility of being intimate with the immediacy of thejungle, 
7 Upon his return to the Venezuelan jungle, the protagonist discovers that the threshold he had 
earlier crossed has been covered over by the floods the tropical rains have swept across thejungle; the 
steps back to the Valley Where Time Had Stopped lost in the duplicity of the jungle's signs. 
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represented in the protagonist's erotic encounters with Rosario, is based upon an 
artistic pursuit which, by definition, excludes him from the very intimacy he seeks. 
This is precisely what is meant by the ex-timate relation: being intimate with an outside 
that denies the unification between an identity in search of itself in a past it can never 
reach. Such a contradiction exposes identity as essentially -and-continuaffy postponed. 
What we need to ask now is how this postponement is inscribed; that is, whaf is the 
concept that best articulates the condition by which this postponement is inscri, bed? 
In Los pasos perdidos, the artist appears condemned to linearity, to the thrust 
towards the future, to the thirst for "new tangible witness", one that is based upon the 
awareness of the precolonial and colonial texts which have been responsible for the 
construction of Latin America for Europe. Since Latin American ýiction emerges out 
of a "world already conjured up by the European imagination", 8 it seems condemned to 
creating itself from "within a fiction of which it is a part". In this sense, "America is a 
literary and fictional place, a new beginning that is already a repetition" (PH, 28-29). 
Appearing captured within a whole network of converging textual inscriptions from 
without, many Latin American writers attempt to "escape [the] literary encirclement" 
that this represents by "constantly striv[ing] to invent themselves and Latin America 
anew" (PH, 27). In this sense, "born of Modernity, Latin American literature appears 
to be condemned to the delusions of newness in order to expose them" (PH, 28-30). 
Fuentes echoes this when he writes that the "relationship between time and the 
manifestation of time" is intimately connected not only to Latin American fiction but to 
the complex sense in which to situate a Latin American modernity. Fuentes argues 
that having been "born into modernity ... 
during the Enlightenment" Latin American's 
8 "In this sense, the discovery of America was the actualization of a fiction, the fpnding of a world 
that had its origins in books before it became a concrete and tangible terrafinna" (Edmundo 
O'Gorman, The Invention ofAmerica: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the Alesv [Vorld and the 
Meaning ofits History. As Carlos Fuentes tells us, "in his classic book Yhe Invention ofAinerica, the 
Mexican historian Edmundo O'Gorman maintains that America was invented rather than discovered. 
If this is true, we must believe that, first of all, it was desired then imagined" (M0,183). Fuentes' 
enormous Terra nostra attempts to point out that, in the face of its own decline Spain desires its own 
rebirth in the virginal and edenic New World. In this sense, the absence of America is the condition 
that makes it possible to imagine and invent America, a notion I will be exploring shortly. 
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were "told to forget the instantaneous, circular, and mythical times of our origins in 
favor of a progressive, irreversible time, destined to an infinitely perfectible future". 
The linear time of Enlightenment thought promises a continually emerging and new 
society into which the poor, savage Indian can finally find truth; the truth of progress 
and the "secular eterriity" it engenders (MO, -75). However, in orderto understandihe 
condition in which identity finds itself postponed as it begins to be articulated in Los 
pasosperdidos, we must not only read the time of the novel as a response to the time 
of the Enlightenment, but also as an annunciation of the time of Carpentier's own 
writing. This time mirrors the distance that the protagonist cannot escape in his 
relation to the people who inhabit the Valley Where Time Had Stopped. The 
protagonist is immersed within immediacy while, at the same time, completely bound 
to the linearity of his life "back there". The contradiction implied by. the conjunction of 
these two times is opened by the work of art in its testimonial response to a present-in- 
history; that is, the present-time of Carpentier's novel, of our reading, of the 
protagonist's narration. Carpentier "is caught in the paradox of being "in the entrails of 
virginal America, " the fruit of a fatherless, unmediated conception; the product of an 
originality which denies anteriority while affirming at every step that his own text [that 
is, Lospasosperdidos] is a repetition -a new version, perhaps, but one whose lineage 
can be traced" (PH, 174). It is only through the medium of "paper and ink" that 
Carpentier can discover the hidden tradition whose lineage can be traced back through 
what Echevarria calls the traveller writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: 
Alexander von Humboldt, Chateaubriand, Richard and Robert Schomburgk, to name 
just a few. "If the steps leading to [the origin of a "Latin American literary tradition"] 
indeed are lost, the novel [as a form] presents itself not as a keeper of the tradition, but 
as a new beginning" (PH, 162). The contradiction of being immersed within an 
immediacy that is accessible through the mediation of the literary text exposes us to 
"the revolutionary nature of writing, its perpetual shifting around an absent source" 
(PH, 33). The connection between history and narrative is therefore intimate; or, more 
precisely, ex-timate. History is not merely reflected in the narrative that seeks a 
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representation of it nor is the narrative simply a means of creating history anew. 
Rather, the history to which a narrative responds always remains in circulation; its 
meaning, the kernel of truth that would finally settle the questions about just what this 
or that historical moment meant, is always postponed because of the necessary and 
unimpeachable gap that separates the time ofthe historical moment and the present- 
time of the narration and, of course, of our reading, the time right now. Everý work of 
art makes witness not only to the impossibility of returning to primeval purity,, but also 
to the possibilities opened by that impossibility; that is, the possibility of art in its 
testimonial response to a present-in-history. As Fuentes argues, it is precisely this gap, 
this divorce between the two, which constitutes the possibility of art itself Early on in 
Fuentes' "Reasonable People" for example, the narrator tells us that 
... in art a project and its realisation, a blueprint and the construction itself, can never correspond perfectly ... there 
is no perfection, only 
approximation, and that's the way it should be, because the day a 
project and its realisation coincide exactly, point by point, it will no 
longer be able to design anything: at the sight of perfection ... art dies, exhausted by its victory. There has to be a minimal separation, 
an indispensable divorce between idea and action, between word and 
thing, between blueprint and building, so that art can continue to 
attempt the impossible, the absolute unattainable aesthetic. 9 
The space of art is that opaque gap or distance shared by word and thing, image and 
reality in which any unification between the sign and its signified is prevented. But this 
prevention is, in effect, an affirmation of the individual since it demands the active 
participation of the artist in the construction of meaningful works of art. Rather than 
merely reproducing a stock of images held in common by a culture, the artist can break 
open the image allowing its multiple meanings to become manifested for an audience. 
9 Constancia and Other Storiesfor Virgins, tr. Thomas Christensen. (London: Picador, 1990): 26 1- 
262. When writing of this issue in another context, Fuentes has this to say: "Gaston Bacliclard has 
written that all great writers know that the world wants literature to be everything and to be 
something else: philosophy, politics, science, ethics. Why this demand, asks the French thinker. 
Because literature is always in direct communication with the origins of the spoken being, at the very 
core of speech where philosophy, politics, ethics and science themselves become possible. But when 
science, ethics, politics, and philosophy discover their own limitations they appeal to the grace and 
disgrace of literature to go beyond their insufficiencies. Yet they only discover, along with literature 
itself, the permanent divorce between words and things: the separation between the representative 
uses of language and the experience of the being of language" (HO, 70). 
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The demand placed on the artist by the opacity of the between is thereby transferred to 
the perceiving subject. Once confronted by opacity, the relation between word and 
thing, image and reality becomes a productive source of self-creation and self- 
identification. Again, it is not the failure of the sign to adequately represent reality, but 
--the-imposgibIffity of opacity, embodied in the very resources employed to fill in the gap 
or to bridge it, that provides the condition for productive relations. Contra Le"'rinas' 
assertion that it is the transcendence of the ego and the other "with respect to each 
other" which creates a distance "in which language occurs", 10 the distance of opacity is 
mirrored in the "minimal separation", the "indispensable divorce... between word and 
thing". 
Earlier I argued that Levinas speaks of the relationship between the egg and its 
double as resemblance and that he gives language a primary role in the fundamental 
duplicity which he correctly sees as the hallmark of human identity. " Andyet, 
language suffers from the cleavage that separates it from the very ground Levinas still 
seems to rest upon: a sense that the duality of identity and the image is founded upon a 
minimal first order exteriority wherein the ego is caught up in its own self- 
referentiality. Alterity can only be engendered for Levinas when this self-referentiality 
is pushed through to the excesses of an Other beyond resemblance. This structure is 
limited by its prioritisation of resemblance at the expense of what, for us here, is at 
work in the relation between identity and the image; that is, the interruption of identity 
in the subject's encounter with an image which, in being "a stranger to itself' (CPP, 6), 
is simultaneously both familiar and yet foreign to that subject. While Levinas is keenly 
aware of these configurations, he does not question towards the between; he does not 
make the between the question but remains tied to a discourse that is indebted to the 
resurrection of an Other whose death has been the result of the tradition Levmas is 
indebted to. Levinas' work is, in this respect, the hardest and cruellest work of all: to 
10 See above, pg. 17. 
11 See above pg. 15ff. 
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work with the language of what has been for him a constant companion and enemy, a 
language whose betrayal must remain a source of recompense for the deaths it has 
guaranteed. 
If space permitted, we could discover similar convergences between identity and the 
image in Fuenteg'7erra nostra, convergences that prioritise the between in the 
explication of the simultaneity of temporal and historical modalities. And 
convergences that allow us to directly confront and affirm the between as the 
possibility of relation. Notwithstanding this, Terra nostra demands too much for the 
rewards it offers to the unrelenting reader, rewards which when lacking refuse one of 
the fundamental aspects the novel attempts to affin-n: the duplicity and subsequent 
postponement of identity, time, history, narrative. This refusal is the result of Fuentes' 
constant attention to lengthy and often fully scholastic complaints; a tendency when 
writing longer works to produce too much detail in the form of intellectually informed 
debates between characters in the work itself These debates soon become tiring, their 
questions so often falling with both feet heavily on the ground. And it is precisely this 
heaviness that strips Terra nostra of the duplicity and postponement it so desperately 
wants to enact. The constant deformation of chronological time and linear narrative, 
the constant repetition of encounters between characters whose sole purpose, it 
appears, is to create disequilibrium and instability in the reader, only serve, because 
they are belaboured, to cloud over the sense of duplicitous signification the novel 
intends to convey. It is as if Fuentes thinks that only in a work that enacts duplicity 
through the subterfuge of a singularity produced by repetition can the duplicity of the 
sign - of language, of history, of story - be engendered in the reader. The constant 
debates Felipe, El Seflor has with his secretary And chief huntsman, Guzmdn are a case 
in point. These debates all revolve around El Sefior's intolerable fear: 
ithat he will 
never be able to acquire a complete and absolute death, a death which would not be 
"the material guarantee of a new life, a second life, another life, but simply that: my 
absolute death... "(Di, 235); a fear engendered in that image which stares back at him 
from the glassy surface of his hand mirror, confronting El Seflor with the radical 
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duplicity of existence: "the life of the mirror, of all the mirrors that duplicate the world, 
that extend it beyond all realistic frontiers, and to all that exists, mutely says: you are 
two" (Tii, 229). El Seftor believes that only through an act of writing can he escape 
the conunandment of the duplicity which denies an absolute death, for "what is written 
. remains, what is written is true-in -itself, for it cannot-be subjected to the test of truth, 
or to any proof at all; that is the full reality of what is written, its paper reality, full and 
unique" (Th, 224). It is this uniqueness that alone can save El Seflor from the duplicity, 
he sees engendered by the countless generations that stare back at him whenever he 
faces "the sterile lake captured within the frame" of his hand mirror, the same hand 
mirror which has belonged to countless people before him; an emblem, then, of the 
impossibility of escaping the destiny of a deathly repetition. Write, El SefiQr 
commands Guzmdn, write; because "nothing truly exists if it not be consigned to 
paper" (Th, 13 1). 
El Seflor's trust in the power of writing to supplant the rigors of duplicity fails to 
grasp what is, for Fuentes, central to language: the unimpeachable separation between 
signs and referents, "a modem divorce between words and things" (MO, 51). El Sehor 
comes close to realising this when he asks GuzmAn whether or not any singular story 
is, in fact, always on the verge of succumbing to this haunting duplicity. 
Does a Devil never approach you and say, that wasn't how it was, it 
was not only that way, it could have happened that way, depending 
upon who was telling it, depending on who saw it and how he 
chanced to it; imagine for an instant, Guzmdn, what would happen if 
everyone offered their multiple and contradictory versions of what 
had happened, and even of what had not happened, wouldn't that be 
the limit, wouldn't that turn us over and throw us to the wind ... then 
what would happen ... 
if everyone could write the same text in his 
own manner, the text would no longer be unique (Tn, 224). 
In this loss of uniqueness all political and social power is dissolved "for upon ýVhat is 
government founded but the unity of power? And this unitary power, upon what is it 
founded but its privileged possession of the unique written text, an unchanging norm 
that conquers" (Tn, 224-225). Even though El Sehor faces the realisation that a text 
which records an event may be multiplied endlessly through the multiplicity of voices 
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employed to write that text, he still fails to realise that this multiplication is at the heart 
of the very language he uses to escape duplicity, the language which he believes will 
allow him to write the one unique text. Terra nostra is a testament to the impossibility 
of fulfilling El Seflor's desire for a unique text, an absolute death which is not, in itself, 
the source of constant rebirth. The'rnerridirg'U-Sehor dictates to Guzmhn as a means 
of writing the one unique text thus become a text in which El Sefior's desire to grasp 
the one unique text is forever fi-ustrated by his inclusion in yet another text - the text of 
Terra nostra itself - which offers its own story, its own version of the decline of Spain 
and the discovery of the New World. 
What really marks the transformation between Latin American modernity and 
Latin American postmodernity then, is the manner in which the cootradiction of being 
both itself and its other, of being identifiable through its own fictionality, supplies many 
Latin American writers with the tools by which to create themselves through the very 
fragmentation of self As Echevarria has pointed out, because Latin America "is not 
the direct descendent of an autochthonous tradition going all the way back to a primal 
birth in the colonial period" (PH, 20), it must continually search for a means by which 
to create itself in relation to the founding condition of an absence, the absent centre 
around which it revolves. It is the investment in this absence that dramatically marks 
the turn Latin America takes towards itself-, a turn towards theforeig7117ess of the very 
language through which Latin Americans achieve self-identification. Juan Marinello 
has clearly worded this in his Antericanismoy cubanismo literarios where he writes: 
"We are through a language that is our own while being foreign" (PH, 29). Echevarria 
points out that Marinello prioritises the language in which identity is spoken as a 
principal problem of identification itself Although the-centrality of language is not 
peculiar to Latin America, "for language, to any writer, is always forelign, a given code 
within which [the writer] must labour" (PH, 29-30), Marinello argues that "what is 
distinctly Latin American ... 
is a double sense of otherness that n-ftrors and magnifies 
the initial otherness of language" (PH, 30). Colds' attention to the centrality of 
alienation in Rtoniela thus seems crucial. The alienation to which Raytiela responds is 
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not a European alienation forged by Romanticism's response to modernisation. Rather, 
Rajitela responds to colonial alienation. This is why CoJAs will maintain that "even the 
problem of the appropriateness of a concept like 'postmodernism' for Latin American 
culture should be inscribed within this history of colonial alienation" (PL, 35). Latin 
America sets itself apart from Europe by exacerbating its contradictory relation to 
Europe. By reftising to seek an ideal unity of identity, Latin America confronts its oý'w 
otherness in the space between itseo'and its other. In this sense, Latin American 
writing in the 60's and 70's raises to the forefront of critical and artistic attention the 
sense in which Latin Americans are condemned to live in the interstitial space between 
the Idea and its representation, between the sign and its signified, between identity and 
difference, self and other; a sentence that is, in fact, their very liberation. , 
Consequently, it is the separation of the between that is central to this period of 
transformation, this transition from the modem to the postmodern in Latin America. 
What is therefore required in the continuing analysis of the tension between Latin 
America and Europe and North America is an understanding of the transformative 
power of many forms of Latin American fiction by underscoring what Colds calls the 
"avant-garde mediator", "the bricoleur" who, by "reworking the stolen tools of the 
enemy" transforms that enemy into something different. Latin America recognises 
itself in the process of differentiation that mediation produces via the hybridisation of 
European categories and concepts. Latin America is therefore differential in 
mediation. And this is why Colds draws attention to the notion of mediation, since 
"the cila is, at the very least, a way of purchasing and securing the authority of the 
writer at the expense of the authority of the source" (PL, 46-47). Hence, where 
immediacy, plenitude and purity were central to Latin Americdn modernity, of that 
failed project of defining what was particularly, uniquely Latin American, 
postmodernity in Latin America is marked by the attention to the productivity of 
mediation. We need a terminology then, that would focus directly on the form and 




In order to drive to the heart of mediation and the specific accomplishments some 
Latin American fiction achieves in respect of mediation, we need to pay close attention 
to the role of separation in relation. And it is precisely because certain types of Latin 
American fiction arise from the between in the sense I have been exploring that it is 
particularly advantageous for an analygis oTthe separation of relation. Much of this 
advantage arises as a result of their prioritisation of the fictional act as a meahs of 
constructing their own identity. In short, because of the contradiction of beiný both 
itself and its other, the Latin American fiction I will be exploring embodies in a 
particularly clear way the role of separation in relation, and specifically in the relation 
between self and other. In coming to understand this fiction, we come to understand 
the role of separation in relation precisely by employing a critique. of that role in the 
very reading and critique of the fiction. 
First and foremost, relation is always a factor of encountering - the face-to-face 
between a subject and an object. And yet, what presides over this encounter is neither 
the subject nor the object but the between, the separation which makes relation 
possible. "I" is incapable of knowing "you" completely because something always 
remains outside the face-to-face encounter. This remainder is marked by the very 
separation that brings us together. Since perception is always partial - the eye that 
cannot know the totality of what it perceives - then the perceived is always a nearness 
that is remote; that is, is always ex-timate, an intimate exteriority. This intimate - 
exteriority is not reserved for the relation between "I" and "you". As the eye looks 
inward, turns toward itself, it encounters the intimate exteriority of an "I". Even on the 
inside something remains outside, a remainder once again marked by the separation 
that permits of partial perception. In this sense, intimdcy is not a simple exposure of 
one's self in the face of another, nor is it simply the "closed society" Of the couple as 
Levinas has thought. 12 Intimacy is impossible without separation. That is to say, there 
is always something that remains impossible, something which remains opaque; 
12 See above, page 21 ff. 
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something which prevents the fulfilment of that nostalgic hope for a simple achieved 
Oneness, whether temporal, social or psychical. Unable to pin itself down to any one 
unit of referential meaning (that is, the impossibility of gaining itself in a totality), the 
eye perceives an "I" in circulation. When "I" becomes identical with itself it ceases to 
-exist, or, at least, ceases to be capable of perceiving and recognising itself, that is, it 
folds into itself and disappears. The "I", in order to be itself, must be other than itself 
the "I" is differential. Separation, therefore, is an impossibility; not only the 
impossibility of experiencing the experiences of others, but also of experiencing all of 
one's own psychical attributes as a unified totality. Otherness is therefore not a 
destination, not an outside beyond the self. As Octavio Paz has argued, "if man is 
double or triple, so are civilisations and societies. Each people carries on ki dialogue 
with an invisible colloquist who is at one and the same time, itself and its other, its 
double. Its double? Which is the original and which the phantasm? As with the 
Moebius strip, there is neither inside nor outside, and otherness is not there, beyond, 
but here, within: otherness is ourselves" (OE,, 288). 
Many Latin American writers have been keenly aware of this. For example, in 
Gabriel Garcia MdrqueZs "Dialogue with the mirror" a solitary protagonist encounters 
a familiar yet foreign face in the mirror of his morning shave. While the protagonist is 
"giving the last touches to his left cheek with his right hand, he managed to see his own 
elbow against the mirror. He saw it, large, strange, unknown, and'Observed with 
surprise that above the elbow other eyes equally large and equally unknown were 
searching wildly for the direction of the blade. Someone is trying to hang my brother. 
A powerful arm. Blood! The same thing always happens when I'm in a hurry" (IE, 
96). When ihe protagonist searches his face for the injury he (, annot find it. , 
There 
were no wounds on his skin, but there in the mirror the other one was bleeding 
slightly" (IE, 96). As the protagonist attempts to rationalise this encounter he asks 
himself whether "the image had taken on its own life and had resolved - by living in an 
uncomplicated time - to finish more slowly than its external subject? " (IE, 96). To 
complicate things more, we are told earlier on in the-story that the protagonist, when 
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he first looks into the bathroom mirror, was caught by "a quick shudder ... as he 
discovers his own dead brother, newly arisen, in that image" that stares back through 
the rnirror (IE, 93). Without the possibility of identifying the protagonist with the 
image in more than the most superficial way, our attention turns towards the mediator 
of thdir relation - the mirror. Without any concrete identification between the 
protagonist and his image, our attention turns to the only identity that has meaning for 
us: the between, the separation of relation. 
As I argued above, separation is not to be confused with a spatial and temporal 
distance; that is, separation is not a geo-temporal gap. 13 Put very briefly, Levinas 
conceives of separation in terms of the "distance that separates ideatilm and idea" (TI, 
49) which he derives from the Cartesian cogito; that is, in Descartqs, "the knowing 
being remains separated from the known being" (TI, 48). This sense of separation 
prioritises transcendence as "the sole ideatum of which there can only be an idea in us; 
it is infinijely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, because it is infinite" (TI, 49). 
Hence, what is of particular concern for Levinas, at one-level, is the distinction he 
wishes to make between objectivity and transcendence whereby transcendence is seen 
to enact separation as temporal and spatial distance; that is, as stemn-dng from or 
produced by the idea of Infinity. And this is why Levinas will also say, following on 
from his critique of the Cartesian terminology, that "by virtue of time this being [that 
is, the Cartesian ego, or at least the Cartesian "inner life", its "psychism"] is not yet - 
which does not make it the same as nothingness but maintains it at a distance from 
itself' (TI, 54). What I want to argue is that separation as opacity registers relation in 
a different field than that which pertains to separation as the "infinite distance of the 
Stranger" (TI, 50), a field embodied in a particularly clear way by a number of Latin 
American texts. But opacity also, because it is a term that recuperate's what the 
rhetoric of Otherness has occluded; that Lyotardian 'unheard of phrase!. 
But what of this opacity? Does it not point to an outside beyond conceptuality, to 
13 Nor is it Hegel's Kluft; that is, the "insurmountable cleavage between the being of God and the 
being of men" (Altarity, 7). 
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an Other more radical than myself? No matter how radical the alterity of this Other, it 
is always another subject and therefore cannot escape the inimitable separation upon 
which subjectivity is based. Separation as opacity cannot be imitated by the 
subject/object duality that subtends Levinas' discourse. Otherness is that unspoken 
remainder that we refer to by speffing alanguage unknown to us: the unknown 
tongue referring to an allusive subject. What the discourse of the Other has failed to 
pursue is the question of this remainder. Levinas'prioritisation of language and 
communication serves transcendence as that which is beyond conceptuality vis-A-vis 
the Idea of Infinity. Alternatively, separation as opacity prioritises the very otherness 
of language as the vehicle through which the relation between self and other is 
mediated; that is, conceptualised, made cognisant through the concept. Irk short, "I" 
and "you" are relational in separation, in part, because of a wounding, a fracture in 
language itself Consequently, the proximal relation between "I" and "you" is 
"mirrored and magnified", to use Echevarria! s words, by the proximal relation between 
signs and signifieds. In order to think this remainder it is vital to attend to that sense of 
intimacy I spoke of earlier. Opacity is itself grounded in the dialectic of intimacy, the 
ex-timate and proximal relation of two who never t ouch as the possibility of their 
touching. On the one hand, the intimacy of two who are separated and, on the other, a 
language which exacerbates this separation in the divorce between words and things. 
In both these proximal relations we are made foreigners and orphans who can only 
speak "wandering, orphaned words" (MO, 54). The desire for intimacy (and love) is, 
therefore, a desire for the impossible; that is, a desire founded upon separation as 
opacity. Paz comes very close to this when he argues that 
society denies the nature of love by conceiving it as a stable union-. 
whose purpose is to beget and raise children. It identifies it, that is, 
with marriage ... The protection given to marriage would 
be 
justifiable if society permitted free choice. Since it does not, it 
should accept the fact that marriage is not the supreme realisation of 
love 
... 
Whenever [love ] succeeds in realising itself, it breaks up a 
marriage and transforms it'into what society does not want it to be: a 
revelation of two solitary beings who create their own world, a 
world that rejects society's lies, abolishes time and work, and 
62 
Interlude 
declares itself to be self-sufficient" (Is, 179-180; L, 199-200). 14 
It is for similar reasons that Cortfizar says that "all love goes beyond the couple, if it is 
love" (PL, 50), since love is best served by the risk to plunge into obscurity, into the 
unknown, that opacity which stretches out between the couple, holding them together 
in the most radical and creative separation imaginable. 
My contention that separation as opacity is the condition for relation affirms the 
act of self-fictionalisation by placing that act at the forefront of self-creation. 
ýhis 
affirmative reading is often eclipsed by an equally important, though misguided attempt 
to soften the harder edge of these fictionalising acts. Bell has pointed out in his study 
of Garcia Mdrquez! s El otoho delpatriarca [The Autumn of the Patriarch] that 
"Fictional 'relation' is always double-edged. It may be a means, of emotional insight 
into others or it may be a way of seeing the other as a fiction ... A utunin is a book 
which studies, and enacts, this sinister underside of fiction as a model of de-realisation 
.... The polyphony of narrative voices in Autumn creates a mutual play of mirror 
images in which everything you see may be illusory" (GGM, 78). Bell augments these 
reflections with the contrast Garcia Mdrquez provides in Autumn between the figure of 
Ruben Dario and the patriarch himself. Bell argues that "for the reader ... there 
is the 
deeper contrast that the patriarch, apart from his personal vacuity, is ostentatiously a 
fictional being, a product of words, while Dario's splendour of language is an historical 
fact. Dario's reality caps the patriarch's tawdry fiction" (GGM, 78). While this may be 
the case, appealing to facts to prove the point about the relation between the fictive 
and the real seems misguided. Such an appeal misses the point about the relation itself 
It would be comparable to asserting that what is at stake in reading "Dialogue with a 
mirror" is something like a process of determining who the protagonii t and, even 
14 Bataille's famous consideration of eroticism should not go unnoticed here. SeeTheAccursed 
Share V. H& III, pp. 123ff. Similarly, Blanchot's own articulation of this problem descrves at least a 
partial repetition here: "The community of lovers - no matter if the lovers Nvant it or not, enjoy it or 
not, be they linked by chance, by "I'amourfou", by the passion of death (Kleist) - has as its ultimate 
goal the destruction of society" (The Uncwowable Community, 48). 
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more, who or what the mirror image are. The very fact that Dario is afigvre in a text 
already suggests that the question of his status as a living historical person cannot 
simply be assumed as holding out over and against his status as a fictional character on 
the basis that he really exists outside the text; that is, in the real world. That world, 
especially Dario's, is only real for us because 6fthe texts whibb have created it. There 
is no reason to accept that Dario is any more nor any less real or fictional because we 
can say he was bom in Nicaragua in 1867 and that he was a "great modem ... poet" 
(GGM, 78). The question is about the nature of relation, that is, of separation as 
opacity, and not one about the difference between the fictive and the real: the relation 
between the fictive and the real is still one structured by the tension of extimacy, the 
tension of an intimate exteriority, the tension of the between which the copcept of 
separation as opacity expresses. Appealing to dates and descriptive phrases as Bell 
does only underscores this issue, since Dario can only be known to us through the 
mediation of both Garcia MArquezs text and Bell's analysis of that text. But the 
stronger line is also that, even in the face-to-face encounter vAth the corporeal Dario, 
separation, as the mediating condition of all relation, prevents any simple and pure 
identity, some totality from (transparently) shining through the mist of opacity. 
Immersed within the dialectic of the ex-timate relation, "I" encounters nothing it 
knows, the intimate exteriority of a "you". Whether that "you" is fictional or real is 
completely beside the point. As I argued above, opacity, structured by the dialectic of 
the ex-timate relation, is the separation that cleaves "I" and "you" in the duplicitous 
sense Taylor exhumes from the etymological grave of the verb 'to cleave': our rending 
is the condition for our communion and our communion the possibility of our rending. 
Therefore, rending is never a simple tearing asunder nor is cofnmunion a simple 
achieved oneness. Hence, the encounter with an "I" in circulation is the encounter 
with an "I" which circulates around an absent kernel of representational meaning; that 
is, an absent centre. Opacity then, is the separation in which we encounter absence. 
What Latin American fiction demonstrates to us is that our identity is irreducible 
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and, in that irreducibility, multiple. Hence, there can be no founding narratives to 
which we could appeal to acquire a sense of our true, authentic identity: the steps back 
to the source of human history and time are truly lost. What those who have made the 
journey back to this absent source have discovered is the very absence that, all along, 
has provided them with the possibility Of making the journey in the first place. 
Absence is the centre to which this Latin American fiction responds in its atterript to 
create an identity for itself, an identity which arises out of the self-creating act pf 
fiction revolving around an absent centre. The response to this absence is 
foreshadowed in the divorce between words and things, in the separation between "I" 
and "you", in opacity structured by extimacy. But to speak towards absence is, in fact, 
to lose language in the speaking of language since language itself is subjected to the 
very encounter it seeks to unfold; that is, language is always subjected to opacity. To 
speak towards absence, tofigure absence in speaking towards it, we must speak the 
language beyond language, a language which is spoken by an unknown tongue. The 
Latin American fiction I am principally concerned with speaks this unknown tongue 
and is one of the pre-eminent forms by which many Latin American authors have given 
form to absence: an unknown tongue which speaks in the space of opacity that little 
language Bernard so desperately desires, the language lovers use, the language of the 
eroticevent. Such an event should not be seen, to use Colfts' words, as "a genuine 
blurring or merging of self and *other". The problem is not to overcome "the cleavage 
between self and other" (PL, 40) but to affirm that cleavage as the radical possibility 
for intimacy. Merely to seek a "blurring or merging" of horizons would completely 
frustrate and defer that cleavage I spoke of earlier. The erotic event must be seen as 
the encounter between identities in circulation, circulating around temporary names 
and temporary decisions: an eventation, the letting out that is a creation, a renewal, a 
creating anew. In this sense, the erotic event embodies opacity as an emblem of 
absence: the impossible here now. 15 
15 As we iiill see nearer the end of our study, this now is always a time postponed; that is, the time of 
postponement which subtends the between of rclation, and offers us a competing interpretation of the 
present than that given by either Lyotard! s reading of Newman or, as we N%ill see, Paz's 
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*** 
The Duplicity of Fiction 
Indeed, the insurmountable distance between "being" and "having" 
oneself is one of the discoveries of literature, highlighted by its 
explorations of the space between. 
Wolfgang Iser 
The Fictive and the Imaginary 
0 
As I have tried to show, the approach to the question of anonymity requires an 
attentiveness to the concept of opacity, a concept which has a direct connqction to the 
notion of duplicity engendered in the contradiction at work in Carpentier's Lospasos 
perdidos. What Carpentier's novel opens for us is the role of absence in the 
configuration of duplicity and contradiction: the duplication of identity in the face-to- 
face encounter with the absence of any source to which that identity could refer in 
order to acquire a (transparent) view of itself In short, the relation between (word 
and thing, "I" and "You", Latin America and Europe) is one based upon the opacity in 
which we encounter absence. My intention now is to explore duplicity and absence 
more thoroughly in order to demonstrate how they combine to offer a more complete 
understanding of the between itself. Wolfgang Iser's recent study of literary fictionality 
is informative here because it provides us with a critical language by which to highlight 
the close connection between duplicity and absence as invaluable concepts in the 
explication of the between of relation and, subsequently, allows us to further explore 
Carpentier's relation to the latter in a close reading of El acosd [771e Chase], the novel k 
A which directly follows Los pasos perdidos and which radicalises the discoveries made 
there. 
conceptualisation of the return to origins. The key term in this competing interpretation is the notion 
of impossibility and its relation to postponement, one that iNill become clearer as we proceed. 
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Iser writes in his analysis of "Renaissance Pastoralism as Paradigm of Literary 
Fictionality", that 
Psychoanalysis speaks of a core self that can view-itse1fin the mirror 
-seff. 16 -As -their own doppelgiingers, - however, human beings are at 
16 In outlining various traditional conceptions of the imaginary, Iser has thiý to say about the 
common link made between the imaginary and fantasy: "A glance at foundational discourses reveals 
an unmistakable reduction, whereby fantasy is always subordinated to something else. Fantqsy was 
regarded as perfection, in which art enabled human beings to participate ... [which] 
implies ihat 
perfection gains its character by running counter to existing realities; it takes on its form by in eans of 
something that has to be overcome". Similarly, conceived as otherness, fantasy is understood as the 
form by wItich to bring "something into the world that was not there before. In this view, the 
appearance of fantasy creates an impact that cannot be deduced from anything that existed earlier". 
And, finally, as a concept recovered by psychoanalysis, fantasy is linked "to the unconscious, 
subordinating it to "the laws of the primary process" [Rolf Vogt et al., "Experimentelle Rorschach- 
Untersuchung zur'pensde opdratoire"', Psyche 33 (1979): 8341, although its vagrant "offsprings", 
which appear only before the conscious mind, require another reference if they are to be identified. 
And as desire, fantasy needs a "miffor stage" (Lacan's term) of the self in order to bring to light the 
reverse side of the ego". According to Iser, in "all these definitions ... fantasy appears not as a 
substance but as a function preceding what is, even though it can manifest itself only in what is" (FI, 
172). Iser then provides a historical overview of the imagination as it was conceived by idealist and 
empiricist philosophy in order to show that, in being defined primarily as an act of combination, 
imagination was seen to be a foundation for cognition. This is important for Iser's project as a whole 
(although he spends far too much time throughout his text locating ideas historically) because he will 
want to argue later that the imaginary, once it is realised in an analysis of play, cannot be defined a 
priori through any particular function. "To say, however, that the imaginary manifests itself as play is 
to employ a discursive language which may distract us from the fact that it can never be perceived, let 
alone defined as a "whole" or as whatever it is. Designating the imaginary as play entails making a 
cognitive statement, but this cannot be taken as an ontological foundation of the imaginary .... Play 
would appear to be a prominent aspect of the manifest imaginary that can take on a variety of 
functions by way of its manifestations but can never be pinned to any one of them. Every statement 
about play is eo ipso a philosophical one, and there is no shortage of philosophies of play. But the 
philosophical statement seeks to define the function of play, while the basic to-and-fro play movement 
within which the imaginary bodies itself forth can never be defined a priori through any particular 
function" (FI, 223). Iser will finally argue that writers such as Samuel Beckett completely disrupt any 
connection that could be made bctAN, ecn the imaginary and function by "depict[ing] a consciousness 
that has suspended its own intentionality, with the result that the imaginary can no longer be 
fashioned by a particular application. Consequently, what is thematized is not the imaginary but the 
gap between consciousness and the imaginary. This gap can be experienced through endless 
cognitive cfforts to bridge it. A consciousness that blocks itself off, and an imaginary that can only 
run in circles - these are the last remnants of a game in which we no longer kn6w whether it is ending 
or beginning. These remnants are nothing more than a dynamic emptiness that also imposes itself on 
language; only language that consumes itself can give articulation to the imaginary" (FI, 246). The 
reason for this lengthy note is not only to indicate where Iser grounds his own analysis of the 
imaginary but to show that his prioritisation of certain key concepts - the gap, postponement, 
language - are ones that, in my analysis, will receive a slightly different inflection. And, since Iser 
does not provide us, %ith any sense of how language consumes itself, or what such a language looks 
like, it seems necessary to bring our attention to bear upon it in a thesis that openly problematises 
language vis-A-vis postponement. -The question remains as to what a postponed language (and a 
language that postpones) might look like, a question I hope to deal with in the concluding section of 
the thesis. 
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best differential, travelling between their various roles that supplant 
and modify one another. Roles are not disguises with which to fulfil 
pragmatic ends; they are means of enabling the self to be other than 
each individual role. Being oneself therefore means being able to 
double oneself (EI, 80-81). 
in Iser, doubling is the effect of the disguises that are necessary for humans to 
encounter the beings that they are, a form of encountering he locates squarely within 
the movements of the fiCtiVC17 and the imaginary. Doubling is not a simple (that is, 
uncomplicated) replication of oneself nor an unveiling of a true, authentic self buried 
"behind the screen of social position, bureaucratic function, the false identity others 
give us, and, above all, behind a ffilsifýing use of language" (MO, 102). 18 The key 
notion through which doubling is delineated in Iser's text is that of simultaneity 
modelled on the relationship between subterfuge, which serves to conceal, the identity 
of the characters in the literary text, and the recognition of an identity lurking behind a 
character's self-concealment. Clearly, there is a tension between Iser's desire to 
conceive human identity in terms not reducible to the assumption of a core self and a 
reading of the pastoral romance that relies specifically on the existence of some initial 
ground upon which a character can begin to conceive himsetr. Therefore, in an 
attempt to understand the applicability of Iser's arguments here, it is important to pay 
attention to the relationship between subterfuge and recognition, the role of 
contradiction within it and the manner in which it feeds into and supports Iser's notion 
of boundary-crossing, the latter of which prioritises the notion of relationality at its 
core. 
17 By'fictive' Iser means "an intentional act, which has all the qualities pertaining to an event and 
thus relieves the definition of fiction from the burden of making the customary ontological statements 
regarding what fiction is" (FI, 3; n. 3). Although Iser will go on to argue at length about the role of 
temporality in the relation between the fictive and the imaginary as sites for the doublinj of human 
identity, at no point does he question the appropriateness of 'the event' as a concept which can unfold 
that relation for us. Of particular note here is Iser's analysis of "the eventful nature of fantasy". See 
FI, 171ff. As I will argue in in), analysis of Rulfb's Pedro Phramo, the temporality of'the evenV as 
standing squarely within a ternary time system that is based upon linearity runs contrary to the 
temporality opened by Rulfo's novel, one that more adequately responds to the between of relation in 
the service of a response to anonymity. 
18 Here we would need to ask Fuentes what an authentic use of language would look like, one which, 
presumably, did not falsify but affirmed its subject. Would this be the language that consumes itself 
which appears in Iser's formulations? 
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Iser's conceptualisation of the relationship between the employment of masks as an 
act of subterfuge and the recognition of an identity constantly striving for self- 
recognition and self-identi fi cation is based upon the reinterpretation signification 
underwent during the Renaissance. This reinterpretation is the foundation upon which 
-Iser devdops all Ifis later arguments since it is during t1fis period that "the old 
"conjuncture"" that bridged the gap between the letter and the spirit in medi'e; val 
scholasticism is transformed into a series of "sin-fflitudes" and "resemblances" 34- 
38). Briefly, the Renaissance problematised the medieval cosmic order by dissolving 
the "conjuncture" between "the significant" and "the signified", replacing it with a 
series of "resemblances" that bring together what had been previously construed as 
two distinct and completely separated worlds. Since the gap between the two worlds 
was bridged by a conjuncture whose instigation satisfied the medieval desire to "bring 
about clearly distinguishable significations by means of which the inherent polysemy of 
the linguistic medium is channelled in such a way that tangible solutions may arise" (FI, 
36), 19 then any disruption of the conjuncture would greatly disrupt the relationship 
between letter and spirit, signifier and signified. By the seventeenth century this 
relationship will have become strictly binary in character and will be the progenitor of a 
correspondence theory of representation that completely welds the sign to its 
referent. 20 And, even though, during the Renaissance, this relationship was still ternary 
19 Goal directed behaviour as a model for reacquainting theoretical approaches to fiction vis-A-vis 
intentionality has a significant function in Isers argument as a whole. As I pointed out above (n. 15), 
it is the movement away from conceptualisations of the fictive and the imaginary within the 
constraints of function and intentionality that motivates Iser's enterprise in this text. 
20 For an in-depth analysis of the historical underpinnings and reinterpretations signification 
underwent during the seventeenth century, see Michel Foucault The Order of Things. The decision to 
employ Iscr's latestwork rather than Foucault's indisp ensable study is based purely on the need to 
orient our attention towards the importance of absence in my own project. FoucaulVs analysis cannot 
go unnoticed here. In particular, the priority givcn to literature in making the diýtinction between a 
Classical understanding of language and a 'modern' understanding (that is, one which arose from the 
nineteenth century onwards) in which "literature began to bring language back to light once more in 
its own being" bears important similarities to a number of writers I have had occasion to explore here. 
And it is not without consequence that Foucault would touch upon the importance of this distinction 
for the space of literature itself, After regaining a sense of the being of language, "language was to 
grow with no point of departure, no need, no promise. It is the traversal of this futile yet fundamental 
space that the text of literature traces from day to day" (7he Order of Things, 44). This "futile yet 
fundamental space" I call the space between, the gap, the opaque. Both Iser and Foucault prioritise 
literature in their particular and quite different analyses, and my project here is really an attempt to 
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it was developing in such a way that "the preordained interdependence" of letter and 
spirit "begins to fade" (EI, 38). What arises in the place of this ternary system is a 
proliferation of interconnections that "transform the ternary sign system into a serniotic 
game" (M, 69). The play element in language and the semiotic relation has been 
central to the majofity of texts-Iser has written since the -1979s and it is not surprising 
that he would underscore the importance of experimentations into the realms of play in 
the Renaissance that would become significant in his own work. For Iser, the semiotig, 
game is played out primarily in the alternation between subterffige (the employment of 
masks) and recognition characterised by the pastoral romance. As Iser argues, 
11 "conjuncture is supplanted by the play space, which in turn prevents the two worldS21 
from establishing themselves as the binary opposition of a logocentric ord9r; instead 
the two worlds interact" (FI, 69). it is this interaction which is the hallmark of 
doubling and mirroring endemic to the pastoral romance. 
The two models by which Iser delimits doubling unfold in his reading of the pastoral 
romance as the articulation of the interaction between "mutually exclusive semiotic 
systems" (M, 70). In the first model, the identity of the protagonist is said to reside hi 
absemia behind the mask he employs to achieve certain goals in certain situations. In 
the second model, the mask is pushed to the background allowing the full presence of 
the protagonist's identity to surface as, again, a response to the requirements of a 
give my own response to the question posed by these and other writers: "What is language? What is a 
sign? What is unspoken in the world, in our gestures, in the whole enigmatic heraldry of our 
behaviour, our dreams, our sicknesses - does all that speak, and if so, in what language and in 
obedience to what grammar? Is everything significant, and, if not, what is, and for whom, and in 
accordance with what rules? What relation is there between language and being, and is it really to 
being that language is always addressed - at least language that speaks truly? What, then, is this 
language that says nothing, is never silent, and is called 'IiteratllreTý (The Order of Thingq, 306): 
"What is the work? What is language in the work? When Mallarind asks himself, "Does komething 
like Literature eýjst?, " this question is literature itself. It is literature when literature has become 
concern for its own essence. Such a question cannot be relegated. What is the result of the fact that 
we have literature? What is implied about being if one states that "something like Literature e., dsts"T' 
(Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 43). These are the indispensable questions that haunt 
the pages of my response (and its possibility) to the question of anonymity. 




certain situation. For Iser, this oscillation between models constitutes the "dual unity 
of simultaneous veiling and unveiling [as] an illustration of fictionality that allows the 
hidden to be revealed through deception" (F7,73). This revelation is the key to the 
relationship between subterfuge and recognition since this "veiled unveiling drives the 
protagonists into a startlingly revealing relationship with themselves. While in disguise 
they have to stage their real selves in order to achieve something that does not yet 
exist. Thus the person is not left, as it were, behind himself, but "has" himself 4s 
something that the person himself cannot be" (FI, 73-74). The relationship between 
subterfuge and recognition is one in which the protagonists double themselves in order 
to reach themselves in the "multiplicity of possibilities" open to them by staging 
themselves through disguise (FI, 74). 1 
Consequently, in the interaction between subterfuge and recognition, Iser argues, 
something is always made absent while something else is made present. While the 
prince stages himself as a shepherd, his "royalty is made absent, even if this absence 
remains present in its guidance of the actions of the mask" (EI, 75). At the point when 
the protagonist reveals himself to his "beloved", he makes the mask absent. And yet, 
"the absent mask becomes present partly through reflections on its possible strategic 
uses and partly through the doubts it casts on the credibility of the prince himself 
What is present remains in close relationship to what is made absent" (M, 75). It is 
this alternation between presence and absence and its relation to doubling, mirroring 
and boundary-crossing that will concern us here. 
For Iser, doubling is the possibility for achieving self-identification because, insofar 
as "We ourselves are separated from ourselves by the very fact that we exist but 
cannot know what existence is", doubling opens us'to the recognition. that, as actors, 
"the phantom images" we employ to achieve certain goals "lack authenticity insofar as 
we believe we have ourselves through them. The fact that we cannot capture 
ourselves in any absolute role lifts all limits on the number of roles that can be played" 
(EI, 82). Here encountering ourselves would mean approacl-ýng near to that which we 
are but which could not be understood by first- looking inside ourselves; that is, 
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encountering that aspect which lays bare consciousness and, especially, consciousness 
of oneself 22 Doubling thus opens us to the infinite possibilities of changing roles and 
changing perspectives, changes which never deny that we encounter ourselves but 
affirm that the "I" which is encountered is an "I" in circulation; that is, an "I" that lacks 
any grounding in one particular role as the result of the gap between our phenomenal 
appreciation of existence and any epistemological awareness of that existence as a 
totality. Such an "I" circulates around the various and multiple roles opened to it: the 
"I" in circulation is this multiplicity. 
In the context of literary construction, fictionalising acts comprise the "selection" 
and "combination" of elements from an author's social, cultural and historical "fields of 
reference" that, through a mode of self-disclosure in the literary text, not only offer 
themselves for observation but "pen-nit the perception of all those elements that the 
selection has excluded. These, then, form a background against which the observation 
is to take place. It is as if what is present in the text must be judged in light of what is 
absent" (FI, 4-5). This is why Iser finds the pastoral romance valuable in his analysis 
of the fictive and the imaginary since it embodies in a particularly clear way what he 
sees as endemic to the literary text as a mode of expression: the conjunction of and 
oscillation between presence and absence as a mode of self-identification and self- 
creation. For Iser, literary texts are therefore necessary in the approach to this 
identification. 23 Through fictionalisation, a process of mask-ing and disguising 
22 In spealcing of the play in language, Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth argues that the liberation of 
language from the constraints of representation becomes apparent when we recognise that the stress 
on the grammatical nature of tense in language is "an historically limited phenomena" and needs to 
be set alongside a sense of the nongrammatical function of tense which stresses what Ermarth, 
somewhat loosely, refers to as "aspect" (SH, 140). Ermarth's attention to the notion of play, 
simultaneity and the relation between language and history offers an alternative to Isees ýonccption, 
one I will deal with later. 
23 And yet, the possibility of perceiving a set of norms against which one! s own set is distinguished is 
surely a positive way of placing those other norms into view; that is, precisely, giving them presence 
through a gesture of non-committal; a non-committal, that is, to the unveiling of subtle and intricate 
devices by which others (cultures, perceptions, norms) are occluded from one's own culture or 
perspective. Hence, it is not absence which is at issue here but the making present of alternatives for 
the perceiver. This, it seems to me, is at the heart of Isces overall aim in The Fictit, e and the 
knoginary. While such an aim may or may not be a worthwhile one, it nonetheless does not afford us 
an adequate perspective of the notion of absence because it prioritises a politics of inclusion rather 
than a phenomenological understanding of the absent. Such an understanding would, of course, 
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ourselves, we are able to construct ourselves only by way of a deconstruction of those 
elements to which any given role is indebted, a process in which "the constructing 
tendency ... always leads to a deconstructing tendency as a precondition 
for liberation. 
The constant switching from one to the other is potentially endless,. and herein lies a 
minimal condition Tor the creative act" (FT, 77-78). Liberation from the-roies we are 
destined to fulfil requires an act of fictionalisation in order that, by being both" 
"simultaneously inside and outside" ourselves we can, in fact, create ourselves (EI, 78). 
The initial problem that arises from Iser's very close reading of the pastoral romance 
is the distinction he makes between the hidden and the absent. In his conjunction 
between the pastoral and dream, Iser remarks that the former exceeds the latter 
because, while the dreamer is "imprisoned in his or her own imageý% the protagonist of 
the pastoral romance is able to "unfold himself' in his manipulation of the interaction 
between subterfuge and recognition. His very ability to disguise himself is his ability to 
take control of the construction of his own identity. Iser argues that the ability to be 
"simultaneously themselves and not themselves" means that the princes are never in 
hiding, but are constantly presenting and unpresenting themselves; that is, making their 
identities absent (FI, 74). 24 There is a great deal that is appealing about this 
formulation, especially in light of contemporary issues concerning the multiplicity and 
plurality of self, of cultures, of histories, a number of which Iser has been instrumental 
in articulating. And yet, what remains problematic in terms of including such a 
formulation here is Iser's insistence that, in the interaction between subterfuge and 
recognition, neither the mask nor the prince's true identity as prince is ever truly hidden 
behind the other but, rather, made absent. In what sense, we need to ask, can we 
adjudicate between the two: the hidden and the absent in Iser's text? 
As quarrelsome as this may seem, the distinction between the merely hidden and the 
return us to EnnartWs use of 'aspect', to the notion of language and history articulated in her . Nork 
and, therefore, as preparation for such a return, to the important role foreignness (as an emblem of 
opacity) plays in situating absence-within the relation between. This preparation can only folloNv the 
preliminary observations I am making here, while a return to Ermarth can only come after the 
consideration of time offered in §2: 77ze Time ofthe Between. 
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fully absent is important in distinguishing the status Isees project affords to fiction, 
doubling and boundary-crossing. Iser's position requires him to maintain a duality with 
respect to the self as a means by which to affirm the "multiplicity of possibilities" open 
to the protagonists of the pastoral romance. Invariably, this duality cannot escape the 
-rimits oTthe-hidden even though Iser wants to argue that the self is always "travelling 
between ... various roles" that, on the surface of things, appear temporary. 
The princ'ýs 
of the pastoral romance, however, always return to the ground of their identity as 
royals. While they are able to do so on the basis of being "simultaneously themselves 
and not themselves", they nonetheless have a fundamentally secure position in the 
knowledge that they are princes. In this sense, whenever any other identity is 
employed by them as a deception, their constant identity as princes remain, s intact and 
must, therefore, be seen to be hiddeii behind the mask of their subterfuge and not, in 
fact, absent. To be absent, a subject must lose itself, must disengage itself from itself 
in order to encounter itself. The princes always have themselves as princes even while 
they have themselves as something they are not; namely, shepherds. If anything is 
absent, it is this identity as shepherd. But even this identity is guided by the ever 
present identity of the prince as prince. 
The sense of this becomes clear in Iser's use of 'mask' and 'identity. Iserarguesthat 
"Being outside oneself' as a result of disguising ourselves as something we are not 
"does not ... mean transcending oneself-, 
it means staging oneself. Overstepping 
oneself by means of the mask allows the self always to be with itself in a different 
manner" (EI, 78). However, this model is based upon an implicit moment of 
recognition whereby the subject says to itself 'That is me', thereby grounding the 
relation between selection and combination, which engenders the interplay between 
construction and deconstruction, on a prior possibility for decision making an ,d goal 
direction; namely, the sense of oneself as possessing or having already created some 
sort of identityfor oneself25 While this may hold within Iser's general claim that self- 
25 In this way, the ego in Iser's formulations appears to correspond to Levinas' first order exteriority. 
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creation and self-identification are founded upon this interplay, it is a formulation 
which actively negates absence on the basis that a prior identification is necessary in 
order to put the system into operation. 26 If absence is fundamentally at work in the 
alternation between subterfuge and recognition, it would be impossible to adjudicate at 
what point a ma§k was a mask and an identity an identity; that is, at what point either 
was identical with itself since there would be no transcendental position from"which to 
guide perception or cognition. It seems impossible to establish any criteria by)Vhich-to 
separate a mask qua mask from identity qua identity. Iser seems to come close to this 
when he argues that "the lack of any transcendental reference and the impossibility of 
any overarching third dimension show literary fictionality to be marked by an 
ineradicable duality, and indeed this is the source of its operationalpower. Since the 
duality cannot be unified, the origin of the split eludes capture, and yet it remains 
present as the driving force that constantly seeks to bring separated entities together" 
(F77 80). 27 Again, while this remains a consistent point within the context of Iser's 
argument it actively negates the notion of absence which is central in. understanding the 
separation of relation and the place Latin American fiction takes within it. " Absence, 
in the way I am using it, is neither analytic nor allegorical. That is, it neither conforms 
26 This, it seems to me, is essentially Locke's problem as well insofar as he attempted to locate 
subjectivity within an empirical epistemology that required for its fulfilment the grounding of human 
identification in an exlemal reality as the precondition for self-creation. Iser is not unaware of this. 
However, he appears not to be aware of the similarities between the assumptions he makes in relation 
to those made by Locke nor that the inclusion of 'absence' in his own work does not sufficiently 
distinguish him from Locke's own misconstrual. See M, 110-117, passhn. 
27 What my criticisms here are leading to, of course, is the suggestion that while the pastoral 
romance might open this question for us through Iser, it is only in a literary form such as we find in 
Latin America that the role of absence can be legitimated and not undermined by a sense of the prior 
possibility of a subject upon which recognition (vis-A-vis. intentionality) is based. In fact, asweiNill 
see shortly, a number of key Latin American texts provide us with a sense of the subjectless nature of 
the subject as a meaningful access point to the notion of absence. 
28 In this respect, Iser does a considerable service to the overall argument I am pursuing with respect 
to the question of there being, properly speaking, a Latin American literary tradition. In 
distinguishing my own project from that put forward by Iser, the latter of which reaches a long way 
back into a European tradition, Latin American fiction can emerge under the constraints of a 
terminology it has engendered and to which it constantly responds. The appropriation of terms from 
Europe must therefore be seen as an active means of distinguishing themselves from a tradition they 
do not belong to but which has had considerable effects on their own writing. 
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to an empirical, material world on the basis of which it could be ontologically 
grounded nor is it merely a symbolic making present of that which exceeds language. 
Absence is neither subtraction nor the hypostatising of an outside or a beyond 
accessible only through the disunity inscribed between letter and spirit. The 
reinterpretafion sighification underwent is, therdfore, not sufficient in and of itself to 
lead us towards this absence. Absence, therefore, avoids or resists both these 
definitions by failing to arrive as such, as a concept for which a definition is 
appropriate or fbrthcomýing. As such, absence must be seen as active postponement, 
refusal to arrive, impossibility to be present as anything other than this hesitation, this 
postponement of itself. The contradiction implied in this is necessary for absence to 
operate within an analysis of the between since it is contradiction that opeos the 
between for us, an opening we have already seen inscribed in Carpentier's own 
contradictory writing. 
Iser has told us that his argument seeks to reinterpret the role of fiction in human life 
by concentrating on what fiction makes possible for that life on the basis that each 
shares a common ground; the duality implicit in the relation between the fictive and the 
imaginary. However, Iser argues in his reading of the significance of double meaning 
in the pastoral that the princes always want to disclose their true identities as princes to 
the princesses. This revelation is accomplished through the employment of tales which 
describe adventures the princes have actually been through. Hence, 
if the one meaning (that of the heroic deeds) serves as a sign for 
another (the protagonists' desire to be taken for what they are), a 
mutual displacement [of either] is out of the question, and this 
inseparable duality presents itself as the structure of double meaning. 
The latter entails that there is always a manifest meaning 
adumbrating a latent one .... The disguise must completely fictionalize all its utterances so that it can be understood as the 
image of a hidden reality. What is said is not what is meant, and the 
manifest meaning must give way to the latent (FI, 62-64). 
Consequently, "only the fictionalization of what is said allows for the simultaneity of 
mutually exclusive meanings" (FI, 65). In no way does this remove us from the trap of 
psychoanalysis as Iser maintains. Rather, the language of latency completely ties Iser's 
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conceptualisation to the notion of the hidden and prevents him from moving fully in the 
direction of the absent, a movement which is necessary if we hope to move beyond the 
conception of subjectivity as a palimpsest, as a tiered edifice we descend as if towards 
hidden truths. This has repercussions for Iser's delineation of absence because it 
grounds the relation between the prince and the princesses on the basis of a true 
identity constantly striving to achieve full presence through the "unified dualitý of 
double meaning" (FI, 63). This clearly undermines what Iser argues in his use, pf 
absence. Absence, he argues, is the sign of a duality that cannot be unified by the 
literary text, and because the duality of literary fictionality, which is inscribed by a lack 
of a transcendental position, cannot be unified, it testifies ipsofacto to an absent 
origin19 constantly at work trying to unify "separate entities". Fur(hermore, Iser argues 
that the task of preserving the mask and yet revealing the prince's true identity entails 
the "simultaneity of the mutually exclusive, and demands increasing fictionalization" 
(FI, 63). However, this entire schema depends upon a distinct idea of what exactly the 
prince is for himself, what his goals are and what strategies would best allow him to 
achieve those goals. In this sense, the prince never has himself as something he is not 
in any radical sense implied by Iser's conceptualisations and formulas. Granted, 
doubling in the pastoral romance opens us towards the importance of literary 
fictionality, but it does not reach the radical extremes of its own position until doubling 
is seen as a response to absence. As we will see, Carpentier's El acoso provides us 
with precisely this radicalisation by placing its protagonists in the full presence of the 
postponement and, in the end, utter fragmentation of self, one based on the very 
absence Iser is unable to engage with. 
*** 
The analysis of doubling and literary fictionality leads Iser to conclude that "if the 
29 Again, Foucault's The Order of Things gives a detailed accounting of the ways in which the 
concept of the origin is reconceptualised at the close of the Classical period. Of particular interest for 
us here, especially Nvith what comes later, is the relationship between the origin and historicity: "It is 
no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very fabric, makes possible the 
necessity of an origin which must be both internal and foreign to it" (The Order of Things, 329). 
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main concern is success ... 
fiction does not mediate between reality and cognition but 
takes effect by boundary-crossing, that is, by bringing imagination into play as a 
process that cannot be captured by cognition and that, in the final analysis, defies 
referentiality" (FI, 170). Iser's notion of boundary-crossing arises out of the reading of 
the pastoral because it is in the pastoral that be sees the attempt to conjoin two 
mutually exclusive worlds as emblematic of literary fictionality and its anthropologicýl 
consequences; namely, that literary fictionality provides a form through which we 
double ourselves and thereby reach beyond our own limitations. What stands out for 
Iser is the way in which this con unction is made possible in the breakdown of the j 
relation between signs and signifieds that occurs in medieval scholasticism. When the 
""conjuncture"" between the two is severed, with the result that the pastoral, as a 
genre, could "no longer be identified with the state of affairs it [was] supposed to 
represent" (FI, 42), the pastoral turns to the "nesting of literary genres" as a means of 
constructing its own world. This "nesting" in turn reveals the copresence of different 
genres within the space of the pastoral romance itself. And it is the border between 
these genres that the protagonists cross when they "take back with them into the ways 
of life [what] they have temporally left behind" (EI, 47). Contrary to McHale! s rather 
simplistic understanding of boundary-crossing in postmodernist fiction (namely, that 
"the ontological structure of the projected world is essentially the same in every case: a 
dual ontology, on one side our world of the normal and everyday, on the other side the 
next-door world of the paranormal or supernatural, and running between them the 
contested boundary separating the two worlds .... Another world penetrates or 
encroaches upon our world ... or some representative of our world penetrates an 
outpost of the other world, the world next door" (PF, 73-75)), Iser argues More 
convincingly and more pertinently that the pastoral world is itself a doubled world; that 
is, a world in which two worlds collide. 30 "Instead of beingjoined the pastoral and 
30 In Iser's examination of the pastoral romance he argues that the predominant, ternary sign system 
is problematised in Jacopo Sannazaro's Arcadia and brings to light important issues concerning the 
role of simultaneity, difference, repetition, memory, doubling and boundary-crossing that allow Iser to 
pursue the relation between the fictive and the imaginary. The point for Iser is to demonstrate how 
Sannazaro not only sets out to construct two mutually exclusive worlds - that of the shepherds and the 
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sociohistorical worlds in the pastoral romance3l are separated by a boundary that poses 
the problem of their correlation. They are presented through two different sign 
systems ... the pastoral romance does not set the pastoral world against another that 
lies outside itself' but inscribes a differenCe32 between the two on the basis of the 
interconnections between "two mutuailly ekclu§tve serdiotic systems" (FI, 46-47). 
However, as with his analysis of doubling, Iser's understanding of boundary-crossing is 
once again indebted to the hidden and not the absent. In his reading of the histprical 
determination of fiction in pl-fflosophic discourse, Iser argues that Jeremy Bentham's 
attention to the function of fiction finally leads to the awareness that "as a particular 
genus fiction cannot be understood, because - although it depends on discourse - it is 
also the main reason for the increasing complexity of discourse" (El, 128). As such, 
fiction is understood here as a "linguistic determination" brought forth in discourse 
royals who enter their folds - but to demonstrate that the exchange between the two, one in which the 
two are actually combined, is no longer covered by the conjuncture of the ternary sign system. Rather, 
the difference created by the combination of these two worlds "creates an empty space that Sannazaro 
virtually allegorizcs when, in the transition from Arcadia to Naples, he speaks of the great emptiness 
stretching between the two worlds that he can bridge only through dreamlike sleepwalking. " (EI, 5 1). 
Iser argues that these two worlds are not so much in confrontation with each other as they are 
telescoped in and through the other: "The [artificial pastoral world] gains its significance only by 
functioning as a mirror, and the [historical world] by being refracted in the reflected image" (FI, 48). 
For Iscr this is a vital element in articulating "literary fictionality" since the boundary-crossing at play 
in the pastoral romance prioritises neither the artificial nor the historical worlds but the act of 
combination that "allows for worlds to be surpassed within the world" (FI, 48). 
31 The importance of the sociohistorical Nvorld in Iser's reading at this point arises from the 
reinterpretation representation underwent at the moment the pastoral ceased to reflect its own outward 
historical boundaries. As Iser argues, "the nesting of literary genres epitomizes a departure from the 
received notion of representation, whose patternswere meant to give presence to the represented and 
not to be strategies of concealment. The telescoped genres serve to indicate both the limitations of 
representation and the necessity of conceiving what cannot be grasped. This two-tiered arrangement 
is itself a forin of representation, though it is no longer geared to the stratification of the social 
pyramid. Instead, the disputed correspondence betwecn the genýe and the sociaf hierarchy points to 
the growing expansion of the sociopoliticalworld .... The upshot of this recasting, of the traditional 
notion of representation is the emergence of two worlds: one that can be reprcscntPd and another that 
cannot, and that therefore is only to be impinged upon" (FI, 44). 
32 It is important to note here that Iser employs the temi'diffcrencc' not as a way of demonstrating an 
opposition between the two worlds of the pastoral romance. Rather, since the protagonists "maintain 
the presence of the first [%vorld] in the second, a network of possible connections arises. The 
difference does not, therefore, stabilize opposition but allows for the readability of two mutually 
exclusive semiotic systems as their interconnections evolve from and intend to bridge that difference, 
which - having no content of its own - cannot indicate any particular way of reading" (1,71,46-47). 
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whose operational power "doubles the partial presence of things with their absence .... 
This fictional designation always tells us of the absence of what it makes present as 
quality, conceivability and intention", three tiers in Bentham's overall conceptualisation 
(FI, 129). While Iser moves away from Bentham's ideas, principally because they 
remain tied to the funct7ionality and ihtentionddity of fiction, he nonetheless incorporates 
the notion of doubling as the making present of an absent into his own work: "Being 
something else within one's consciousness without giving tip what one thillks onesetf t9 
be - this turns out to be a human need that literature uncovers by. meeting it in a 
striking variety of ways" (EI, 246; my emphasis) not the least of wl-ach is the 
simultaneity of mutually exclusive sen-ýiotic systems upon which the pastoral takes 
shape. In the first instance then, boundary-crossing is made possible by the awareness 
of the relation between a recognisable hidden reality and the subterfuge employed to 
achieve certain ends. Furthermore, according to Iser, the threshold that is crossed 
between the mask and the identity of the prince entails an act of doubling as the 
copresence of imagination and consciousness initiated by fictionality: "Fictionality thus 
becomes a medium for the manifestation of double meaning" (RI, 69). However, Iser 
also argues that the prince stages his identity behind a mask by appealing to fantasy "in 
the service of a hidden reality that was to find expression through language" (EI, 69). 
Hence, language enables the hidden to appear (even as such) vis-A-vis fictionality. As I 
noted above, fictionality in Iser's work is the conjunction between the acts of selection 
and combination that, working together, produce "relationships in the [literary] text" 
(EI, 8) out of the "fields of reference" authors have available to them. The emphasis 
on relationality allows Iser to argue that not only do authors constantly cross the 
boundaries that ostensibly separate each of these fields, but thdt, in the text itself, the 
components of these fields similarly break the confines of their own reference , points 
and conjoin with others in a new "intertextual field of reference" (EI, 9) opened by the 
initial acts of selection and combination. This new field of reference coils back on the 
language of the text itself, stripping it of its denotative function and transforming it 
"into a function of figuration" (FI, 10). It is this function that ultimately allows 
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language to "indicate, through its figurations, the linguistic untranslatability of its 
references" (FI, 11). Hence, from the beginning of his analysis, Iser conceptualises 
language as the medium through which an'unheard of phrase' gets expressed; or, more 
accurately, is exposed as such, as a phrase which is beyond the pale of language. Not 
unlike Kawin and Levinas, Iser gives language the role of bridging the rift between an 
inside and an outside on the basis of which boundary-crossing has meaning. Ijoubling 
in Iser is therefore, a direct response to language! s ability to open an outside tys. 
While this outside is not, to be sure, a world that is not implicitly located in the 
semantic relations of the text itself, it is nonetheless not reducible to those semantic 
relations. As such, there is a gap between the two that is bridged by a consciousness 
striving to unify the two through a language whose failure, as in Kawin, becomes a 
productive force in its own right. 33 
As in Levinas, where the transition from a first to a second order exteriority is 
accomplished in the ego's awareness of an other the ego cannot accommodate or make 
equal to its represe ntations of itself, an awareness in which language bridges the rift 
that separates the ego and the other in the commandment to speak, the priority of 
language in the making present of a putative Outside not reducible to language is 
upheld in Iser's formulations as well. In Iser, language inserts itself between the initial 
movement of selection and the more complex associations accomplished in the 
movement of combination. The difference between selection and combination rests 
upon the latter's ability to "endow the imaginary with a specific form according to the 
relations to be established", a form which "eludes verbalization" (FI, 11), whereas 
selection "encapsulates extratextual realities into the text, turns the elements chosen 
into contexts for each other, and sets them up for obsefvation against. those elements it 
has excluded" (EI, 6). Selection provides a contextual and intertextual site for the 
combination of lexical and semantic elements that, finally, give a form to the imaginary. 
As fictionalising acts, both selection and combination operate on the basis that they 
33 See above pp. 12,25-26. 
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bring together elements from different fields of reference; that is, on the basis of 
boundary-crossing. But the movement of combination is, strictly speaking, a linguistic 
one, one that employs the conjunction of various different lexical and semantic 
modalities. The transition from the movement of selection to that of combination is 
therefore accomplished by language, by a comFinafion -oTlingtfistic elements that points 
to the very extralinguistic form of the imaginary the combination gives access to. 
Language is therefore employed in order to point towards the outside of language; th4f 
is, the ineffable conceived within the ordinary analysis as that which cannot be 
adequately verbalised. As Iser argues, 
there is no verbalization of the relatedness of semantic enclosures, let 
alone of the revolutionary event of their transgression .... Thus, the 
cardinal points of the text defy verbalization, and it is only throýgh 
these open structures within the linguistic patterning of the text that 
the imaginary can manifest its presence. From this fact we can 
deduce one last achievement of the fictive in the fictional text: It 
brings about the presence of the imaginary by transgressing language 
itself. In outstripping what conditions it, the imaginary reveals itself 
as the generative matrix of the text (EI, 20-21; my emphasis). 
This entire configuration is important in Iser's overall intention to give response to 
the apparent need humans have for literature. By positioning the text's creation within 
the relationship between selection and combination that is grounded by an 
extralinguistic matrix, Iser is able to argue that 
if the plasticity of human nature allows, through its multiple culture- 
bound patternings, limitless human self-cultivation, literature 
becomes a panorama of what is possible, because it is not hedged in 
either by the limitations or by the considerations that determine the 
institutionalized organizations within which human life otherwise 
takes its course. To monitor changing manifestations of self- 
fashioning, and yet not coincide with any of them, makes the 
interminable staging of ourselves appear as the postponement of the 
end (EI, 297). 
In the same way that the imaginary finds its form through the boundary-crossing upon 
which the relation between selection and combination is based, human life finds its 
form through its own attempts to double itself, thereby allowing itself to be equal to 
itself only by being its own other, its double. For Isqr, the pre-eminent form through 
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which this doubling is accomplished is literature since literature, as a medium grounded 
upon "literary fictionality" whose own mode of operation brings about "the coexistence 
of the mutually exclusive" (FI, 79), demands for its communication a reader who is, at 
one and the same time, present in the book and necessarily absent from it. 34 In Iser's 
present work, it is this need for literature and, more predisely, 71iterary fictiondlity" - 
our ability to double ourselves through the fictive nature of the fictional text -'that 
promotes literature! s anthropological importance. 35 Because it is grounded on, the 
relation between selection and combination that opens us to an imaginary that lacks a 
name, literary fictionality is the movement of doubling that, Iser argues, is integral to 
the play element in human life. 36 This play element in the fictionalising acts of 
selection and combination, and thus of literary fictionality itself, inevitably leads to the 
notion of fiction as essentially a differential act, one Iser explores in his analysis of 
Jeremy Bentham, Hans Vaihinger and, finally, Nelson Goodman. Iser's analysis leads 
him to conclude that, since Kant, "the thematization of fiction has ... 
developed as a 
series of changing predications, all of which lead ultimately to providing fiction with 
34 As is well known, for Iser the reader is both a character in and an observer of the text he or she 
reads. For a detailed analysis of this relation, see 7he Implied Reader. Patterns of Communication in 
Prose I, -tction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1976) and The Act ofReading: 
A Theory ofA esthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1978), two essential texts in the 
development of Iser's reader-response theory. 
35 Should we not say literatures' importance since it is not clear that 'literature' refers to a class of 
writing which easily exceeds cultural boundaries? Iser tends to employ totalising concepts - 
'literature', 'human life' - that, left unbroken by the development of his argument, appear to undern-tine 
the importance he places on the coprcsence of mutually exclusive worlds. A portion of this arises 
from his support of Nelson Goodman's rather commonplace notion that worlds are only ever 
constructed within a world; that is, within a set of preconditions as a ground from which an outside 
can enter orbe recognised as such. How then, would Iser explain the relationship between mutually 
exclusive worlds that are introduced to each other through the foreignness of a text itself, that is, a 
text which did not fit the category or character of literature as it is defined by lVestern discourses? 
What, for example, would Iser say about a text like Edmund Jabýs' The Book ofQuestions or any one 
of Blanchot's novels? Are these texts not, in some specific sense, foreign to the institutionalised 
reading that is allowed for and engendered by academia on the basis that they conjoin two ways of 
writing that, traditionally, have been construed as completely distinct and, in some cases, mutually 
exclusive? Or, for that matter, does the coprcscnce of precolonial and colonial texts within the 
boundaries of Carpentier's novels not suggest, on the basis once again of thevery foreignness of those 
texts, that Goodman's approach to the problem is rather simplistic in nature and does not drive to the 
heart of what is essential to it; that is, in terms of the study I am involved in here, the yery space that 
makes the relationship possible? - 
36 See above, pg. 68-69 
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some kind of substratum" (EI, 166). 37 Since this substratum invariably provides 
foundations for fiction that force fiction, as a mode of communication, to "appear as 
something determinate" but which, because of varying systems, can always appear "as 
something else" (FI, 166), Iser concludes that the elemental 'nature! of fiction can only 
be realised when fiction "becomes the differential between decomposition and 
composition" (FI, 166). The between then, of the differential function of selection and 
combination that identifies literary fictionality. Again, this differential function "makeq, 
it possible for [human beings] to operate beyond their limitations. This may entail 
bringing within the necessary pragmatic bounds states of affairs that transcend 
language 03entham) or consciousness (Vaihinger) or existing world versions 
(Goodman), as well as enabling human beings to reach out into an otherwise 
inaccessible reality by way of adjusting it to prevailing exigencies" (FI, 170). 
However, when absence becomes the mediating condition of the between that 
separates mutually exclusive worlds, as is evident in Carpentier, then the between itself 
must be reconceived beyond the act of differentiation as a means by which human's 
overstep their own limitations (as an end or goal). 38 That is, the between as act 
37 In Bentham's epistemology, this substratum is founded upon a notion of usefulness which he 
derives from his reinterpretation of Locke's concept of the subject in relation to what Bentham 
considers are the indispensable fictions of law and his understanding of experience. This 
reinterpretation then turns towards the 'as-if character of the fictitious quality of fiction which, in 
turn, leads Bentham to inscribe an inseparable link between fiction, language and discourse. In 
Vaihinger's nominalism this'as-if character is, of course, pursued more forcefully in Vaihinger's 
attention to the "link between fiction and consciousness" which Bentham had ignored (FI, 130). The 
substrata for fiction in Vaihinger becomes a question of functionality that would be accessed by 
breaking the strict link inscribed between fiction and language that subtends Bentham's arguments. 
What this finally allows is a sense of the functionality of fiction in the attempt to "calculate and 
process reality" (FI, 150). "By pin-pointing this function Vaihinger makes fiction itself the object of 
cognition, and it emerges as a particular hybrid" (FI, 152). Finally, in Goodman's constructhrist 
approach, the notion of the function (and location) of fiction, which was central to both Bentham and 
Vaihinger in varying degrees, is removed "so that only traces are left. of tlýs strange inteilt to pro-tide 
a tangible base for the ftinction of fiction. Indeed it is only these traces that still permit a degree of 
insight into fiction, which otherwise remains ungraspable, even though it continues to funýion 
prolifically" (171,167). The removal of old paradigms finally allows Goodman to shift the emphasis 
from "fiction as representation to fiction as intervention" (FI, 167). For a full discussion of these 
writers see R, 87-170. 
38 My attention to Iser's analysis of the pastoral is intended to open the question of the role absence 
plays in the relationship between subterfuge and recognition. While Iser asserts that his own 
conceptualisations move away from the notion of the function of fiction, his attention to and 
affirmation of overstepping the limitations imposed upon us through the roles we are destined to fulfil 
reinscribes intentionality and goal direction back into the reinterpretation of fiction vis-A-vis the 
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becomes, in the encounter with absence, the impossibility of identification (with a prior 
possibility) as the affirmation of an identity in circulation around absence. The 
possibility for set(-identification is therefore made possible in this encounter with 
absence. 
Consequently, once we understand absence as active postponement, refusal to 
arrive, impossibility of being present, then we are required to rethink identity in ways 
subtly dissimilar to Iser. Rather than the movement between subterfuge and 
recognition whereby the mask is employed by an ego whose self-identity is constantly 
at work, as prior possibility for the division between the two, absence requires us to 
conceive the mask as identity. This would, in turn, require us to think the relation 
between subterfuge and recognition in a manner that would correspond more 
accurately to a sense of duplicity informed by absence, one we have seen at work in 
Carpentier's Lospasosperdidos. To conceive the mask as identity Iser's models would 
need to be replaced by a set of multiple crossings; a chiasmus then, where no priority is 
given to one 'signature' as the founding principle for all the others. The founding 
principle is the absence around which all the 'signatures' revolve. This model is 
founded only upon absence, the absence of a kernel of truth or meaning to which we 
could refer in order to establish a singular identity as that which the mask conceals; 
that is, in the pastoral romance, the prince as prince. And, contrary to Iser, it is not the 
case that we simply determine the employment of one mask from a set of possible 
masks that would best suit the achievement of certain goals, since this would 
immediately reinscribe a singular identity at the core of this model, one which guided 
the employment of certain strategies to achieve goals it set before itself. Such a 
singular identity is always absent.. In this sense, masksas identity are. always in 
circulation around absence as a precondition of their own multiplicity)9 
fictive and the imaginary. Iser's protestations to the contrary, in his formulations the purpose of 
fiction is to allow us to overstep our limitations by becoming something we are not. 
39 As %ve will see in the analyses of Garcli MAN 
t 
ýý's La hojarasca [LeafStorml and El otoho del 
patriarca [The A utumn ofthe Patriarchl 
Ahd lt*'gulfb'ý Pedro Pdranto, the literary text that self- 
consciously invokes a multiplicity of voices qs a m6de'of expressing its central themes has this 
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Identity as multiplicity of masks means that the boundary between (an) inside and 
(an) outside - mask and identity - is never inscribed in order to be crossed. The 
principal factor that structures the relation between mask and identity is absence; that 
is, the absence of any kernel of representational truth to which we could appeal in 
adjudicafing the realI-hidden belu-nd orbeneatb the false propriety of the mask. The 
mask constructs identity in the absence of identity, and is therefore the creative source 
of its own identity. In this sense, all fiction is a mask, the creative production of an 
identity. This productivity is not a sure way of eliminating absence but remains, 
always, as a response to absence: absence remains, for the mask always constructs 
identity as a substitute for the anonymity of "I". In this respect, Iser's attention to the 
notion of disguising is revealing. Once again, Colfts' analysis is helpful herp. 
In his reading of CortAzar's Rayuela, Colds argues that Horacio's cominitment to 
rational mediation as a way of ordering his own world is a direct response to his 
unwýlingness to make an ethical commitment to the process of dealienation. Such a 
commitment can only arise when Horacio finally discovers the significance of 
"participatory processes over meaningful endings" (PL, 62), when he discovers that 
freedom from alienating structures can only be experienced when one gives up the 
planned opposition involved in contemplating the structure of things; that is, when one 
agrees to take a leap. 40 Until then, Horacio is committed only to a rationality that 
concept of circulation around absence as a precondition. Not surprisingly, in both Garcia Mdrquez 
and Rulfb, this absence is formally inscribed in the figure of a dead body or bodies as emblematic of 
the presence of absence as itself a precondition for expression, self-identification and self-creation: 
Not surprisingly because death and, more importantly, the relation between the dead and the living 
embodies emblematically the very between from out of which this writing emerges, a condition I will 
explore shortly. 
40 "In my view, interpretations that dwell on whether Horacio ýills himself, goes insane, or both, 
miss the point of the scene's open-endedness. It is not that we don't know what happens, být rather 
that the leap itself is what happens. Horacio has learned to valorize participator), processes over 
meaningful endings. And we should be forced, deprived of an ending, to attend to the act itself, 
precisely as Horacio has learned to do. It is the leap itself, the act or experience, and not what follows 
it, its meaning, that we must focus on" (PL, 62). 1 %vill be dealing with the notion of the leap later in 
my discussion of the differences between Paz and Rulfb. In preparation however, recall that 
Carpentier clearly refused the Romantic desire for immediacy and plenitude because he began to 
realise that his mediation vis-A-vis narrative and, precisely, the presence of the authorial figure in the 
text, brought to light the inherent literary conceit of such a gesture. In this respect, ColAs never seems 
anxious to ask whether or not "unalienatcd immediacy" is e'itli6r possible or, what is more, desirable. 
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cannot acconu-nodate any sort of detour because, as Colds points out, "Only a searcher 
is annoyed by detours. Indeed only when one is searching does a detour appear as 
such. Authentic wandering cannot be interrupted because it presupposes no stationary 
standpoint" (PL, 58). For Colds, the leap is vital in Horacio's transformation or 
conversion to an 'uh4lienated-immediacy" because it requires no necessary ending or 
plan for its fulfilment as leap; that is, as commitment to "participatory, materW, and 
ethical practice" (PL, 62). In the same sense that authentic wandering can nevgr be 
confronted with a detour, one can never, strictly speaking, disguise what one did not 
have; that is, an identity the perception of which corresponds to an inward turning self- 
referentiality which Iser's efforts have been trying to avoid. The prince has himself as 
prince because of a global understanding of his place in his social, Wstorical and 
cultural order. Similarly, in Goodman worldmaking is possible on the basis of a tacit 
knowledge of shared realities or, at least, components of those realities. But it is 
precisely this global understanding which we cannot have a representation of, even 
according to Iser's own admission. 41 In the pastoral romance, there is always a 
common ground upon which the prince stands even while he might be said to be beside 
himself. In this sense, the prince is never absent, but rather hidden behind his ulterior 
motivations; that is, his sexual desires. In contradistinction to this position, the 
presence of absence requires us to redefine mask as that present image whose 
anonymity is not evidence of "I" peering through from behind the cover of subterfuge. 
Rather, anonymity is the face of identity. To be anonymous is to be oneself in the 
midst of the anonymity of existence, in the raidst of all that is unknown to us, in the 
ný(d)st and separation of relation. 
41 See above pg 70: "We ourselves are separated from ourselves by the very fact that we exist but 
cannot know what eýdstcnce is" (FI, 82). 
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Fiction's A bsen t Source 
I argued earlier, following on from Echevarria, that Carpentier's Lospasosperdidos 
represents a moment in the Cuban writer's awareness that the possibility of there being, 
properly speaking, a Latin American literary tradition was founded upon a direct 
confrontation with absence as the mediating element-in his own efforts and discoveries 
during the early 1950's. At that time, I also argued that the awareness of absence leads 
directly to the notion of the separation of relation as it is developed in response to 
mediation, a response which we have seen is also essential to Colds' reading of 
Rayuela. Given the addition of my critique of Iser's conceptualisation of absence, it is 
now possible to pursue Carpentier's relation to the concept of absence more fully by 
exploring the intricacies of El acoso. 
We have already seen how Echevarria clearly pinpoints the relationship between 
Carpentier's desire to return to virginal America vis-A-vis the literary text and how that 
return is marked in Carpentier's writing by the awareness of the repetition of certain 
European texts which have been instrumental in creating and dissen-driating a vision of 
that virginality. It is important to point out here the importance in Carpentier's writing 
of the desire to con oin history and narrative. As Echevarria argues, "the question of 
history and the narrative was at the very core of the experiments in the forties and the 
concept of "marvellous American reality". There ... it was the recovery of 
history from 
the texts that contained it that motivated Carpentier's enterprise - turning the fictional 
text into a pastiche of the texts from which history was recovered, and recovering with 
those texts the concert of history, already present as an organic continuum with 
nature" (PH, 236). In my analysis of Lospasosperdidos within the context of the 
I 
separation of relation I have tried to show that Carpentier disdovers the impossibility of 
returning to primeval purity, to the origin, as emblematic of the duality inherent in the 
subject of Latin America itself Echevarria is able to locate the problem: if Latin 
America is the product of texts that have been written during the precolonial and 
colonial periods, then any attempt to discover the origin of its own history will 
inevitably lead Latin Americans back through those -texts, thereby exposing that history 
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as essentially duplicated - it is theirs while it remains generatively possible because of 
another - with the consequence that any possibility of there being an origin of that 
history is irretrievably erased. The absence of any origin then becomes the possibility 
of self-creation vis-i-vis the amalgamation and hybridisation of those texts that 
preceded Carpentices own text. The suFJect of Lospasosperdidos (which is not to be 
confused with what the novel may or may not be about) circulates around absence as a 
precondition for its own self-identification and self-creation. What this circulaling 
around absence suggests to Carpentier is that history and narrative conjoin in the 
present-time of the author's own writing. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, by 
positioning the narrator in the awareness of his own duplicity, Carpentier demonstrates 
that not only is "the fantastic as stemming from the fusion of naturqý and creative 
consciousness ... unveiled as a 
literary conceit" (PH, 190), 42but also that the 
impossibility of returning to one's origin places (the transparency of) the self and the 
history to which it could belong in order to be identical with itself in abeyance; and, 
secondly, that once the narrator is suspended as a self-identical being, the text in which 
the narrator finds him/herself becomes recognisable as a 'historical drama' only through 
the constant bifurcation of the past through its own (that is, the text's) multiple, 
intertextual connection s. The subject is, therefore, recognisable to itself (only) as the 
multiplication and bifurcation of itself through these textual convergences. Not unlike 
Iser's argument, in which he underscored the importance of the slippage of the sign for 
the pastoral romance, one which demanded the incorporation of different literary 
genres into the genre of the pastoral itself, Carpentier's protagonist in Los pasos 
perdidos becomes aware that he, as artist, can only make witness to the textual 
interconnections present throughout history as a meaný by which to know himself, that 
is, to return to himself, the protagonist writes in a present which conjoins history and 
narrative as an act of self-identification. 
42 Echevarria tells us he is using the Nvordconceit' "both in its present meaning and in the old poetic 
sense of binding image and concept" (PH, 22). Also, recall the complete misreading McHale offers 
regarding Carpentier and Io real niarmilloso I alluded to above. See above pp 41-42. 
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Echevarria claims that one of the difficulties in the analysis of Carpentier-'s writing as 
a whole is locating a singular voice in an beuvre that consistently reappropriates 
precolonial and colonial texts in the construction of its own works. These 
reappropriations are so extensive Echevarria believes that only a rigorous genealogical 
b cou . 
43 In addition to this, Echevarria researc tild afford him a gilimpse of that oeuvre 
also discovered that Carpentier's own statements about his writing, about his place in"a 
literary tradition it may, in fact, be impossible to locate, his reflections on the 
relationship between that anonymous tradition and certain European movements such 
as Surrealism, statements that appeared to contradict each other, undern-dried the 
possibility of easily locating a singular authorial voice at the heart of Carpentier's 
oeuvre itself. More importantly, however, Echevarria, as if infected by the, process 
Carpentier will eventually become fully cognisant of, discovers a "series of infinitely 
repeated and receding sequences" (PH, 183) of texts from which Lospasosperdidos 
has disseminated, a discovery which is at the heart of Carpentier's own writing: not 
only did Echevarria discover an important "discord at the centre of Carpentier's 
production" (PH, 17), but an indispensable relation between the return to origins, 
fiction, and the possibility of constructing a new beginning that could arise out of the 
sequence of texts that contain the historical and cultural memory of Latin America 
43 It is important to distinguish between two methods of performing genealogical research. In the 
first method, which I will call the surface-depth relations analysis, proper names are attributed with 
specific socio-historical functions within a set of relations which branch out from a source at the top to 
an, albeit in principle, infinite subdivision of proliferating proper names. This analysis is typically 
employed in determining and illustrating the influences that have affected the development of an 
author or authors in relation to their forbears. It is an analysis that allcmpts to read both an author's 
life and their works on the basis of a movement from surface to depth whereby the degrees and details 
of symbolic meaning grow exponentially as one passes through the stratifications on the way, in prin- 
ciple, to the kernel of (representational) meaning which%vill bring us unto the truth of We author's life 
and works. All good attempts to construct or represent an author's oeuvre are studies that.. invoke this 
analysis. The second methodwhich I will call the non-linear, shallow rift analysis, deals In concepts 
rather than proper names, attempting to demonstrate at what point certain concepts affect the writing 
of certain authors, rather than attempting to demonstrate how one author inherits concepts supposedly 
engendered or, at least, redeployed by a previous author. This analysis does not move from surface to 
depth in order to discover that kernel of (representational) meaning, but is focused on the remaining 
'husk' left over by a reading that attempts to locate the convergence of concepts within a large body of 
textual practices. It is this latter analysis that is at work in this thesis as a whole. In principle, it is an 




itself. Consequently, in the process of attempting to portray Carpentier's writing 
within the moth-eaten notion of a unified oeuvre44 Echevarria discovers instead an 
uncontrollable proliferation of voices, a type of fragmentation of both the subject of 
Carpentier's writing and of the very subject of Carpentier himself. What we discover in 
readingEchevarria reading Carpentier is that the centre of a writing Which constantly 
reveals itself through a series of autobiographical misprisionS45 is one that is, Properly 
speaking, always slipping away, always postponed. In the end, Carpentier's oelpre, in 
the proliferation of its voices, seemed to annul the notion of a unified, progressive, 
linear development which is a necessary element in the possibility of locating an 
oeuvre. Carpentier's many voices seem to undo the oeuvre itself and, thereby, undo 
unity, progress and linearity. The difficulty in locating the origin opin Carpentier is 
therefore consistent with Latin America! s exile from any zero moment of creation, an 
origin to which any considered reading of the appropriate texts could return us or Latin 
American's themselves., The only reality that can, therefore, be returned to is the 
reality of those texts, the reality of fiction. In the absence of any clearly definable 
origin from which to piece together an oeuvi-e, Echevarria inadvertently locates the 
centre from which Carpentier's writing springs; that is, the absence of any "organic 
44 In Echevarria's defence, I feel it necessary to point out that he is aNvare of the problems involved in 
the attempt to unify Carpentier's writing. In fact, Echevarria sees such an attempt as fundamental to 
understanding Carpentier's writing as a whole precisely because of the impossibility of achieving it. 
"The order in which Carpentier's works were written constitutes a way into the mechanics of the texts, 
a route, as it were, full of meanderings and retracings. The recharting of such a route is of necessity a 
charting of error, both in its connotation of mistake and in the etymological sense of wandering. But 
because of the nature of the route and the metaphorical quality of its temporal unfolding, such an 
iternerary cannot arrive at a synthesis, which would amount to a total and final fiction about 
Carpentier. At the same time, the diachronic unfolding of such a structure renders the very form of 
fiction unavoidable, and in a sense turns this book [that is, The Pilgfim At Home] into a sort of 
metanovel" (PH, 24). Echevarria therefore, seems to be giving priority to the contradiction inherent 
in Carpentices writing as a clue to the need for an attempt at synthesising his W'Orks. However, if 
synthesis is ultimately impossible, then a vain attempt at achieving a transcendent viciNpoint from 
which the 'mctanovel' could take shape betrays an unwillingness to respond to th -knomadic quality of Ci 
Carpentier's works. Nomadic, that is, in the sense that they are not attached to any singular identity 
as a guiding thread for their construction or for our ability to understand them. 
45 Carpcntiez's "disavowal of early works such as iEcue-Yamba-0! and his defence of the theories of 
the prologue to The Kingdom of this 11"orld years after its publication, while holding views blatantly 
opposed to them, is a clear indication that Carpentier is always a problematic and persistent context 
for Carpentier" (PH, 24). 1 will be addressing a similar formulation in Fuentes'reading of Nikolai 
Gogol at the end of this study. 
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connectedness" (PH, 21). 46 The principal difference between Echevarria's analysis and 
my own is the degree to which this absence becomes central to our various readings of 
LospasosperdidosandElacoso. Nonetheless, from these preliminary reflections on 
Echevarria! s own difficulties in his approach to Carpentier's writing, it should be 
apparent that for Carpentier the "revolutionary nature of writing" is grounded in the 
co-axial relationship between the lost steps, which could not lead him back to the 
origin (either of existence and time or of a Latin American literary tradition), and the 
perception of an absent centre around which his and perhaps all Latin American 
writing revolves. It is therefore precisely this absence that fosters the creative and re- 
creative activities of a fiction perpetually moving back and forth across the shallow 
fifts of a textual convergence. Echevarria! s sophisticated response to the rhallenge put 
forward by Carpentier's writing is a credit not only to Echevarria's own skill at 
synthesising a vast network of influences that have made their mark on Carpentier, but 
to the complex and dynamic historia of Carpentier's own writing. However, what 
seems particularly perplexing in EchevarrWs analysis is his decision to conform to the 
dictates of genealogy (as surface-depth relations analysis) when he admits that such a 
lineage is, in the final analysis, incapable of dealing with what is at the heart of 
Carpentier's writing. If the journey back to the source of human existence is gauged in 
terms of a Romantic desire to join human consciousness with nature, it is vital to 
attend to the manner in which the impossibility of such a return is worked out within 
Carpentier's texts, ones which, by including specific texts from the "Romantic 
Naturphilosophie" (PH, 28), demonstrate the contradiction inherent in the proposition 
itself. in order to return to virginal America, Carpentier must first have a conception of 
the very purity and immediacy which is ascribed to America, a'conception conveyed to 
Carpentier through the writing (that is, the mediation) of the Romantics. In s6rt, the 
return to virginal America is mediated by the Romantics, a mediation which 
problematises the notion of their being a singular, pure and unmediated origin to return 
46 Echevarria concludes his study by affirming the importance of the notion of absencc in 




Although Echevarria does fall back into the old habit of topographically and 
thematically inscribing Carpentier within an apparently rigorous set of temporal 
bandS, 47 he does make it clear that the primary difficulty in achieving any lasting 
success in such an-insciiption is Carpenflees own problematisation of the relation 
between author and work. The inclusiveness of birth and death, which I will' attend to 
shortly, eventually leads Carpentier to reassess the Romantic trust in the fusiop of 
meaning with a sign system whose emergence is seen in the transcendental code of 
nature. As we have seen, by Los pasosperdidos Carpentier had already conceived 
nature, and especially thejungle, as "the Unknown" (PP, 144; LS, 132) which emerged 
in all its anonymity out of the impossibility of attributing any meaning to its signs. 
However, at the close of Los pasos perdidos there is a sense that this anonymity has 
not yet taken its toll on the subject of the novel itself The musicologist has discovered 
that he cannot return to the origin, but he has not yet called himself into question; that 
is, thepossibility of his own identity. This radicalisation of the dislocation from any 
return to original innocence is pursued in El acoso where, as we will see, the 
impossibility of a return to onesetf is inscribed in the language of death and 
fragmentation. 
* ** 
With these preliminary comments in mind, we can now turn to El acoso where, as 
Echevarria argues, Carpentier reworks the Romantic serniotic system by placing his 
protagonists in the position of utter and irresolvable duplicity. It is within this duplicity 
that the notions of fragmentation and death become increasingly important in 
I 
47 These are: The period between "the mid-twentics to 1939" in which Carpenti 'r attempts "a unique 4 
and different form of narrative ... grounded in the symbolic plenum of Afro-Cuban religion"; the 
period " 1939-1949 ... encompassing what has come to be known as "magical realism"" and which tfcentrcs on the conceit of the natural fusion of Latin American history and a process of uTitingvi, hich 
excludes the conscious author" - my concern with Carpentier beginning midway %vithin this period; 
"the third moment ... from 1949 to the mid-fifties" which reassess the relationship between the author 
and "his product" by responding to "the alienation of the %,, Titer" within the "context of contemporary 
political history"; and, finally, the period from "the mid-fifties to the present" (Echevarria's study was 
written in 1977). See PH, 32-33. 
93 
The Unkncum Tongue 
Carpentier's writing and ones he will explore in increasing detail in those novels that 
follow El acoso. As I have already indicated, my interest in El acoso is the degree to 
which the absence that was a consequence of the protagonist's journeys in Los pasos 
per&dos places certain demands on Carpentier himself, as an artist for whom the 
question of self-identification could not be posed vVit'hin the confines of Romanticism; 
that is, within the confines of a unification with original innocence fostered by a 
Romantic sensibility that sought to uni6i signs with their putative meanings by 
achieving ultimate forms from Nature to which human consciousness could be fused. 
As Echevarria points out, by casting himself in the literary work itself 411 Carpentier 
calls into question the possibility of locating an authorial voice whose efforts could 
fulfil themselves in the very unity of that work. In El acoso these configuKations are 
pursued through the complete duplication of the protagonists and the resulting 
dislocation of subjectivity. If in Lospasosperdidos we come to recognise the 
impossibility of returning to the prior possibility of a Latin American literary tradition 
and, indeed, of a Latin American identity routed in that tradition, in El acoso we come 
to recognise the more radical impossibility of returning to the prior possibility of the 
self. 
The impossibility of achieving a union between the significant and the signified is 
foregrounded in El acoso in the separation that frames the development of 
characterisation and the interaction between the protagonists themselves. As we will 
see, this separation is not, strictly speaking, a phenomenal distance but the very space 
that is opened by the impossibility of unification, one which the two protagonists share 
and one, therefore, which drives to the duplicity at the heart of the novel. In fact, the 
48 "The war of time is waged [in Los pasos perdidos] in the act of writing, and the only mythic figure 
that can emerge is that of the modern, "Titer, who is by definition the undoer of myths, including his 
own" (PH, 162). Echevarria pursues this in a detailed accounting of the relation between the text of 
Los pasos perdidos and Carpcntices own statements about its construction which leads Echevarria to 
consider the problematisation of autobiography as indicative of Carpentices decision to fictionalise 
himself rather than maintain a clear cut distinction between author and narrator. This decision 
ultimately had the result that, because the narrator remains anonymous throughout the novel and 
there is therefore no way of establishing what his identity is, "the narrator [becomes] the space 
between the "I" and the "he""; that is, between the first and third person pronouns through which the 
narrator is 'disclosed to us at the beginning of the novel (PH, 165). 
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notion of sharing is important to any understanding of duplicity and one that is lacking 
in Iser's formulations. Duplicity would never appear as such, that is, as a concept in its 
own right, without a background against which the concept distinguished itself While 
this seems a commonplace, it drives to the heart of the assumptions at work in Iser's 
arguments; namely, that -identity is assumed tobe duplicitous prior to any conceptual 
grounding of that duplicity in the reconceptualisation signification underwent during 
the Renaissance. In short, Iser requires us to accept the former in order to understand 
the significance of the latter in the broader context of understanding the role fiction 
plays in supporting our efforts (and our need) to reach beyond ourselves by doubling 
ourselves. But why should we accept that identity is, in fact, duplicitous in the first 
place? The answer to this requires us to attend to the question of the possibility of 
relation generally speaking and, more specifically, of the relation we have with 
ourselves andMth others. By locating that possibility in the separation of relation, I 
hope to show that identity is duplicitous because of an elemental unknowing, an 
impossibility grounded in part by the inability to experience the experiences of others, 
one that points directly to an opacity at the heart of relation itself. that is, opacity as 
separation as the condition of possibility for relation. Duplicity therefore arises when 
we are faced with the impossibility of unification, either between signs and meaning, 
between self and other, 49 or, indeed, between one culture and another. In the 
following analysis it will, therefore, be necessary to attend to the sharing'O of 
separation as an affirmation of duplicity. " 
49 This is why Levinas pays particular attention to the notions of doubling and resemblance, since 
they are suggestive of the field opened when the ego confronts an outside it cannot recuperate into its 
own identity; that is, its attempts to be identical ivith itself through a negation of that which is beyond 
it or by cnfolding that beyond back into itself, thereby appropriating it for itself. ' 
50 The notion of sharing is particularly important to Bataille's formulations of erotic. As I 
mentioned above, the examination of eroticism exceeds the limits of this thesis bui needs to be sign 
posted here in order to point to the suggestive nature of my claims. Bataille's analysiswould be 
instrumental in developing those claims in the direction of eroticism, towards that moment in which 
the erotic is exposed as the sharing of AvIiat it is impossible to share. 
51 This sharing will come to be recognised as the only prior possibility for self-identification 
conceived within the broader parameters of philosopl-de discourse and thereby reaffirms the heed to 
break from a tradition that either attempts to locate that possibility in a material world or, equally, in 
an origin which exceeds time and space. I am what I have given away, that essential part of me that, 
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From the very first pages, separation frames our encounter with the protagonists of 
Elacoso. "SinfoniaEroica, composta per festeggiare il sourvenire di un grand'Uomo, 
e dedicata a Sua Altezza Serenissima il Principe di LobkovAtz da Luigi van Beethoven, 
op. 55, No. III delle Sinfonie ... The startling crash of the slamming 
door shattered his 
childish pride at having understood those word§" (ob, -'-85; 
C, 3). ne first protagonist, 
a ticket seller at a theatre in a nameless city, occupies his time during those moments bf 
inactivity that are a mark of abject (that is, deferential) labour by reading a biography 
of Ludwig van Beethoven. The ticket seller believes that this apparent diversion from 
the monotony of subservient labour allows him access to a world (even a truth, a 
complete metaphysics) the audience to the performance of Beethoven's 'Eroica' can 
only feign an appreciation of. That world is, of course, the world of Beethoven 
himself. BeethoveWs inner psychism. From the very start, then, this protagonist places 
his trust in the power of the text to deliver him to the truth that lingers behind all the 
falsifying appearances of Beethoven handed out by poor conductors. "If he was there, 
perched on the stool, leaning against the wom damask curtain, in that ticket booth as 
narrow as a desk drawer, it was so he could leam to understand great things, because 
he admired things others kept behind closed doors, locked away from his poverty" (ob, 
87; C, 6). And yet, we can already detect a betrayal of the ticket seller in the very text 
that we are reading, suggesting that the text, as a form, may not hold out in the way 
the ticket seller believes it should: as the bearer of truth. The ticket seller is described 
as having a "childish pride" and as being engulfed in a "poverty" others appear to be 
aware of If the ticket seller recognises this it would only confin-n our suspicion that he 
is, in fact, an impoverished man whose attempt to "understand great things" through 
the mediation of the written word testifies to his lack of recogiiition that he constantly 
withdraws from the existence he believes the text gives access to, a lack inscribed in 
the apparent gap that separates him from the world he inhabits. This gap is foreclosed 
in the distance that separates the ticket seller from the people in the theatre lobby. 
in being essential, is not mine to give away. 
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The furs [the women] wore in spite of the heat made moisture 
collect on their necks and bosoms. To relieve themselves of the 
weight, they would let their stoles slip down, draping them from 
elbow to elbow across their backs as if they were thick festoons in a 
painted scene. I-Es eyes fled from what was so near yet so 
unattainable. -Beyond the 
flesh lay the park with its columns 
abandoned -to the cloudburst,, wuL -beyond the -par1c, 
beliind the 
doorway in shadows, the mansion with the Belvedere - once upon a 
time a manor house surrounded by pines and cypresses (ob, 86; C, 
5). 
The desire that erupts in the ticket seller at the sight of the erotic gestures of 
A 
women drives his imagination to bridge the gap that separates Ifim from their bodies. 
However, this drive onlY propels him towards a mYthic world he cannot reach because 
of his enclosure within the narrow world of his occupation as ticket seller and, more 
importantly, the narrowness of textuality expressed in the contradiLion of attempting 
to achieve unity of form and intention, signs and meaning through a text - the 
biography - that offers one version of the great Romantic composer Ludwig van 
Beethoven. The impossibility of bridging the gap between himself and the womeds 
bodies drives his imagination to prefigure an impossible world as a solution to the 
unattainability of their impossible bodies: one impossibility supplants another, thereby 
reinscribing and reaffirming the insurmountable gap that marks out his existence. In a 
moment of uncontrolled nostalgia (as an emblem of his vain attempts to bridge this 
gap), the ticket seller, as if reaching the absolute outer limits of his existence, imagines 
a woman lying in wait for him and him alone, waiting with her legs spread open like 
the biography he reads, the biography "whose pages were spread open before him" 
(ob, 89; C, 9) so that he alone could penetrate to the kernel of truth that lies behind all 
outward appearances. 
Enter the second protagonist: "At that very moment, an ambulancek passed in front 
of the building at top speed, swerved, and brutally slammed on its breaks. "A seat, " 
said an urgent voice. "Any seat, " the man added impatiently, while his fingers slid a 
bill through the bars of the ticket booth" (ob, 88; C, 7). Having failed to bridge the 
gap through the efforts of the imagination, the ticket seller, as if by divine providence - 
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for it is, after all, Truth that he seeks, the Purity of the One, the Unique - believes he is 
given the possibility of reconciling his desire with its object immediately that he 
recognises the bill as a sign: since all the cash books had been closed, that bill "became 
a bridge, parting the bars, piercing walls, stretching [him] toward the woman who was 
waiting - he could not imagine her in any way except waiting" (ob, 89; C, 8). And yet, 
the princess of his fairy tale is none other than a prostitute; that is, a substitute for the 
unattainable and real object of his desire. The bank note "would make him owner of,, 
the house without clocks - whose doors would stay locked even if visitors knocked 
and shouted - for an entire night" (ob, 90; C, 10). Hence, the bank note becomes a 
sign for the unification between his desire and its object by bridging the gap that 
separates him from his lover-in-waiting who, in being a prostitute, is never in waiting 
for him and can never be his. Because the object of his desire is substituted for by a 
prostitute who is, by definition, no one mads possession, the bank note actually 
signifies the impossibility of uniting desire with its object. And, because the bank note 
supports this dual signification, it testifies to the impossibility of uniting signs to a 
putative meaning resident in a True and Unique (that is, Absolute and Eternal) beyond. 
In this sense, everything is ordered for the ticket seller by the impossibility of 
unification; that is, precisely, the separation which drives the operations of the 
imagination. But, because it is this impossibility that frustrates the ticket seller's 
desires, he attempts, through a union with the prostitute, to close the gap he can not 
bridge. Unable to bridge the gap between desire and its object, the deprived and 
impoverished ticket seller believes he can nonethelessfill it up by embracing what, it 
happens, is only a substitute for an unattainable object. What the ticket seller does not 
I 
realise is that, on the one hand, it is precisely this gap that cannot be filled and, on the 
other, constantly resists any puerile attempts to circumvent it. 
This separation is pushed further in the characterisation of the second protagonist, 
the one for whom the novel gains its name, the one who rushes into the theatre in a 
desperate fury. The introduction of the second protagonist comes at the end of his 
story, just moments before he is shot at the conclusion of Beethoven's 'Eroicaý. Astep 
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back is decisive in understanding this protagonist's condition. We learn, as we move 
backwards through the novel, that he is a student at the local university and that he 
took up residence in the Belvedere in the old mansion. He soon leaves the closed 
quarters of the room, leaving behind a trunk With an assortment of personal belongings 
-he-bas no more interest in. But, years later, when he is on the run from the authorities, 
he returns to the Belvedere "in search of some final protection, bearing the weight of a 
hunted body 
.... Now, 
breathing in the scent of terniite-eaten papers, of the carýphor of 
dried ink, he found in that trunk something like a symbol, one only he could decipher, 
of Paradise before the Fall" (ob, 114; C, 43). This perception of time lost, of a purity 
unsullied by the duplicitous actions of people whose motivations lie concealed behind 
the vales of their subterfuge, their secrecy (the hunted one belongs to a radical 
movement through Which a plot to murder a government official was planned and 
executed), is mirrored in the other protagonist who, having arrived at his lover's house, 
is completely betrayed by the bank note he had earlier seen as a type of ultimate sign 
for restoration and unification. The prostitute he caresses with all the delusions of a 
man in search of Truth does not respond in kind but proceeds to complain about a 
recent visit by the police to her sacred chambers. Her complaints soon turn to outright 
fear at the prospect of being sent to the wometfs prison for involvement in a crime she 
has only recently become aware of, the murder committed by the second protagonist 
and for which he is being hunted. The ticket seller, feeling oppressed by her 
complaints, gives her the bank note telling her to treat herself to a drink only to find 
out that the bank note is a forgery. Immediately the prostitute realises that he has no 
money to pay for her services, she makes her excuses and sends him on his way. As 
soon as the ticket seller is ejected from the prostitute's house his imagination again 
strives to unify what she has made impossible for him, taking him off to places beyond 
the pale of time and the rain-soaked streets of his rejection. As if to overcome his 
despair, his imagination reaches back to his childhood, to the days of innocent games 
played with a female friend, to lost opportunities which are nonetheless preserved in all 
their purity in the image he has of them in his memory. And in that pathetic moment 
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Despair gave way to shame. He would never get anywhere, never 
free himself from that maids'room, from pressing his handkerchiefs 
on the mirror to dry, from wom socks tied up at the big toe with a 
piece of string, as long as the image of a prostitute was all it took to 
distract him from the True and the Sublime. He opened the book, 
whose pages turned blue in the flash of a neon sign (ob, 10 1- 102; C, 
ý-27). 
Once again, having failed to achieve a union between desire and its object, one that 
would bring about an encounter with the Truth, the ticket seller turns to the body of 
the biography for that flash of recognition that precedes all such encounters. The 
ticket seller's life is therefore marked by the oscillation between the duplicity of 
semiotic systems and of a failure to recognise that the text of the biography is, in this 
respect, no different than the text of the prostitute's body, the body he attempts to 
penetrate in order to break through the veils that conceal the True and the Sublime: 
both betray the sign as subterfuge, duplicity and pretence. 
Both protagonists share the space of this duplicity represented by the bank note and 
the mansion with the Belvedere: on the one hand, a sign of lost purity and, on the 
other, a refuge from the terrors of lost innocence after the fall. In this sense, after the 
disaster of the fall, nothing will ever again be unified. The nostalgic hope for reunion 
with that lost purity in the ticket seller is mirrored in the hunted one! s sentimental 
reminiscence of a lost time he can only dream about. In both, separation is the 
possibility for their relation to an external world and is, in fact, the condition which 
finally brings them together in the theatre at the end of the story. 
The significance of separation as the condition that brings the two protagonists 
together is foregrounded, once again, in the role of the bank note in the process of the 
narrative. After spending some time in the Belvedere, the hunted one's re6ge is 
L 
breached by the death of the mansion owner, a woman who looked after Wrn in his 
youth and who gave Wrn lodging during those early days of his education. With her 
death, the apartment below the Belvedere soon becomes filled with the crowd of 
people who have come to the old women's wake. The hunted one is now forced to 
leave his refuge, "to turn himself over to freedom - to the street, the crowds, the eyes - 
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which was like being called before a judge" (ob, 124; C, 58). When he finally gathers 
his courage and escapes the crowd farrrýing in the old lady's apartment, he is 
immediately gripped by the fear of his new found and undesired freedom. He knows 
he needs shelter and in order to acquire it he heads farther and farther away from the 
centre of the city, farther and farther away from contact with people. - Like the -ticket 
seller, he moves beyond the field of contact with others, into the very deep of night 
itself, into the blackness of a dark street and the shadows of a house, the only bouse 
where he knows he can find shelter: the house of the prostitute the ticket seller will 
later be thrown out of because his bank note is a forgery; the very bank note the ticket 
seller receives from the hunted one after the hunted one is also forced to abandon the 
prostitute's house. I 
The hunted one arrives at the prostitute! s house with the bank note in his pocket. 
After a brief sleep and an exchange of sexual embraces, the hunted one requests th at 
the prostitute contact his superiors in the underground movement he is involved with 
and, to that end, gives her the bank note to expedite her transportation across the city. 
However, when she returns to her house and attempts to pay a taxi driver his fare, he 
exclaims that the bank note is a fake. The ensuing argument draws the attention of a 
nearby policeman and, in the mounting tension, the hunted one makes a hasty retreat 
through a back window. In both cases, then, the bank note leads each protagonist to 
the house of the prostitute under the sign of unity and protection only to immediately 
cast them out because it is a duplicitous sign: it delivers exactly the opposite of what it 
promises: it is a lie that exposes both protagonists to a world they believe they are 
abandoning through the very sign of the bank note itself. The bank note therefore 
never signifies what the protagonists believe it signifies and, in this way, they are joined 
through the very duplicity of the sign opened by the separation of relation. And, as if 
this were not enough, after the hunted one is shot dead at the end of the novel, we 
discover that, in fact, the bank note is genuine: in the end, even sitnulatioll is a sign 
that betrays the protagonists. 
*. * * 
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I argued above that Iser makes great work of the double meaning implied by the 
collision of mutually exclusive sen-ýiotic systems in the pastoral romance. At that time, 
I also argued that Iser's attempt to read this double meaning on the basis of the 
connection between "the image of a hidden reality" (brought forth through 
'-ficfiondlisation) and the duplidity of the sign did not avoid a psychoanalytic model that 
bases itself on the tension between latency and self-revelation. 51 What we are seeing in 
Iser is the retreat from the implications engendered by his own work to the prior 
possibility of meaning embodied in the latent meaning to which subterfuge always 
refers. Such a configuration undermines the use of absence in Iser's work, throwing 
that work back upon the ground it seeks to abandon. In El acoso, on the other hand, 
the radical implications of absence are fully embraced in the utter annihilation of the 
prior possibility for meaning and, indeed, for subjectivity. This annihilation is 
engendered in the impossibility of attributing any meaning to the signs that the 
protagonists believe lead them towards certain Truth. In the duplicity and duplication 
of the sign, itself signified by the almost empty quality of the bank note - empty, that is, 
because it signifies prolifically - both the protagonists are constantly separated from the 
meanings they seek: in the ticket seller a purity embodied in the True and the Sublime; 
in the hunted one a refuge from the afflictions bestowed upon him after the disaster of 
his fall from grace. Both, therefore, seek a return to themselves vis-A-vis the purity 
and innocence of a before that is constantly retreating or being deferred through the 
very signs which they believe can fulfil their need for a return in the first place. In this 
way, El acoso completely dissolves any question of latency to which the duplicity of 
the sign would ultimately refer. Instead, that duplicity testifies to the very absence of a 
source for which latency can gain its meaning as the sign of a hidden reality. Locked 
within a serniotic system that eschews unity, reconciliation and return, the pro'tagonists 
wander endlessly through the dark and shadowy streets of a city which is itself 
duplicated through the collision of its various and contradictory architectural signs: the 
52 See above, pp. 75-76. 
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mansion with the Belvedere become a tenement set alongside a row of modem 
buildings. In the end, meaning is endlessly fragmented throughout these streets, 
neither pointing towards a homeland, an origin for self and society, nor to the promise 
of a tomorrow that would see the reconciliation between dismembered realms of 
e)dstence. In the end, the two protagorfists areleft, the one dead and the other 
disowned by the world, utterly fragmented in an existence whose only centre, is 
absence itself, that is, in an existence whose own identity is fragmented and p9stponed. 
In Carpentier, the need for self-realisation and self-creation turns toward an origin 
that cannot be reached as the possibility for self-realisation and self-creation. 
Carpentier thus finds in fiction's impossibility to return him to theprigin the very 
possibility of a self-creative act, the decisive act allowing Latin America to create itself 
anew: a new Latin America engendered in the confrontation between the indispensable 
fictions of Europe and the fictionalising acts of self-creation. Hence, there is a tension 
between a search for an origin which, through an allegorical sign system, the pre- 
eminent form of expression in Romanticism and the post-Romantic sensibility to which 
Carpentier aligns himself, "would affirm the unshakeable certainty of transcendence", 
and therefore guarantee the union between meaning and signs, and the realisation, by 
El acoso, of "the impossibility of attaching a permanent meaning to signs except when 
ordered and fixed by death" (PH, 202). But the fixity of death is ultimately cast in the 
mould of a fictionalising act that must reach out to the immediate and intimate exter- 
iority of the reader for its fulfilment, since it is only in the reader that the "perpetual 
present of memory ... can be re-enacted" by the reader's awareness of what "is 
foreclosed to the protagonist" (PH, 203). 53 The only event that can unite the past, 
53 Fuentes echoes the importance of the reader in the fulfilment of the temporality of the text in his 
reading of Denis Diderot where Fuentes argues that "Diderot saves time from the tyranny of the 
calendar by producing movement. He writes novels with the purpose of uniting movement, time and 
desire, which in reality are separated". This purpose, whose fulfilment underlines Diderofs 
enterprise, is inscribed in Diderot's reinterpretation of time, in part, through the demand he places on 
the reader "as co-producer of the work". Hence, while "Diderot is not coy" about his presence in the 
work as author, it is an "authorial presence [that] will need another presence: that of the reader .... 
Diderot constantly instates; the reader within the book and finds in the book the common ground (the 
common-place) between author and reader .... Diderot is telling us that the author's 
freedom is 
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present and future in the absence of the origin is the event of death, an event that has 
its fixity in the unifying present of the text-reader relation. As such, death is the "only 
permanent presence: the true apex where all the different lines will merge and become 
one uninterrupted continuum" (PH, 200); a continuum which is one for us now. 54 
-This sense of contemporan6ity is important for understanding why Echevarria makes 
an, albeit weak, defence of Carpentier's Lospasosperdido s on the basis that being self- 
consciously contemporary, the novel avoids grounding its assertions in the essence- 
giving historicity they nevertheless suggest. In the present-time of writing and the 
present-time of reading - the two coordinates of the present-time of history engendered 
through textual coalescence and convergence - transcendence is elided in the fluidity of 
the text-reader relation. The materiality of the origin cannot be maintaineq where 
Romantic allegory is dissolved into an allegory that affirms the dissolution of textual 
fixity, a fixity dissolved in the present-time of the text-reader relation. As Echevarria 
points out in his reading of Eaplosioii MA Cathedral, "the shifting of allegories in the 
novel uncovers the ultimate fluidity of the emblem55 .... 
The fluidity stems from its 
being a code rotating around an empty centre ... which can signify only 
by its elusive 
and allusive movement" (PH, 255). Completely detached from any meaning, signs 
inseparable from the freedom of the reader recruited so as to give relief, ... ivith his presence, to the 
presence of the iwiting: to its immediacy" (MO, 78-81). The temporality of the book is therefore 
dependent upon the bctiveen both the author and the reader share. I will return to this in my 
concluding section. 
54 It seems that Carpentier's textual origin transgresses an origin it displaces in the very effort to 
locate or return to it. But tl-ds transgression must be seen as the irreducibility of time now; that is, of 
the present-time of writing. A present-time as the time of fragmentation and death. As Octavio Paz 
has also, "Titten: "I believe that the poet hopes to find in death (which is, in effect, our origin) a 
revelation that his temporal life has denied him: the true meaning of life. When we die, 
The second hand 
will race around its dial, 
all uill be contained in an instant.. 
andperhaps it uill be possible 
to live, even after death. ' 
A return to original deat h would be a return to the lifc'before life, the life before death: to limbo, to 
the matemal source" (L, 56; Is, 62). 
55 Eclievarria argues that the emblem, as in Ortega, is "the physical, visible manifestation of a 
codified system - an allegory" (PH, 255). 
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float in the fluid stream of dissolution. The materiality of the origin cannot be fixed by 
a sign which "has [always] already moved on", leaving behind "an epitaph for its 
source": a trace and only a trace that snakes its way perpetually and eternally 
elsewhere (PH, 255). 
Fernando Ortiz has written that Cuba is populated by people who, "since the 
sixteenth century ... have all been exogenous and have been tom from their places of 
origin" (PH, 26). But, as Echevarria quickly points out, it is precisely this alienation 
and orphanhood which provides Latin America with "a general condition for writing" 
(PH, 26). In this sense, writing provides a way back to the seed of one's creation, to 
the virginal source of history and time. If many Latin American Wýiters are searching 
for a way in which to create a history, a beginning, an origin, an authentically Latin 
American time, this will always be impeded by the conquest and colonisation, a 
condition which makes of Latin America an orphanage within which, without parents, 
without a direct lineage, Latin Americans embrace the fiction to which they are 
condemned and to which they respond in their fictionalising, self-creative acts. Latin 
Americans realise that they are foreigners within, essentially set adrift in a body they 
call their home: on the one hand, a history which is not theirs and therefore the need, 
on the other, to create their own history, an act which is always perfon-ned while 
walking in the footsteps of the history of conquest. This is, precisely, the tension of 
extimacy. 
Being condemned to a fiction is the immediate possibility of writing faced as it is 
with the absolute absence of any origin. Language does not arise between us and this 
absence but is our response to the impossibility of returning to any primeval purity. 
Language, in this sense, is not the impossibility to represent this absence but the very 
embodiment of opacity. Language testifies to our foreignness with respect to the 
impossibility of returning to any primeval purity. We are (made) foreign precisely in 
the space of this impossibility: fiction's impossibility in its testimonial response to 
absence. Fully aware of his place within a fiction, Carpentier seeks to overcome this 
105 
The Unknonw Tongue 
foreignness by appealing to the possibility of the written work, the work of art, to 
return him to the origin of his culture. In the process, however, he becomes fully 
aware that language itself is implicated in this foreignness, as an embodiment of it. In 
the search for immediacy, restoration, the origin, Carpentier discovers that "only the 
order of writing emerges -a simulacrum" (PH, 41M). 56 In the proem-of-this 
discovery, he also becomes aware, once the one-to-one correspondence between 
meaning and significance has been irreparably severed, of "the betrayal of art, religion, 
and love as paths back to innocence" (PH, 201). What Carpentier discovers then, is 
that the "longing for restoration" (PH, 30) can only be situated in a desire continually 
moving outside itself, a desire perpetually moving towards its object within fiction, but 
one which, as we have seen, is continually postponed. 57 
56 Iser echoes this argument when he writes that conceiving fiction in relation to functionality 
requires the development of a substrata in order that fiction would "appear as something determinate, 
whereby the substrata imputed reveal themselves to be a mode of ascription that can quite easily be 
replaced by other ascriptions of fiction as something else. If a mode of ascription is taken for the 
'nature! of fiction, the result is reification .... This applies from Kant to Goodman. It is therefore logical that in postmodem discourse, reification has been totally expunged from fiction, so that the 
iNiped-out traces of all imputed substrata expose fiction as a simulation" (FI, 166). 
57 As I remarked above, the significance of this conception of fiction and fictionalisation iý relation 
to temporality will be brought into sharper relief when it is read through Fuentes' reading of Gogol. 
For us, the principal concern is to trace the movement of this concept of fiction and fictionalisation 
throughout various texts from Latin American writing in order to map out a cartography of a Latin 
American nervous system which runs through a number of its key authors. This cartography will 
inevitably provide us with a lens through which a response to the question of anonymity can be 
gauged. Again, we need to recall Iser's claim that "the person must fictionalize himself in order to 
reach beyond himself" and the problems I have raised about his understanding of this configuration in 
relation to absence. 
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I 
owa lity which D. H. Lawrence used the image of the 'foreigner' to highlight the separateness and unknowa 
are necessary to true relatedness. In his view, relationship is never a merging; it is only a relationship 
because the beings are distinct and should indeed, in a personal relationship, even be polar. True 
relationship is always a polar tension between unknowable entities. Something comparable is implied in 
[Gabriel Garcia] Mdrquez. Where the tension between difference and relationship collapses it is possible 
to fall into the abyss of solitude, as happens to the doctor in LeafStorin. Or it is possible to become one of 
the herd like the townspeople in the same story. The former may be a greater suffering but the latter is the 
greater ignominy. 
Michael Bell 
Gabriel Garcia A16rquez 
only what belongs to the greatest opacity is transparent 
Maurice Blanchot 
Yhe Space ofLiterature 
The Unknowt Tongue 
As I argued above, the claim that language is constituted by an initial otherness helps us 
to understand Carpentier's awareness that writing revolves around the absence of an origin 
to which that writing could return as a way of uniting (or reuniting) with itself. Carpentier 
discovers that writing, in fact, disposes the author of his or her authorial voice through the 
duplication and multiplication of voices opened through the repetition -of-those-texts-VAfich 
have preceded the author's own text. In this way, no text (indeed, no system of 
signification) can purport to be the one unique text, the text which could, through its own 
unity, lead us towards a unified totality. Rather, the disposition towards absence 
engenders in both the text and the author the dislocation of a unified identity. The notion 
of a unified literary tradition in which a singular voice could take on the value of the whole 
is therefore constantly dissolved in the multiplicity of voices that the tradilion is 
constituted by. What this finally opens us towards is the radical foreignness of the 
authorial voice, its constant circulation around the absence of any concrete and stable 
identity, its lack of a reference point in an Outside that could be seen to be its progenitor. I 
I Paz has written that "Before becoming a reality, the United States was an image to me. That is not 
surprising: we Mexicans begin as children to see that country as the other, an other that is inseparable 
from us and that at the same time is radically and essentially alien. In the north of Mexico the expression 
"the other side" is used to mean the United States. The other side is geographical: the frontier, cultural: 
another civilization; linguistic: another language; historical; another time (the United States is running 
after the future while we are still tied to our past); metaphorical: it is the image of everything that ive are 
not. It is foreignness itself' (OE, 137). The concept of foreignness therefore has a political and cultural 
dimension embedded within it. This cultural dimension is also cvident in many of Fuentes' stories. In 
Del Jardin de Flandes [In A Flendsh Garden], for example, the protagonist, after coming face-to-face 
with the ghost of a Belgian woman who roanis the secret pathways of a garden at the back of a house the 
protagonist has agreed to occupy as a favour to a friend, after this strange encounter, the protagonist rinds 
himself held back from leaving the house by some mysterious force. He tells us "Thcrc! s no telephone in 
the house, but I could go out on the Avenida, call up some friends, go to the Roxy .... 
After all, this is my 
city; these are my people! Why caift I leave this house; more accurately, my post at the doors looking 
onto the garden? " (Los dias eninascarados (Biblioteca Era S. A., 1954): 40. Translated in the English 
collection Burnt Mater as In A Flemish Garden (Burnt [Plater, tr. Margaret Sayers Peden. London: Seckcr 
and Warburg, 1981): 19). The protagonist has become a foreigner ivithin the familiarity pf his own city, 
his own people. But this only underscores the difficulty Mexicans experience in understarlding what they 
are as individuals, as Mexicans. What does it mean to be Mexican? This is the question Puentes 
constantly asks himself as the writer who, having been bom and raised outside his 'homeland, constantly 
experiences the conjunction between the familiar and the foreign in his own attempts to achieve self- 
identification through a 'return' to Mexico rooted in the decision to write and speak in Spanish. 
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The anonymity of the authorial voice is therefore in direct relation to the foreignness of 
that voice, a foreignness inscribed within the familiarity of a tradition which, while it can 
be traced, is nonetheless duplicitous: or, to be more precise, is duplicitous precisely in 
being a trace of multiple texts. The resonances of that tradition in Carpentier's writing 
never coifJdm toTorm a totality or a unity, *but Ifighlight the impossibility of locating -the 
condition that could unify them in the first place: the multiplicity of voices brolight 
together as an image of the absence of a unifying principle. In this sense, each, voice in the i 
chorus of Carpentier's texts is a foreign voice because it does not, properly speaking, 
belong within the temporality of the other voices to which it is conjoined. At the same 
time, however, the present voice of Carpentier's own narrative is made possible by the 
familiarity of the texts that have preceded it. Tangible witness is therefore a response to 
the voices that have preceded the present voice of Carpentier's writing. It is precisely in 
this sense that Isers conjunction between absence and duplicity vis-A-vis the hidden fails to 
comprehend what is, for us, central to the question about the possibility of naming the 
anonymous: "I" is, properly speaking, anonymous because of the impossibility of achieving 
self-identification within a tradition it nonetheless cannot fully transcend. This 
contradiction is vital in understanding the role of foreignness in the delineation of 
anonymity since it underscores the constant shifting between voices that is endemic to the 
notion of circulation I introduced above. Therefore because the concept of foreignness is 
vital to the discussion as a whole, especially in our understanding of how opacity shifts the 
discussion of anonymity away from the discourse of otherness, we need to dwell on it 
here. 
Foreignness As An Emblem of Opacity 
It is not too early to say something about the impossibility of returning to any prior 
position given what I have argued in my reading of Carpentier's Los pasos perdidos and El 
acoso. Even by way of underscoring the centrality of temporality in this discussion as a 
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whole, and as a way of anticipating what will come later in my reading of Octavio Paz and 
Juan Rulfo. To say here, then, that the return must always fail, must remain an 
impossibility is to make urgent our need for a language that could open this impossibility 
as such. A language then, that would find its own annunciation difficult, its own ability to 
speak -bout Af he 6 -Itse M back by a condition it imposes on itself and on-its communication 
to us. How to name the anonymity of a language, the voice which speaks at the edge'*of 
communicability, at the edge of sound, almost silently, quietly like a whisper? This is the 
question we approach in the impure return to opacity that is offered here, a return which 
must not lose sight of the voices we have already engaged in at the level of languages 
duplicity and of its role in fabricating the impossibility of any pure return. Every return is 
therefore made impure in the duplicity proffered by language, whether thatý return is to 
oneself or to the possibility of self-identification in an origin which exceeds time and 
space. 
To return to opacity here requires our attentiveness to foreignness, for it is in this 
concept that opacity can open itself as the impossibility itself, the impossibility of the 
subject to return either to itself or to a prior possibility of itself because it is always in 
circulation around an absent source. Gabriel Garcia Mfirque2s La hojarasca [Leaf Storm] 
and El otorto delpatriarca [7he Autumn of the Patriarch] provide us with two clear cases 
of this configuration by developing characterisation through the presence of a dead body, 
a body which is, properly speaking, in absentia; that is, a foreign body, a body that is not a 
body anymore even while we relate to it as a body, as something which needs caring for, 
as a loved one, or a ffiend, or even an enemy for whom our life must pause in order to 
reach the temporality of death and, within that time, to fulfil our debts and our promises 
and, finally, to lay the dead to rest: an impossible body,, an anonymous body. 2 In this 
2 In The Space ofLiferature, Blanchot underscores the problem for us: "The image does not, at first 
glance, resemble the corpse, but the cadaver's strangeness is perhaps also that of the image. What we call 
mortal remains escapes common categories. Something is there before us which is not really the liNring 
person, nor is it any reality at all. It is neither the same as the person who was alive, nor is it another 
110 
Return To Opacity 
sense, our relation to the dead is mediated by the gap that separates our two bodies, our 
two times. It is precisely this configuration that subtends both La hojarasca and El otoho 
delpatriarca: in both stories, it is the relation to the dead that allows each character to 
become a character for us; that is, we identify with them and, even, they with themselves 
through the space oT death as absence, as 1he anonymity of the oulside. 3 
The Strangers of La hojarasca 
Even before his death, the doctor who arrives one evening at the house of a nameless 
Colonel asking for lodging and financial support because he finds himself without any 
resources, is a complete foreigner. From the very first page, the sense of foreignness as a 
guiding thread for the whole story becomes evident. An anonymolls voice, one which we 
never hear from again, introduces us to the infamous village of Macondo. This 
anonymous voice tells us of the "whirling leaf storm" that descended upon Macondo one 
day, bringing with it all the accumulated rubbish of other towns: "And all of a sudden that 
rubbish, in time to the mad and unpredicted rhythm of the storm, was being sorted out, 
individualized, until what had been a narrow street vAth a river at one end and a corral for 
person, nor is it anything else. What is there, with the absolute calm of something that has found its 
place, does not, however, succeed in being convincingly here. Death suspends the relation to place, even 
though the deceased rests heavily in his spot as if upon the only basis that is left him. To be precise, this 
basis lacks, the place is missing, the corpse is not in its place. Where is it? It is not here, and yet it is not 
anywhere else" (SL, 256). 
3 Again Blanchot: "Writing, the eýdgency of writing: no longer the writing that has always (through a 
necessity in no way avoidable) been in the service of the speech or thought that is called idealist (that is to 
say, moralizing), but the writing that through its own slowly liberated force (the aleatory force of absence) 
seems to devote itself solely to itself as something that remains without identity, and little by little brings 
forth possibilities that are entirely other: an anonymous, distracted, deferred, and dispersed way ofbeing 
in relation, by which everytl-dng is brought into question - and fiist of all the idea of God, of the Self, of 
the Subject, then of Truth and the One, then finally the idea of the Book and the 1ýork - so that this 
writing (understood in its enigmatic rigor), far from having the Book as its goal rather signals its end; a 
writing that could be said to be outside discourse, outside language" (IC, xii; my emphasis). Even to this 
point, I have been constantly returning us to the possibility of such a relation founded in the effort to name 
the anonymous through writing. 
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the dead at the other4 was changed into a different and more complex town, created out of 
the rubbish of other towns .... In the midst of that blizzard ... the 
first of us came to be the 
last; we were the outsiders, the newcomers" (LSS, 1-2). The leaf storm brings foreigners 
who, because of their numbers and their affects, transform Macondo into the village of the 
-ledf storm. --The storms Village transforms the inhabitants into foreigners within the 
familiarity of a transformed village. ' In this sense, the villagers of Macondo are no lohger 
themselves even while they remain tied to the remnants of the village in which their 
identity is formed and cast because the vehicle through which identity is achieved has itself 
been transformed: while the mode of identification may remain the same (the connection 
to the village), the objective reference has changed. The doctor arrives in Macondo with 
the leaf storm and, like the leaf storm itself, he is a drifter, someone who goats around 
within the community while remaining simultaneously absent from it. 
But this stranger is even more strange because he comes without himself, that is, he 
lacks presence, and even before his death he has become a kind of spectre, an opaque 
space, a border between this world and another: 
Even though he hoped it would be the opposite, [the doctor] was a 
strange person in town, apathetic in spite of his obvious efforts to seem 
sociable and cordial. He lived among the people of Macondo, but at a 
4 Much could be said about modem society by the manner in which Nve dispose of our dead. Until 
recently, rural communities in Canada always buried their dead on the familial property of the deceased. 
Now such prommity is prohibited on the basis that the decomposing body represents a health threat to the 
living. Now we bury our dead at the edge of our communitics, at the frontier that separates us from the 
rest of the districts that surround us, and thereby procure our own survival by increasing our distance from 
death. Does this disposition towards death not suggest the most recalcitrant manias known to'civilised' 
society: The presumption that space alone could secure our own survival against the persistence of the 
dead's effect on us and our community? Doesn't this mania for life misconstrue that effect by 
conceptualising it within the framework of a ternary time system which says that, to survive, we must 
reach towards the future, posses it by abandoning the past to the furthest limits of perceptibility? Does the 
trust in that system hold out against the very distance we share with the dead as a possibility for our very 
survival, our living on in the future? 
5 Transformation towards the postcolonial, as I argued above, is not a jettisoning of external influences, 
but the hybridisation of the outside within an inside that is always shifting its boundaries. Transformation 
is therefore, the result of a culture's contact with another. 
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distance from them because of the memory of a past against which any 
attempt at rectification seemed useless. He was looked on with 
curiosity, like a gloomy animal who had spent a long time in the 
shadows and was reappearing, conducting himself in a way that the 
town could only consider as superimposed and therefore suspect (LSS, 
54). 
We can only achieve presence by coming tied to the past that preceded and defined us. 
The doctor, on the other hand, arrives empty, without a past, for "no one evqr knew 
where he came from" (LSS, 11), speaking in a voice that is his while it belongs to another, 
even to the hollow empty air, a "parsimonious ruminant voice" (LSS, 73) that)ike a 
phantom, can fill that empty air only by gesturing to its own lack of a body. 6 We are told 
that when the doctor first arrived in Macondo he followed the main street to the Colonel's 
home saying that he urgently needed to speak to the Colonel. After receiving the stranger, 
the Colonel's wife, Adelaida, tells her husband that "When I smilea at him he remained 
serious, but he nodded his head very formally and said: 'The colonel. It's the colonel I 
have to see. ' He has a deep voice, as if he could speak with his mouth closed. As if he 
were a ventriloquist" (LSS, 34). The doctor's voice is like a ventriloquist's because it is a 
mirage, an object that is not an object, a bodiless sound that neutralises the presence of the 
mouth that uttered it, making the voice the nonlocalised presence of absence: the voice 
(and voiceless speech) as opaque. 7 Opacity is the mark of a division, a rift, a borderland 
between conception and the image, " between word and thing, between a body and a voice. 
61 do not mean to suggest that concealment or obscurity could disturb all our familiar habits of ascribing 
to others certain characteristics and meanings. But, if it is true that we see only when objects acquire a 
certain determinacy as things which immediately affirm or negate our own referential codification, then 
the doctor, because he lacks a past - that is, because he arriveswithout himself - does not appear as an 
object to which we could ascribe any meaning. He exists outside our codification and this is why he has 
such a strange effect on the people of Macondo: In the most profound sense, they do not recognise hini. 
7 The doctor is strange and foreign not because he speaks, but because his spcMdng arises out of the 
opacity that makes speaking possible. The doctor's voice has b6come identical with its condition of 
possibility, with opacity, and this is what is strange; this strange identification v4h the unknown: That 
self-idcntification is achieved through the mist of opacity. In my analysis of Rull'b's Pedro Nraino I will 
explore the notion of voiceless speech more full), in connection to the silence engendered by Rulfb's novel. 
8 Again, Blanchot's approach to this problem can focus our attention to what is vital in the relation 
between conception and the image: "The image, according to the ordinary analysis, is secondary to the 
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In this sense the doctor is a foreigner because he arrives out of an opacity that separates its 
from his past. This foreignness structures our relation to him, the between of an opacity in 
which he and we meet, a meeting point that is constructed by the voices of the three 
prin cipal characters in the story as they stand around the doctor's dead body and 
remerfiber. -In La hojarasca these voices are the voices of memory speaidngin-response 
to the doctor's dead body, a body, therefore, which is the condition that makes those 
voices possible for us. 9 
The extent to which foreignness structures relation in La hojarasca goes beyond the 
merely formal and unfamiliar posture one takes in th e presence of a dead body, a posture 
vaguely and roughly formed only at the moment that body says to us'I am a body without 
substance, an object which is not an object'. In the silent vocality of the dead body, even 
the most familiar responses and perceptions are transformed into the most unfamiliar, the 
most foreign. For the three characters who, with reluctance, enter the doctor's house in 
order to prepare him for burial, this transformation is immediate and lasting. The Colonel, 
to whom the doctor had given a letter of recommendation twenty-five years previously as 
his only sign that he was, in fact, someone, the Colonel's daughter and her son are the only 
ones who, because of a promise the Colonel had made years before, have arrived at the 
object. It is what follows. We see, thenwe imagine. After the object comes the image. "After" means 
that the thing must take itself off a ways in order to be grasped. But this remove is not the simple 
displacement of a moveable object whichwould nonetheless remain the same. Here the distance is in the 
heart of the thing .... It 
is not the same thing at a distance but the thing as distance, present in its absence, 
graspable because ungraspable, appearing as disappeared. It is the return of what does not come back, the 
strange heart of remoteness as the life and sole heart of the thing" (SL, 255-256). While it has gone 
beyond the confines of my project here, an analysis of the image as a concept appropriate to the relation 
between writing and self-identification is warranted. My intention throughout this project has, however, 
been primarily concerned with relationality and, specifically, establishing concepts which could unfold the 
significance of the between in the adumbration of relationality. Only after this initial work can we move 
to a more specific analysis of the image. 
9 Not only is the identity of these characters made possible in relation to a dead body, but the identity of 
us as readers is similarly made possible because of the absence that dead body represents. 
Xnd as 
outsiders ourselves, as bodies to which Macondo is a foreign space, we only achieve identification with 
this foreignness through the conduit of an absence. In this sense, the doctor's dead body as a formal 
absence is the centre around which all the relations in La hojarasca are constructed. 
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doctor's death bed to fulfil the Colonel's word. The young boy, already confused by the 
rituals being performed before he and his mother left their house, because, as he tells us 
"It's Wednesday but I feel as if it was Sunday because I didn't go to school and they 
dressed me up in a green corduroy suit that's tight in some places" (LSS, 3), when he 
- lindny-looks upon the doctoi's dead body, is overcome-byits-nbiquity, as ifwhen he 
finally recognises the body as a dead body, he cannot help but see him "everywhere, with 
his bulging eyes and his green, dead face in the shadows" (LSS, 6). The ubiqui, tY of death 
confirms the unfamiliarity of the child's surroundings, transforming even himself into 
something foreign, an object his own mother finds strange: "Mama is dressed up as if it 
was Sunday too. She put on the old straw hat that comes down over her ears and a black 
dress closed at the neck and with sleeves that come down to her wrists. Since today is 
Wednesday she looks to me like someone far away, a s. tranger... " (LSS, 4). The young 
boy is thinking this at the same moment his mother tells us that her son "has looked at me 
several times and I know that he finds me strange, somebody he doesn't know, with this 
stiff dress and this old hafthat I've put on so that I won't be identified even by my own 
forebodings" (LSS, 9). The ubiquity and foreignness of the doctor's dead body mediates 
the relation between the mother and her son, transforming both into foreigners, strangers 
even unto themselves. But such foreignness is not to be conceived as some Outside 
rubbing against the familiarity these two people share with respect to each other. Rather, 
the foreignness has penetrated that familiarity, marked out the space in which these two 
people know each other at this moment: foreignness is now a part of that familiarity 
precisely by becoming the mediating point of the relation between these two people. In 
this way, the doctor's dead body as a formal absence around which these characters 
achieve self-identification is based upon its infiltration into the fan-dliar. ity of the between 
which structures the relation of one character to the other. 
This tells us a great deal about anonymity and about the possibility of naming the 
anonymous. In the first instance, the doctor does not bring the outside with him on that 
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day when he enters Macondo. Rather, he is the gap in which or because of which the 
outside and the inside are brought into relation. As a foreigner he is an emblem of the 
opacity in which the outside and the inside are brought into relation. And this is why I 
argued that opacity is structured by the ex-timate relation. But, more importantly, this 
-structufing of opacity is brought -into full relief in the relation the characters-have -to the 
doctor's dead body. By achieving self-identification in relation to absence, to the nameless 
presence of the cadaver, opacity comes to be seen as the impossibility of the subject itýelf, 
of its sub ectlessness. That is to say, opacity prevents any relation from being grounded j 
on the basis of unity and thereby prefigures all relation on the basis of its anonymity: we 
encounter a thing and the thing is utterly opaque, and sometimes the thing is ourselves. 
We are, therefore, made anonymous in the very process of attempting to give ourselves a 
name through the unimpeachable opacity as the separation of relation. Similarly, the leaf 
storm does not merely represent the outside's invasion into the relative enclosure of an 
inside, but the incorporation of that outside into the fabric of Macondo's life. The relation 
between the foreign and the familiar is therefore, properly speaking, an ex-timate relation, 
a relation whereby the outside remains as such on the inside. The doctor's dead body is 
the remains of an outside - the past he belongs to - on the inside of a familiarity inscribed 
between three people: the Colonel, his daughter and her son. And this is why I say that 
"I" knows itself, identifies with itself only by becoming aware of itself as another. This 
awareness is guaranteed by the opacity of the between, the clouded space that makes 
relation possible. 
As I argued earlier, any model that deals directly with the relation between must not 
reserve itself for the interaction between two bodies alone. Such a reservation would 
confuse 'the betweerf with a geotemporal distance that is not appropriate to it, 10 Even on 
10 And this is also why Blanchot argues that the remove of the object is not to be confused with a "simple 
displacement of a moveable object" but that "distance is in the heart of the thing". I have tried to clarify 
this notion by depending upon 'separation' as a demarcation point. It also needs to be said, however, that I 
am reserved about placing too great a stress on Blanchot's notion of distance without giving some detailed 
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the inside, opacity mediates the relation between "I" and its consciousness of itself, its own 
self-identification. When the young boy is about to leave his house with his mother, he 
passes a mirror in the hallway and sees himself as something both familiar and yet foreign: 
"I saw myself in the round mottled looking-glass and I thought: Aal's n1e, as if tOCIV was 
-Sultdq" (LSS, 3). In this sense, the mirror does not provide-theToung-boy V'rith a 
rej7ection of himself but allows himself to see himself, that is, to recogilise himself as 
another. Psychoanalysis thus confuses relationality, especially the ego's relation to itself, 
by asking the subject to look inside itself to achieve a mirror image of itselffor itself 
Psychoanalysis searches for the hidden and true reality behind the falsifying language the 
subject employs to guard against the intrusion of the outside and, specifically, of exposure 
to that outside. But in its efforts at protection, the subject only finos that language has 
betrayed it in the duplicity which is a hallmark of language itself, thereby, in effect, 
delivering the subject unto itself by exposing it to its own duplicity; that is, by exposing 
the subject to its subjectlessness. In this sense, psychoanalysis must always fail since "I" 
never arrives as anything other than the impossibility of arriving. 
In this sense, we are always abandoned, fragmented, and postponed in the foreign not 
because of it. The misconception that prioritises guilt and blame in surrendering to the 
notion of the foreign as enemy, as scapegoat, turns us away from what is truly unique in 
the encounter with the foreign. There is a threat in such an encounter, but it is not a threat 
engendered by the foreign as our enemy but by the foreign as our double. This relation is' 
not the confrontation between an outside and an inside where either could maintain its 
own self-sufficiency, a simple relation we could adjudicate through the language of 
analysis of the phenomenological implications imbedded within it, an analysis which is suspended here in 
the interest of conserving space. The reservation really concerný the search for essences that marks out 
one particular development of phenomenology from Husserl. It seems difficult to4all back on such a 
search after making the claims that I have. However, it is not immediately evident that Blanchots relation 
to Husserl is not, in fact, antagonistic and contrary. One of the notions that would play an important role 
in adjudicating the relation between Blanchot and phenomenology would be that of 'aspecV, one I will 
return to later. 
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otherness and alterity, a language which has now become clich6 precisely because it has 
become a household word; that is, it has become disembodied from the anonymous voice 
which had uttered it, becoming the'property'of the community. In becoming the voice of 
everyone, Otherness has become familiar and no longer announces the anonymity of the 
opadity that structures the relafion between thd-lngide and the Outside, of the very 
possibility of our speaking of a nearside and a beyond. On the contrary, opacity sets itself 
apart from both a conception of otherness as exterior and doubling as reflection of thp, 
same. Foreignness and doubling are emblems of the ex-timate relation, that intimate 
exteriority which structures opacity, that echo of our shadow which reverberates around 
us; the shadow because of which the subject is abandoned, fragmented, postponed. 
It is important here to come to ten-ns with the status the voice is afforded in this whole 
configuration, a status Garcia MArquez's El o1oho delpatriarca brings fully to light and 
which requires us to pause here and dwell upon it. This will, in turn, allow us to return to 
La hojarasca with a conception of voicing that will be invaluable to our continued analysis 
of it. 
The Voices of Autumn 
The reason that the mother and her son have become strange to themselves and to each 
other in La hojarasca is grounded in the irrational command the dead body has over them. 
This command is irrational because it is based on a contradiction: the dead body lies in 
absence of itself and we of it, but it is this absence which bears down upon us. It is, as if, 
in the impotence of its body upon which absence would be grounded, the dead body 
achieves all its force and vivacity, its power over us. In E, I o1oho del patriarca the relation 
between power and impotence is explored in detail in the memories of those. who, in their 
approach to the dead body of the patriarch, speak to us. The voices that gave us the 
world of Macondo in La hojarasca become, in El otofio, a cascading multitude which 
collide with each other, rebound, collide again, constantly fragmenting the space within 
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which they achieve their own identification; that is, precisely, the space of literature. " In 
El oloilo that space becomes the fragmented space of the voices for whom death has 
allowed them to become real for us. The real here then, would only be the requirement to 
speak in response to the absence the dead body represents, a requirement fulfilled in the 
duplicity of the voices of autumn, of the approach-towards de-ath-that-recaffs -the fullness of 
its life. Reality is that which, from the shadows of writing, speaks to us. Wfik can be said 
of this speaking and its appropriateness to our understanding of voicing in El otoilo? 
Here, as elsewhere, Blanchot's work is indispensable. In 7he Infinite Conversaiion'2 
Blanchot writes that dialogue is a moment in which unity is eschewed since, "in the 
interrelational space, dialogue, and the equality dialogue presupposes, tend to do nothing 
other than increase entropy, just as dialectical communication, reqqiring two antagonistic 
poles charged with contrary words and provoking a common current through this 
opposition, is itself, after brilliant bursts, destined to die out in entropic identity" (IC, 8 1). 
The desire for unity will always be frustrated in the encounter between two who speak to 
each other because that encounter is based upon "a distortion preventing any possibility of 
symmetry and introducing between things, and particularly between man and man, a 
relation of infinity" (IC, 81). 13 What is this distortion? Blanchot tells us that the equality 
11 This is indicative of one of the unique gifts of literature, indeed of writing itself- Writing agrees to its 
own fragmentation, at times almost demands it. Writing embraces its own death as a way of identifying 
itself with the shadow from which it came. An infinite question approaches: What is writing's death? 
That is, how canwe name and thereby identify with the death that is writing? In approaching the 
possibility of naming the anonymous we similarly approach the space of this death, for it is in the very 
question of the possibility of recognition through the name that anonymity is made possible. Anonymity 
approaches through the name; "I" approaches by being another through the duplicity of language. In this 
way, La hojarasca and El otoho open us towards a question that is indispensable in our approach to 
anonymity: Upon what would recognition be based? I will return to this shortly. 
12 The brief engagement I am offering here cannot do justice to Blanchot's complex work. And yet, as 
brief as it is, the engagement can help to focus our attention on certain concepts thýt, it seems to me, are 
vital to the implications of the voicing produced in Garcia Mirquez's writing. 
13 You will recall that the notion of infinity plays an important role in Le-6nasarguments and therefore, 
that my assertions here tend to bring Levinas and BIanchot together, as well as implicate my own 
movement away from Levinas in the very criticism I brought to bear upon him (see above pp. l9ff and 60- 
61). A good deal has been written about the relation between Levinas and Blanchot and I do not want to 
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presupposed by dialogue is engendered by the "reciprocity of words and the equality of 
speakers"; that is, by the ascription (to the interrelational space) of an essential identicality 
between speakers, "between two men who speak on equal terms" (IC, 8 1). However, 
Blanchot argues, the presupposition of identicality excludes an element that is vital to the 
-interrelational space: diffýrence, -a-difference-thatTmtfýng should simplify; nothing -can 
equalize and that alone, mysteriously, gives voice to two instances of speech by keeping 
them separate even as they are held together only by this separation" (IC, 8 1). The 
distortion of the interrelational space of communication is, precisely, the separation which 
holds the speakers, grips them, and brings them together in the ex-timate relation that 
structures opacity. Distortion is therefore possible on the basis of opacity. Later, while 
analysing the relationship between Freud and Lacan on the question of language as 
mediating relation, Blanchot writes that "it seems evident that Freud's principal merit lies 
in having enriched "human culture" with a surprising form of dialogue .... 
A dialogue that 
is nonetheless strange and strangely ambiguous due to the situation without truth of the 
two interlocutors. Each one deceives the other and is deceived with regard to the other" 
(IC, 233). Any truth that can emerge from the interrelational space, the space of 
distortion made possible as such by opacity, is thereby always postponed in the duplicity 
of the deceiving subject. Hence, speech is not a sure and final way of establishing a 
mutual and reciprocal self-identification with an other in and through which "I" is affirmed 
as a totality and a unity. Rather, in the distortion of the interrelational space between "Ps", 
the subject who speaks is affirmed in all its duplicity. This has important consequences for 
a reading of El otoho that seeks to understand the role voicing plays within it, since it 
provide any derivative analysis of that friendship which has been more fluently explored-by others. What 
I am particularly interested in here is Blanchot's adumbration of relationality on the basis of distortion. 
For Blanchot this distortion engenders infinity and, in that respect, given what I argued above concerning 
the notion of distance in Blanchot, Levinas' "infinite distance of the Stranger" could be seen , in Blanchot, 
as (he ground upon which the Stranger could appear as such, as something to whichwe could not apply a 
name. An analysis of distortion and the relation between spealdng subjects will help to clarify my own 
position here. 
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points directly to the question of duplicity which subtends the novel and which, as we will 
see, leads directly to the question of anonymity. 
In her essay on the relation between language and power in El otoilo, Jo Labany! argues 
that'Garcia Mirquezýholds lo-the traditimml-notion that Kwritingis-a-d=dent fbrm of 
speech inasmuch as it is the indirect expression of a voice which is absent, as opposed to 
speech which is assumed to be the direct expression of the speaker's voice" (Ng, 149). 
Labanyi claims that the patriarch loses his power when he transfers it from the realm of 
speech to that of writing. She tells us that "the displacement of the patriarch's power from 
speech to writing converts it into a trail of words referring back to an absent source. The 
implication is that, like myth, writing separates man from a source ýVith which at the same 
time it seeks to reestablish contact. Writing is a circular, counter-productive process, in 
that it causes the problem it sets out to solve" (NR, 140). At first glance, there are reasons 
to be intrigued by Labanyi's claims, and it seems that her reading opens up a number of 
interesting possibilities in understanding the relation between language, power and 
authority in El Otoj'10.14 However, Labanyi retreats from these possibilities the moment 
she treats "the image of the trace which has lost touch with its source" (NR, 14 1) in a 
completely negative way. Her reading implies that, in asserting that "the distance of the 
written word from its source undermines its authority" (NR, 142; my emphasis), Garcia 
MArquez believes that only through speech is it possible to come into contact with one's 
own origin; that is, self-identification would only be truly possible through speech. The 
patriarch would only be able to hold onto his power by holding onto himsetf, that is, by 
14 Labanyi's short essay does not allow her to quote at length from El otoilo, though some indication 
where she thinks this displacement takes place in the novel would have helped. In rereading the novel 
with Labanyi in mind, the reader might pay particular attention to the following p'Pge references as 
possible evidence in support of Labanyi's claims: A, 10,118-120,160,163-164,172,184.1 think that a 
number of these references can work to undermine Labanyi's arguments which, as we will see, draws us to 
the heart of what is put in play in a text like El o1oho. My attempt to offer a different reading than 
Labanyi's will focus on a few instances in the novel where speech is principally active. 
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asserting his will through speech. However, given that Labanyi is equally prepared to 
argue that "what looks at first sight like an authoritative/authorial account of what the 
patriarch is really like is, it seems, hypothetical speculation on the part of the uninformed 
c. ollective narrator" (NR, 142; my emphasis), she seems to suggest that a mere unveiling of 
--thefacts would set the -record-straight, -an airveiting pi esurnably-aeffieved Ifirvdgh-speech. 
But the question is really about the possibility of anything like objective information' 
existing in the first place. 
This question is pursued in Garcia Mdrquez's Cr6nica de una Miterte atiunciada 
[Chroificle ofA Death Foretold) and highlights the difficulty in accepting Labanyi's 
general claims. Briefly, Cr6ifica is fi-amed by the narrator's attempt to establish the truth 
of a historical event by piecing together certain bits of evidential information. The 
narrator acquires this information by returning to the village where, some years before, his 
ffiend was murdered for violating the honour of a young woman. What is particularly 
interesting about Cr6nica insofar as my present argument is concerned is the role the 
spoken word plays in the novel's overall impact. As the narrator collects the information 
pertinent to the crime and to those events leading up to it, he discovers that the two 
murderers, the twin brothers of the injured woman, had been boasting of their plan to 
commit the crime but that no one in the village had taken them seriously- ""We're going 
to kill Santiago Nasar, " [Pablo] said. Their reputation as good people was so well 
founded that no one paid any attention to them. "We thought it was drunkards' baloney, " 
several butchers declared, the same as Victoria Guzmdn and so many others who saw 
them later" (c, 61; C, 52). However, in the course of his investigations, the narrator 
comes upon a number of discrepancies in what the people admit to knowing. At the 
beginning of the novel, the narrator tells us that "Victoria Guzmdn, for her p4rt, was 
categorical with her answer that neither she nor her daughter knew that they ývere waiting 
for Santiago Nasar to kill him.... "I didn't warn him because I thought it was drunkards' 
talk, " she told me. Nevertheless, Divina Flor confessed to me on a later visit, after her 
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mother had since died, that the latter hadn't said anything to Santiago Nasar because in the 
depths of her heart she wanted them to kill him" (c, 13; C, 11). And, right near the end of 
the novel, the voice of Victoria GuzmAn reappears through the recollections of Cristo 
Bedoya, the one and only villager who makes an attempt to warn Santiago Nasar of the 
plot on his life. 15 "VictoriaGuzmdn had just put the rabbit stew on-the -stove -when tC-risto 
Bedoya] entered the kitchen. She understood immediately. I-Es heart was in' his mouth, " 
she told me. Cristo Bedoya asked her if Santiago Nasar was home and she aqswered him 
with feigned innocence that he still hadn't come in to go to sleep. "It's serious, " Cristo 
Bedoya told her. "They're going to kill him. " Victoria GuzmAn forgot her innocence. 
"Those poor boys worft kill anybody, " she said" (c, 118; C, 106). Who are we to believe? 
Victoria Guzmdn? Her daughter? Cristo Bedoya? Ae narrafoi-Z Cr6nica, at one very 
important level, demonstrates the unreliability of all written accounts. But, because this 
written account is based upon a succession of spoken testimonies that consistently 
contradict each other, there is no way for the narrator to finally come upon the immediate 
truth lingering behind the falsifying descriptions of the events leading up to the murder, the 
reasons why the people hadn't prevented it nor, even, whether Santiago Nasar was, in fact, 
guilty of the crime he was murdered for. Even in speech, meaning is duplicated endlessly 
through the multiple voices that describe an event to another. 16 Therefore, it seems far 
too hasty to assert that Garcia MArquez's claim about writing necessarily means that he 
15 An anonymous letter is pushed under Santiago Nasar's door describing the motive and likelihood of 
the murder taldng place, but he never actually sees it. Cristo Bedoya's is the only outright attempt to 
prevent the crime from happening. 
16 This requires us to ask whether reading is like performing an investigation where the reader searches 
for the truth lingering behind the story? Cr6nica problematises any affirmative answer to this question 
insofar as the novel's central truth or meaning, the one the narrator (and ive with him) actively seeks, is 
constantly postponed in the very act of searching for it. Reading, in this book, isklierefore a form of 
postponement, of postponing language and the anonymous; that is, the reader-text relation is configured 
by a language which postpones its referent, thereby bringing us into contact with the anonyn-dty upon 
which both signifier and signified are based. In this way, the text also postpones language as a referential 
or representational code. 
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ascribes to speech the value of leading the self back to itself, that is, that the voice of the 
"I" is necessarily identical with itself in the immediate moment of its annunciation (its 
antinciando; that is, its announcing or foretelling of itselo. How would we be able to 
recogifise the equality between the "I" and 'its' voice? On the basis of what condition 
would this equality come to be recognised as -such? -L-abanyi offra s clues. 
This brings us back to El o1oho where vocal multiplicity reaches feverish and festival 
proportions. It would be impossible to adequately represent the effect of this multiplicity 
in a short quotation. However, a few reference points will help to focus our attention on 
the question of the mediation of language - whether written or spoken - and the 
impossibility of the immediate. 
El otoilo takes the notion of absence and foreignness to an extreme by placing the 
patriarch in a position of complete duplicity, a position which, even upon his death, helps 
to guarantee his continual presence throughout the country. 
... voices were muffled, life came to a halt, everybody remained stone- 
still with a finger to his lips, not breathing, silence, the. general is 
screwing, but those who knew him best had no faith even in the respite 
of that sacred moment, for it always seemed that he was in two places at 
once .... That simultaneous presence everywhere during the flinty years 
that preceded his first death, that going up as he came down, that going 
into ecstasy in the sea while in agony in unsuccessful loves, were not a 
privilege of his nature, as his adulators proclaimed, or a mass 
hallucination, as his critics said, but his luck in counting on the complete 
service and doglike loyalty of Patricio Aragon6s, his perfect double... 
(A, 10- 11). 
While the patriarch believes he has found in this double the possibility of avoiding that 
dreaded autumn, he becomes so attached to Patricio Aragon6s as to lose himself in his 
own image: "so far removed from the world that he himself did not realize that his fierce 
I 
struggle to exist twice was feeding the contrary suspicion that he was existing less and 
less" (A, 19). And it is only, as if by a sublime fortune, when Patricio Aragon. 'es is 
poisoned and is "facing the demands of death" (A, 2 1) that the patriarch can achieve full 
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and unremitting presence by capitalising on the death he can simulate with the treachery of 
a man who has lived forever. The patriarch is rescued from a diminishing presence by 
dying, for it is this first death that allows him to witness, then torture, and finally eliminate 
his dissenters, reasserting not only his power and ubiquity, but his mystical command over 
death -itself. -TJnTike La hojarasca, El ot6-no conjoins dupli it dy and death such that the 
possibility of identification is based completely on the absence of the patriarch" And it is 
for this reason that the people of the South American country the patriarch governs 
approach the dead body of the patriarch not knowing whether'Or not the body is truly his: 
"It hadn't seemed strange to us, of course, that this should be so in our days, because even 
during his time of greatest glory there had been reasons to doubt his existence and his own 
henchmen had no exact notion of his age" (A, 69). 
For this reason, the people approach the dead body (dead again) in the palace office 
with reservation. 
The second time he was found, chewed away by vultures in the same 
office, none of us was old enough to remember what had happened the 
first time, but we knew that no evidenceP of his death was final, 
because there was always another truth behind the truth. Not even the 
least prudent among us would accept appearances because so many 
times it had been a given fact thav... he had lost his speech from so 
much talking and had ventriloquists stationed behind the curtains to 
make it appear that he was speaking ... 
but the more certain the rumours 
of his death seemed, he would appear even more alive and authoritarian 
at the least expected moment to impose other unforeseen directions to 
our destiny (A, 37). 
To maintain and exercise power, the patriarch throws his voice. Like the voice of God 
which speaks from the burning bush, from the clouds, from the mouth of Moses and Jesus 
and, if you accept the tales, the countless messengers in our own day, the patriarch is 
I 
17 Recall that Labanyi seems to suggest that a simple unveiling of the truth would be enough to settle the 
issue of the relation between speech and Witing and that, presumably, tl-ds unveiling would come as a 
result of providing the appropriate evidence in support of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, a truth "the uniformed collective narrator cannot" provide. 
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supreme and all powerful because his voice spreads out over all the land. If speech is 
power as Labanyi argues, it gains its power through ubiquity, through a complete break 
with the identity of the speaking subject; that is, precisely, the power of the voice in its 
disembodiment from a stable unit of referential meaning. And, even for the people, speech 
'is not a sure way of overstepping subterfuge. -Rafher, through their speech - their rumours 
- the patriarch reasserts his absolute mastery. Speech cannot lead us back to the sourýe of 
its annunciation because it is constantly employed as a means of concealing that identiýY. 18 
Finally, at the very end of El otoho, a terrible moment of recognition: 
... 
[the patriarch] had known since his beginnings that they deceived him 
in order to please him, that they collected from him by fawning on him, 
that they recruited by force of arms the dense crowds along his routes 
with shouts ofjubilation and venal signs of eternal life to the magnificent 
one who is more ancient than his age, but he learned to live with all 
these miseries of glory as he discovered in the course of his uncountable 
years that a lie is more comfortable than doubt, more useful than love, 
more lasting than truth, he had arrived without surprise at the 
ignominious fiction of commanding without power, of being exalted 
without glory and of being obeyed without authority when he became 
convinced in the trail of yellow leaves of his autumn that he had never 
been master of all his powers... " (A, 205). 
Neither through the written nor the spoken word has the patriarch ever been master of all 
his powers. Unlike the patriarch, Labanyi does not come to this realisation remaining tied 
to the illusion that life goes about its business because "I" organises it so. What is 
intimately at work in El o1oho then, is the deception and subterfuge of the sign. This 
deceptio n gains its own authority through death - the ultimate sign of absence and 
18 In Cr6nica, the narrator receives a letter from his mother announcing the arrival of "a very strange 
man" who, like the doctor of La hojarasca, arrives without himself, without his past: "Nobody knew what 
he'd come for. Someone who couldn't resist the temptation of asking him ... received the answer: 
"I've 
been going from town to town looking for someone to marry. " It might have been true, but lie would have 
answered anything else in the same way, because he had a way Of speaking that served him. rather to 
conceal than reveal" (c, 32; C, 25). Like the doctor and the patriarch, both of whom exist ýehind the 
obscurity of a voice thrown out like the deception of ventriloquists, this strange man remains absent 
through his voice, not, as Labanyi wants to argue, directly expressed by it: Speech conceals. Or, to be 
more precise, whether it is written or spoken, the sign conceals, attesting to the effect the duplicity of 
language has on the possibility of recognition and self-identification. 
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dispersion - because it is the death of the patriarch at the beginning of the novel that puts 
the whole network of counterpoints into motion. What El otoilo prioritises then, is the 
impossibility of any uncomplicated and immediate return to one's origin or to the origin of 
on&s culture throuSh the sign. That return is always mediated by the sign, a mediation 
grounded in El otoho in the memories of the people, memories which, because of their 
interpretative character, always rewrite the steps back to the source, thereby reinscribing 
that source within different fields of reference. Consequently, while Labanyi i§ correct to 
assert that El otoilo demonstrates that writing is untrustworthy, she fails to realise that this 
applies to speech as much as to writing and that, what is more, our relation to each other 
is grounded upon this untrustworthy and duplicitous thing called writing. What is 
insightful about Labanyi's essay is the priority it gives to the relation between absence and 
writing. However, it seems misplaced to assert that that relation is a deplorable one. 
Here, as with my analyses above, I want to argue that it is precisely this relation, 
understood against the backdrop of specific notions I have ascribed to the concept of 
relation itself, that gives power to writing; that is, to its voice. 
When Labanyi argues that "Just as the patriarch discovers he is not in control of the 
words that are designed to perpetuate his power, so the reader discovers that there is no 
omniscient author in control of the text he is reading" (NR, 142), she pinpoints one of the 
conditions our relation to absence engenders. As in Carpentier, Garcia Mdrquez actively 
pursues the postponement of authorial identification by highlighting the absent centre 
around which his writing revolves. If El otoho lets loose "a bewildering profusion of 
intermediary narrators, all of them unreliable" (NR, 142), the result is not simply that 
writing itself lacks authority, but that the possibility of identifying ourselves with any one 
I 
story, with any one version of the way things really took place, is constantly postponed in 
the very profusion of voices enlisted to make response to absence. C6nsequently, 
identification itself is also postponed. But it is precisely this postponement that offers us 
the possibility for self-creation and self-invention since we are not limited by any one 
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narrative which might make claims upon us or we upon it. The priority Labanyi ascribes 
to speech in El otoho needs to be diverted therefore by an attentiveness to the relation 
between speaking subjects, the condition that makes such a relation possible and its 
implicatibns insofar as the multiplicity and foreignness of the voice is concerned. 
In an essay on the intertextual relations in El ofoho, an essay which never goes beyond 
the mere charting of those relations and is therefore startlingly empty, Michael Palenciý- 
Roth has occasion to quote at great length from an interview with Garcia MArquez entitled 
Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez habla de Garcia M6rquez. I shafl not pain the reader with such 
a 4ong quotation here. However, this short quotation should provide us with a wealth of 
insight into what is fundamental to El o1ofio. In speaking of Christopher Columbus, 
Garcia Mdrquez says that "he is perhaps the only man in history for whom there are three 
tombs in different parts of the world, and no one knows for certain in which of the three 
his cadaver is really to be found. There is a tomb in the Cathedral in Santo Domingo, one 
in Havana, and another in Seville". 19 What seems to stand out so brilliantly about this is 
the ubiquity of the tyrant's dead body. As in La hojarasca, the cadaver's absence feeds its 
ubiquity. This is essential in understanding the development of characterisation in relation 
to the absence of the dead body and, subsequently, the foreignness engendered by that 
dead body and its relation to language and anonymity. Both the doctor in La hojarasca 
and the patriarch in El otoilo announce the anonymity of the outside by being themselves 
the embodiment of absence. By intruding into the life of Macondo as the doctor does or 
by duplicating himself as the patriarch does, both become foreigners within the familiarity 
of the inside: the daily life of Macondo and the on-going struggles of the nameless country 
in EI otoho. Hence, in order to approach the question'How to name the anonymousTwe 
19 Gabriel Garcia Af6rquez and the Powers ofFiction, ed- Julio Ortega (Austin: U of Texas P., 1988): 
4243. 
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would need to invoke a language that, in its own annunciation, spoke through foreignness 
and absence on its way to anonymity. Such a language can only be spoken, precisely, by 
an unknown tongue; that is, a tongue for whom self-identification could not by achieved by 
first looking for a prior possibility of its own annunciations in a before time which 
corresponded to its origin. This tongue is unknown because the-inherent duplicity of 
language and the semiotic system remove the subject who speaks fTom any simple 
correspondence or identification, any equality with the words "I" uses. Languape disowns 
the subject and "I" can never be equal to the words "I" speaks. 
This is indicative of what is perplexing and confusing in Labanyi's analysis. Labanyi 
argues that "the power of speech [presumably: over the decadence of writing] is refer-red 
to at the beginning of the novel. 'We did not have to force an entry [to the palace], as we 
had thought, because the main door seemed to yield to the mere force of the human voice' 
[A, 7]. The patriarcWs authority resides in his voice: 'he spat out a lethal blast of authority 
with his wordý [A, 73]. But, for most of the novel, the patriarch exercises his power via 
reported speech" (NR, 135; my emphasis). Labanyi frames her essay in the distinction 
between reported and direct speech arguing that "the authority of language derives from 
the notion of authorship, the assumption that language is the direct expression of a central, 
unified voice. The statement which does not have a direct relationship to the voice that 
speaks it does not have authority. Reported speech is less authoritative than direct speech 
because its relationship to its source has become adulterated" (NR, 135). It is never clear 
just what the difference is between reported and direct speech, although the implication is 
that the latter is directly tied to a central, unified voice since, to lose authority, words must 
lose their source. The problem with such an assertion is the assumption that, in the full 
presence of the voice, we as listeners are privy to the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth since the one before us speaks in their own voice and that the unity between 
the voice and the subject who speaks is self-evidently clear. But the voice which speaks 
speaks a language and, as I have been arguing, if language is indeed founded upon an 
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initial duplicity, then it would be impossible to ascertain how direct speech remained tied 
to its source to any greater degree than reported speech. When Garcia Mdrquez equates 
the patriarch's power with his words, as in the reference provided by Labanyi, especially 
against the backdrop of the force of the voice of the people, their is a real sense that he 
-does not make this simple distinction between wiitten and spoken language. And, if 
Labanyi is correct in asserting that the voice of the people is untrustworthy, then whe . ýe in 
fact does that voice gain its power to part the doors of the presidential palace? What, we 
need to ask Labanyi, is the power of the voice rooted in? If it is rooted in the words 
themselves, then what is the difference between reported and direct speech? If it is rooted 
in the different relation each of these has to a central, unified identity, then how do we 
determine that direct speech is directly tied to such an identity? Surely the only way back 
to that identity would be through the words spoken. But this would, ultimately, bring us 
into contact with those words as the mediating force or condition between us as listeners 
and this anonymous identity. The gap between, the separation, would still be maintained 
and we would, therefore, not be able to adjudicate at what point this identity came shining 
through the distortion and opacity that holds us together in a communicative relation. 
While the question of authority is central to El ofoho it is not one dealt with in the 
rather misguided manner that Labanyi has put forward. On the contrary, it is precisely the 
absence of any authorial source, any central identity to which we could return, that allows 
the voices of El otoho to gain their power, a power founded upon their speaking in and 
through the written text. Blanchot argues that once we take hold of the notion of 
distortion in understanding the relation between two who speak to each other, then 
speaking must come to be seen as the manner in which "to bring the other back to the 
same in a search for a mediating speech: but it is also, first of All, to seek to receive the 
other as other and the foreign as foreign; to seek autnd [an other], therefore, in their 
irreducible difference, in their infNte strangeness, an empty strangeness, and such that 
only an essential discontinuity can retain the affirmation proper to it", an affirmation of 
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"interruption and rupture in order to come to the point of proposing and expressing - an 
infinite task -a truly plural speech. Precisely speech that is always in advance destined 
(and also dissimulated) in the written exigency" (IC, 82). 20 In Labanyi on the other hand, 
there is the sense that Garcia Mirquez's critique of authority proposes a central, unified 
identity lingering-belfind the falsifying use of language employed in the written text. That 
is, Labanyi is haunted, as with so many others, by the need to establish the exiýtence of a 
kernel of representational meaning as the core of identity expressed in an act of direct 
speech. There is no justification for this in El o1oho. And, for similar reasons, though this 
criticism must always remain cautious here, we would need to ask Blanchot why, having 
located an elemental distortion at the heart of the relation between speaking subjects, 
having located, in his analysis of Freud, "the situation without trutb of the two 
interlocutors", why he would retain any affiliation with the notion of an other? Does this 
notion not reinscribe the possibility of identification in an outside or a beyond which is 
accessible, in terms of recognition, through language? And yet, as I have been arguing, it 
is precisely language that announces, through the speaking subject of the written text, the 
very anonymity of the outside, its nameless identity. How then, could we become identical 
with ourselves or achieve recognition of this nameless outside if not through the very 
distortion, the very opacity that grounds relation and that engenders the most 
uncontrollable proliferation and multiplication of voices? Again, these are cautionary 
criticisms of Blanchot's complex articulation of the relation between self and other and the 
role of language, speech and writing in that relation. Nonetheless, because of the obvious 
and often contradictory relationship between Levinas and Blanchot, and given what I have 
20 And, in another contexI (which is always adjoining that of The Infinite ConVersation), Blanchot writes 
that for Kafka, "an infinitely reserved man, opaque even to his fiiends and, moreover, not very accessible 
to himself', for Kafka ""I am nothing but literature, and I neither can nor want tolbe anything else"" (SL, 
64-65). Blanchot is, "ise to resist drawing any monumental conclusions from KafWs "passing notes". 
And yet, as we will see nearer the end of this study, the importance of literature for the inner life of 
human beings is its ability, in the simultaneity of its own inner vocality, its multiplying voices, to open us 
to ourselves vis-A-vis our own duplicity - the duplication of our voice. 
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argued regarding language in Levinas' arguments, it is necessary to draw attention to my 
own need to employ a terminology that does not merely reinscribe the discourse of 
otherness in my attempt to approach the question of anonymity. In short, speech reaffirms 
duplicity and the impossibility of unification, of a return to oneself through the image of 
self-identicality, by arising from the very betweený of relation, the verybetween structured 
by the opacity and distortion of the interrelational space between "I's" that speak. Leýinas' 
alterity is not a mere passive intrusion into the life of an'ego'. Rather, "the alterity of týhe 
alter ego ... 
is a force" which is "absolutely exterior" (CPP, XIV). And then this note: "A 
face that is only moral, i. e. absolutely exterior. Thus not a force but interdiction that one 
cannot even touch" (CPP, XIV). Levinas is prevented from touching an alterity wholly 
exterior to him because of an authoritative prohibition. This sense of impQssibility must 
not be confused with the impossibility of recognition. This latter impossibility is the 
confrontation with the strange, the foreign, that "wounded place, the bruise of the dying 
body already dead of which nobody would know how to be proprietor". 21 The foreigner 
is "subjectivity without a subject", a subject I can only "touch it! vain". 22 I "touch in vain" 
the stranger whose relation to me is founded upon opacity, whose own ineffability exceeds 
not only representation but the imperative of an interdiction. I "touch in vain" because of 
opacity. Hence, ineffability and opacity are embedded within the very fabric of relation 
and not exterior to the subject's involvement in the world. This is why it was important to 
raise the ambiguous use of 'the strange' and 'the foreign' in Levinas' text, in order once 
again to mark out the differentiation between the terrain of ineffability and opacity and the 
terrain of otherness and alterity. 
21 Blanchot writes that "Lcvinas speaks of the subjectivity of the subjed; if one wishes to. preserve this 
word - why? - it would perhaps be necessary to speak of a subjectivity'vvithout a subject, ýhe wounded 
place, the bruise of the dying body already dead of which nobody would know how to be proprietor... " 
(Allarity, 207, n. 27). 
22 Maurice Blanchot, The Unavois-able Community (r. Pierre Joris (New York: Station Hill, 1988): 49. 
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What El o1ofio provides us with in the approach to anonymity is a direct confrontation 
with the importance of multiplicity and simultaneity in the postponement of an identity in 
circulation around the absence of any ground upon which it could secure itself in and for 
itself. Labanyi is right to say that the patriarch is a constant absence throughout the novel. 
But we need to realise that the people whose voices litter the pages of El otoilo are also 
fundamentally absent and fundamentally foreign as well. The foreigner is strange not 
because he or she is "outside every order, every world" as Levinas has said. ýather, the 
strangeness of the foreigner is precisely their voice. When, in La hojarasca, Adelaida tells 
the Colonel that there is a man to see him, she describes the doctor with these words: 
"He looks like someone, or rather ... 
he's the same person that he looks like, although I 
can't explain how he got here .... I'm sure 
it's not that he looks like someone but that he's 
the same person he looks like. I'm sure, rather, that he's a military man. He's got a black 
pointed moustache and a face like copper. He's wearing high boots and I'm sure that it's 
not that he looks like someone but that h&s the same person he looks like"" (LSS, 34-35). 
Although what appears to stand out in this passage is something like the question or 
distinction between how we see and what we see, since Adelaida thinks that this stranger 
is, in fact, a military man of some importance when, in fact, he is only a doctor of little 
importance, I am much more interested in the tonality of the passage, this strange 
expression and the degree to which it is suggestive of foreignness as an important concept 
for the question of anonymity. As I argued above, the doctor speaks in a voice that has 
become identical with the opacity from out of which it arises, and this is what makes that 
voice strange. This sense of the strangeness of the foreigner is echoed in the strange 
description Adelaida offers to the Colonel. Her description is not just strange because she 
seems to hesitate or even avoid saying what is literallY-on the tip of her tongue, but, more 
importantly, that the object to which her words could refer is itself outside the normal 
commerce of exchange. The doctor is not identical with himself and this is what makes 
AdelaiMs misrecognition even more humorous and even more important insofar as 
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foreignness is a concept appropriate to the discussion of anonymity. The doctor is 
anonymous, without a past we can come to know, without a voice that reveals its source, 
without a name proper to it. And this is what is strange. Only an errant language, a 
language that consistently postpones itself, can reach the space of this strange quality of 
the for6igner: a-language, therefore, that in postponing itself postpones the identity of its 
putative referential object. And it is a language, as I have tried to show through the 
discussion of Labanyi's essay, that is consistently spoken by an unknown tongue, a tonmie 
for whom self-identification is always postponed through the postponing language of the 
written text. 
The return to opacity is not, in the final analysis, a mere going back to tlýe ground from 
which it was possible to make the return in the first place. Although clarifications have, I 
hope, been made, here return is a means of reaching out to the possibility of responding to 
the question of anonymity, of the anonymous source of writing and, even, of the reader; of 
the very opacity that structures the relation between. In order to better understand that 
relation, having in hand a few indispensable concepts, it will be helpful to turn towards the 
other consideration implied by return; that is, the attempt to locate and delimit the 
relationship between temporality, historicity and the between of relation. 
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for MardBrou-nell 
Retired to the peace of this desert, 
with a collection of books that are few but wise, 
I live in conversation with the departed 
and listen to the dead with my eyes. 
Francisco de Quevcdo 
The Unknown Tongue 
The Persistence of the Past 
Every poet Nvishes to be read in the future, and in a profounder and more generous way than in his 
own time. It is not a thirst for fame; it is a thirst for life. The poet knows that he is simply a link in a 
chain, a bridge between yesterday and tomorrow. But suddenly, as this century draws to an end, he . discovers that the bridge is suspended between two abysses: the past that is retreating in the distance, 
and the fidue that is crumbling: The poet feels lost in-time. 
Octavio Paz 
The. Other Voice 
The conjunction between the past and the present is a suggestive instance of the 
priority of separation in understanding relation. A good deal of misunderstanding 
lingers about this conjunction, a misunderstanding generated by anýunwillingness to 
conceptualise the past and the present outside the linearity to which our ternary time 
system has lent itself, and our understanding of relation will suffer for it. Linearity has 
always relegated the past to a distant region whose apparent inaccessibility is thought 
to be a symptom of the limits (or defects) of memory and the putative constraints of 
critical reflection and interpretation. Furthen-nore, within a linear system the present is 
ordinarily conceived as a unavailing passage point: time is succession constantly 
moving forward to the promise of what, above all else, is new. This is the promise of 
linearity. Linearity impels us to reach the future in order to fully engage in what the 
past has denied us: the new, progress, advancement. Linearity impels us to turn away 
and actively repress the residue of the past that persists in the present. Consequently, 
the complete cohesion to linearity that is a hallmark of our ternary time system has 
made it difficult to think this persistence in terms appropriate to it. It appears then, 
that turning away from linearity offers us a horizon for thinking this pýrsistence. But 
how can we turn away from linearity? 
When Octavio Paz writes that "the past reappears because it is a hidden present" (1s, 
289)1 he has begun to turn away from linearity. The turn for Paz will always be a 
I This is taken from Paz! s essay "Critica. de la pirdmide" ("Critique of the F`yramid") which originally 
116 
The Time Of The Between 
return to what is closest to us; not the simple past, but the shadow of an archaic voice. 
"I am speaking of the real past", Paz claims, 11wNch is not the same as "what took 
place": dates, persons, everything we refer to as history. What took place is indeed in 
the past, yet there is something which does not pass away, something that takes place 
but that does not wholly recede into the past, a constantly returning present" (Is, 289). 
What is this something? Does it have a name? Can Paz name it? Can we? 2 For Paz, 
modernity has made it virtually impossible to speak a language in which this 
'something' could be heard. Modernity is guided by the time not of the past but of the 
future; and the time of the future, a progressive time through and through, makes 
"returns to the past and historical resurrections ... either unthinkable or reprehensible" 
Q, 93; OE, 89). Modernity, which speaks the language of the bourgeoisie, of science 
and technology, liberalism, pragmatism and capitaliSM, 3 has sealed the graves of 
history and the voice of the past by turning us "towards a deceptive tomorrow that is 
always beyond our reach" (Is. 42; L, 47-48). In response to the language of modernity, 
Paz speaks of a return that has as its object the persisting, archaic voice of time. The 
object of Paz's return is the very residue of a past that is, nonetheless, lived now, in a 
present-time that exceeds linearity. What is intriguing about Paz! s conceptualisation of 
the relation between the past and the present is his attempts to maintain two 
contradictory elements: the past is resurrected right here now. To return to the 
beginning is to return to the time buried in or by time, a time, nonetheless, that is lived 
appeared in Posdata (Mexico: siglo veintiuno editores, s. a., 1970). 
,I Recall Bell's argument that, in the face of the obscurity between self and other, Lawrence affinued 
that there was "something else seeking to get expressed" rather than conceiving obscurity as the 
impossibility of ever communicating inner states of self awareness to another. As. 1 pointed out before, 
I am offering a similar affirmation here vis-A-tis an analysis of various Latin Arnýrican texts with the 
exception that the structures of time and history become central to the conceptual appreciation of 
obscurity (that is, for our discussion, opacity) and the significance of its affirmation. See above pp 27- 
28. 
3 Paz employs these terms in his analysis of certain historical relations between the United States and 
the Nfiddle East. For a full discussion of these problems, especially of the relationship between 
religious sentiment and nationalism in Iran and its relation to Paz's critique of modernity, see t, 94- 
103; OE, 90-99 and 192-197. 
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now, in our time. Therefore, the present is the space where this return is enacted. As 
Paz tells us, "the supreme value is not the future but the present. The ffiture is a 
deceitful time that always says to us "Not yet", and thus denies us. The future is not 
the time of love: what man truly wants he wants now. Whoever builds a house for 
future happiness btfilds a pfison for the present". The value of the present-supersedes 
any value for the ffiture because it is only in the present that the voice of hist6ly is 
spoken and heard. In what is surely a personal testimony, Paz tells us that it is, the poet 
who has always been the bearer of the demands of the past. As a progeny of modem 
poetry, Paz is unwilling to separate his theoretical notions concerning time and history 
from his own poetic experience. Paz writes as the poet for whom poetry alone will 
return us to the origin by resurrecting in us the voice "of the begi*ng" (OV, 153). 
The poet returns us by speaking the tongue of the other voice, an archaic voice 
resurrected by the "accent" of the poet, one whose "indefinable and unmistakable 
modulation ... makes 
it other ... the mark of original 
difference" (01ý 153). 
In his treatment of Walt Whitmares Song ofMyset(, Paz argues that "The poet sings 
of an I that is a you and a he and a we. He is one among many, and a unique being; a 
wanderer on foot, and a cosmos. Whitman regains the archetypical nature of time not 
by way of a legendary past but through the immersion in the present moment. What is 
happening right now is happening always"(OV, 29). 4 Later, Paz argues that 
Even when [poetry] is identified with the void ... 
it appears, 
paradoxically, as a presence. It is not an idea: it is pure time. Time 
without measure .... The poetry that 
is beginning with this century's 
end does not really begin, nor does it return to its starting point; it is 
a perpetual re-beginning and a continual return. The poetry that is 
beginning now, without beginning, is seeking the intersection of 
times, the point of convergence ... the preserit 
is manifesi in 
presence, and presence is the reconciliation of the three tifves. A 
poetry of reconciliation: the imagination made flesh in a nchv that has 
4 "The time of the song is also unprecedented, for it is neither a mythical past nor an atemporal 
present. It is a closed present, 1855, and a present that has no dates at all: the here and now that 
comes and goes every day, ever since human beings became human. " Paz argues that Whitman 
radicalises the Romantic tradition by turning the topos of the "legendary hero, behind whose physical 
form the poet conceals himself, into a "poetic expansion" (OV, 28-29). 1 will have more to say about 
Paz's own relationship to Romanticism later on. 
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no dates (01ý 57-58). 
And yet, the sense of the positive importance of the present for the voice of poetry at 
the end of this century seems to be negated at key points in Pazs writing. Paz argues 
that the market economy of the late twentieth century places the poet and the reader in 
a "here" that is 'nowhere and everywhere" because it is "right now". As such, both 
poet and reader are divorced fi-orn the past which gives substance to the voice of 
poetry. "The preeminence of the now weakens the ties that join us to the past .... 
We 
are immersed in a now that never stops blinking and that gives us the feeling ok 
constant acceleration .... 
Whether illusory or real, the past whirls away at a dizzying 
pace and vanishes" (0 V, 114). And this is why the other voice is "never the voice of 
here and now, which is the modem voice, but the voice from beyond, the other one, 
the one of the beginning" (OV, 153). 
How are we to reconcile these seemingly contradictory claims: the future imprisons 
the present, the present is the house of a now without dates that allows the voice of 
poetry to speak towards the past and the present accelerates us beyond and divorces 
us from the very timelessness of the instant? To make this situation more troublesome, 
Paz argues that "The expansion of the present in the domain of literary tradition 
manifests itself in the trend towards instantaneous communication. Endurance, the 
attribute of perfection, yields its place to quick consumption. The past and future 
vanish, and the present intensifies into a single instant: the three times are exhaled in 
one breath. The instant explodes and dissipates" (01ý 114-115). Paz seems to argue 
that the voice of poetry is not at home in the present and yet belongs there intimately, a 
contradiction which results from Pazs unwillingness to overcome his adherence to a 
ternary time system. Paz needs to maintain the ternary time systemýin order to speak 
of the reconciliation of the past, present and future which he sees as the defining mark 
of poetry at the end of this century. This reconciliation empowers society against the 
loss of the future by retaining the past in the present: only in the recognition and 
affirmation of the persistence of the past in the present will society gain a future. 
Hence, to "forget poetry" (OV, 160) is to forget the past since poetry is the constant 
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announcement of "what has been obstinately forgotten by centuries. Poetry is memory 
become image and image become voice" (Ofý 155). The poet sings to us of ourselves, 
of what is closest to us but constantly repressed by the present-time of modernity, that 
now which "gives us the feeling of constant acceleration". The poem thus guarantees 
tbe-future in the Affirmation of the past- and 'is, -therefore, -a-means of binding a 
community around a central identity; that is, precisely, the identity of the origin. But 
poetry is not only the possibility of communion between individuals but between the 
individual and the cosmos. Poetry realises that great Romantic desire of uniting mind 
and nature through its process of "imagining" which "consists, essentially, of the ability 
to place contrary or divergent realities in relationship" (OV, 158). Paz! s return is 
therefore a return to unification in a now that contains both past and future through a 
poetry of reconciliation, a poetry that "offers living proof of the brotherhood of the 
stars and elementary particles, chemicals and consciousness. " 
The confusion in Paz is really the result of using 'the instant' and 'the present' in 
different ways at different points in his arguments. In the critique of modernity and 
linearity, Paz focuses attention on the dislocation and disunity of time in the process of 
instant communication which he sees as a hallmark of modernity. However, in his 
treatment of poetry as the embodiment of a temporality that exceeds linearity through 
the unification or reconciliation of the past, present and future, the present-instant 
represents the very time of the poem, the time of reconciliation itself, a time which is 
beyond linearity because it brings together and unifies what linearity had dismembered. 
(And we must always remember that, for Paz, to be beyond in the realm of poetry is to 
be before or outside linear time). In this latter conceptualisation we can hear 
resonances of Lyotard's analysis of Newman's notion of the instant. AS I pointed out 
above, Lyotard reads Newman's paintings as invocations of a time thht, by dismantling 
consciousness in the process of their own creation, cannot be placed within the 
boundaries of linearity; that is, between the past and the future. Rather, Lyotard tells 
us, Newman's now is the immediate moment of the painting itself, a moment which 
cannot be consumed by the past or the future. In this way, Newman is able to counter 
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the drive towards "the technological manipulation of time" on the basis of the 
"calculation of profitability, the satisfaction of needs [and) self affirmation through 
success". 5 Similarly, Pazs 'instant' embodied in the poem - or rather the instant the 
poem announces - the poeds essential temporality, disrupts the drive towards instant 
communication by exposing us to the elemental connection all people have to the time 
before time, a present-instant of reconciliation and not one that is devoured bý the 
now-time of modernity. This clarification is vital in understanding how Paz 
reconceptualises temporality and to any worthwhile critique of his own inability to 
shake off linearity as a starting point for that reconceptualisation, the latter of which I 
will deal with shortly. 
For Paz, we become aware of the need to return to the origin, tQ the beginning, 
when we become aware of our immersion in the solitude that is a defining mark of 
human existence. "Solitude", Paz writes, "is not an exclusively Mexican characteristic. 
All men, at some moment in their lives, feel themselves to be alone. And they are .... 
Man is the only being who knows he is alone, and the only one who seeks out another 
.... Man 
is nostalgia and a search for communion. Therefore, when he is aware of 
himself he is aware of his lack of another, that is, of his solitude" (Is, 175; L, 195). 6 
The awareness of our immersion in solitude not only impels us to return to the 
beginning but, in so doing, to transcend the confines of our solitude and, thereby, to 
communion with ourselves and our culture, a transcendence which is not only a return 
but a rebeginning, a recreation. In short, transcendence for Paz would entail making 
accessible to consciousness that which is not accessible to it while consciousness 
remains confined to the linearity of modernity. The temporality of modernity is not the 
temporality in which this accessibility is guaranteed. N careful exan-dnation of solitude 
5 See above, pg. 3 1, n. 21 and pg. 33, n. 24. 
6 Recall that in § -1: Terms oflneffability I distinguished 'opacity' and 'ineffability' from a notion of 
lack which appeared in Lyotard's analysis of Burke, NeAvman and the sublime. It is important to 
reaffirm that distinction here with the addition that Paz's conception of solitude as lack needs to be 
replaced, especially with what has gone on up to this point, with a notion of solitude as shared 
abandonment, one I will develop in my analysis of Fuentes' reading of Nikolai Gogol. 
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will help to unfold these notions further. 
In El laberinto de la soledad [Ae Labyrinth of Solitude], Paz writes that "we are 
condemned to live alone, but also to transcend our- solitude, to re-establish the bonds 
- that united us with a paradisiac past" (Is, 175; L, 195). Here, as elsewhere, Lysander 
-Kemp's translation of El 7aberinto de'la s67edadiis niis-leading. * In -Sparfish we read: 
"estamos condenados a vivir solos, pero tambidn lo estamos a traspasar nuesira 
soledad ya rehacer los lazos que en pasado paradisiaco nos wiian a la vida", f1s, 175; 
my emphasis). Kemp's translation obscures the force of the original: not then, a unity 
with a paradisiac past but, more accurately, "the bonds7 that in a paradisiac past united 
us to life". The question we must attend to now, one obfuscated by Kemp's 
translation, is the question concerning the nature of this life, the past to which it is 
attributed and the conditions that make transcending our solitude possible. This 
question is necessary if we are to understand the nuances of PaA later arguments, 
arguments which Kemp's translation not only obscures but, in some cases, completely 
buries. 
To assess these later arguments we must pay very close attention to the subtle 
transformation from a literal to a much more figural use of language in "La dial6ctica 
de la soledad" ["The Dialectic of Solitude"]. In charting this transformation I will be 
paying specific attention to Paz's use of 'vientr&, 'claustro, and 'seno', all of which 
Kemp translates as 'womb', and their connection to his conceptualisation of the relation 
between life and death. 
In the second paragraph of "La dialdctica de la soledad", Paz writes: "Uno con el 
mundo que lo rodea, el feto es vida y en bruto, fluir ignorante de si. A] nacer, t 
rompemos los lazos que nos unen a la vida ciega que Vivimos en el viejUre materno, en 
donde no hay pausa entre deseo y satisfacci6n" (Is, 175; my emphasiS). Kemp 
translates this rather straightforward passage in the following manner: "The foetus is at 
one with the world around it; it is pure brute life, unconscious of itself When we are 
7 los lazos: literally 'lassoes'. 
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bom we break the ties that joined us to the life we lived in the maternal womb, where 
there is no gap between desire and satisfaction" (L, 195; my emphasis). 8 But then, in 
the fifth paragraph, we begin to detect a subtle but decisive transformation in locution: 
14]Na= y morir son expefiencias de 
soledad. Nacemos solos y mofimos 
solos.... 
[5jEntre nacer y morir transcurre nuestra 
vida. Expulsados del claustro matenio, 
iniciamos un angustioso salto de veras 
mortal, que no terinina sino hasta que 
caemos en la muerta 
(1s, 176; my emphasis). 
, Death and birth are solitary experiences. We are bom alone and we die alone. 
When we are expelled from the maternal 
ivomb, we begin the painful strugýle that 
finally ends in death 
(L, 196). 
Kemp not only ornits the first sentence of the fifth paragraph - "Entre nacer y mofir 
transcurre nuestra vida. "- he also extracts the first two sentences' of the fourth - 
"Nacer y morir son experiencias de soledad. Nacemos solos y morimos solos" -a 
paragraph he fails to translate in its entirety, and appends them to the beginning of the 
fifth. The result is an indiscriminate dissection of the original. The fifth paragraph 
literally reads: 
Between to be bom and to die passes our life. Expelled ftom the 
maternal cloister, we begin an anguished leap truly deadly [mortafl 
that does not end until we fall down in death. 
The literal translation is intentional. Paz! s use of the infinitives 'nacer' - to be bom - 
and'morir'- to die - lends a specific inflection to his argument. Paz is referring to the 
events of birth and death, the being bom and the being (unto) death of A humanity. 9 
8 While this will become of greater importance later, it is important to flag Kemp's translation of 
'pausa'as'gapý. Such a translation unwittingly elides the important sense time plays in the underlying 
argument of Pazs essay. Alternatively, a more literal interpretation would in fact underscore 
temporality right from the start: In the maternal wonib, there is no pause between desire and 
satisfaction; that is, in the maternal womb we experience a present which stretches out all around us. 
This notion of temporality will also become increasingly important in my discussion of Rulfo's Pedro 
Pdraino as an important example of the need to affirm the gap and not, as in Paz, to search for a 
temporality that would bridge it, and, subsequently, the significance of postponement centralised in 
Fuentes' reading of Diderot and Gogol. 
9 For Paz, birth and death appear as event horizons; they are the boundaries which condition the 
possibility of life and, therefore, are not horizons of possibility themselves. In this sense, birth and 
death are events because they conform to the first and last movements of linearity. As I will argue 
later, in order to move beyond linearity we would need to rethink the value of retaining 'the event' as a 
critical cxpression which could respond to the sepaiation of relation in approaching the question of 
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Life is that which passes between birth and death: fife is this 'between', this separation. 
By refusing to translate "Entre nacer y morir transcurre nuestra vida", Kemp 
completely obscures this vital understanding of the relation between life and death in 
Paz! s essay. Is this'lifethe life to which we were united in the paradisiac past Paz 
reTers to ear-Flier? -To address this we must turn to the missing paragraph, the -paragraph 
Kemp excludes in his translation. I quote it here in its entirety since its hidden 
questions are central to my analysis: 
Nacir y morir son experieneias de 
soledad. Nacemos solos y morimos, 
solos. Nada tan grave como esa primera 
inmersi6n en la soledad que es el nacer, 
sino es esa otra eaida en lo desconocido 
que es el morir. La vivencia de la muerte 
se transforma pronto en coneiencia del 
morir. Los nihos y los hombres 
primitivos no creen en la muerte; mejor 
dicho, no saben que la muerte existe, 
aunque ella trabje secremente en su 
intetior. 
Su descubrienýento nuncaes tardio para 
el hombre civilizado, pues todos nos 
avisa y previene que hemos de mofir. 
Nuestras vidas son un diario aprendizaje 
de la muer-te. Mds que a vivir se nos 
ensefia a morir. Y se nos ensefia mal 
To be born and to die are experiences of 
solitude. 10 We are born alone and we die 
alone. There is nothing so grave as this 
first immersion in the solitude which is 
birth, if it were not for this other fall into 
the stranger which is death. The 
existence of death transforms itself 
quickly by the awareness of [the event 
and encounter with] death. Children and 
primitive mankind do not believe in 
death; they do not know death exists, 
although she works secretly in their soul. 
Their revelation is never late for civýised 
mankind, which warns us and foretells 
that we must die. Our lives are a daily 
apprenticeship in death. More than to 
live we must teach ourselves to die. And 
we teach this with difficulty. II 
(Is, 176) 
anonynu 
10 1 have translated this literally in order to accent the sense in which the events of birth and death 
are ones which encounter solitude. Kemp! s translation - "Death and birth are solitary experiences" - 
while it confuses much, is grammatically correct. 
It is important to note that, according to Paz, Mexicans are drawn between the experience of 
solitude and the eruption of the fiesta. The tension between these poles is expressýd in two concep- 
tions of death: "Asf, frente a la muerte hay dos actitudes: una, hacia adalante, que la concibe como 
creaci6n; otra, de rcgreso, que se expresa como fascinati6n ante la nada o como nostalgia del limbo" 
(Is, 55) 1 "one, pointing for", ard, that conceives of it as creation; the other, pointing bac"-ard, that 
expresses itself as a fascination with nothingness or as a nostalgia for limbo" (L, 6 1). Paz argues that 
Mexicans have never approached the first of these two notions. "La muerte como nostagia y no como 
fruto o fin de la vida equivale a afirmar que no venimos de la vida, sino de la muerte .... Regresar a la 
muerte original serd volver a la vida de antes de la vida, a la vida de antes de la muerte: a[ limbo, a la 
entrafla materna" (is, 56). That is, they are committed to vie,, ving death as nostalgia and, as such, do 
not conceive of death as "the fruition or end of life": death as nostalgia can only mean "death as origin 
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Life encounters death, constantly walks in the shadow of the death that must precede 
it. Only the confrontation with death can bring us into contact with life: life and death 
are twins, born of a common source, the source of all existence; that is, prenatal and 
presocial life. In order to understand the dimensions of this prenatal life, especially as 
- ike up a central role in Pa2s argmment, -we- must turn w 4he final transfbrmation they ta 
in Paz's language. 
As I pointed out, Kemp's translation of'claustro matemo'as'matemal womb' 
obscures the first transformation of language in Pa2s essay. By the fifth paragraph, 
Paz has moved fi7om an explicitly literal use of language -'vientre materno'- to a much 
more figural use -'claustro materno'. It will only be in the final stage of this 
transformation that any literal reference to'womb'is completely left behind. This final 
transformation comes mid-way through the fifth paragraph where Paz tells us: "Pues si 
todo (conciencia de sf, tiempo, raz6n, costumbres, hAbitos) tiende a hacer de nosotros 
los expulsados de la vida, todo tambi6n nos empuja a volver, a descender al seno 
creador de donde fuimos arrancados" (Is, 176; my emphasis). Whereas in Kemp we 
read: "Everything - self-awareness, time, reason, customs, habits - tends to make us 
exiles from life, but at the same time everything impels us to return, to descend to the 
creative womb from which we were cast out" (L, 196; my emphasis). An unfortunate 
translation. Literally 'seno creadoe means 'creative breast' which, it seems to me, has 
no literal meaning whatsoever. That is to say, Paz has moved -from the fiteral'vientre 
materno' to the poetic and figural 'seno creadoe, a movement that is completely 
.... A return to original death would be a return to the life before 
life, the life before death: to limbo, to 
the maternal source! ' (L, 62). The oscillation between a life of solitude and a desire for a death that is 
original, that returns Mexicans to themselves, is one which points to the recognition every Mexican 
has of "la presencia de una mancha"; "the presence of a stigma" on the body of every Mexican and on 
the "came"; "flesh" of Mexico itself: "no por difusa menos viva, original c imboriable" (is, 57) 1 "It is 
diffused but none the less living, original, and ineradicable" (L, 634). And it is t! his very stigma 
which cleaves Mexicans from and to themselves; a rending which offers Mexicans the hiding place of 
solitude and an adhering to themselves in the explosions of their fiestas. Hence, solitude is not merely 
a moment of isolation. Rather, it is the expression of an oscillation "cntre la entrega y la rescrva" (Is, 
58) 1 "between intimacy and withdrawal". While the Mexican never "trascicnde su soledad" (Is, 64)1 
"transcends his solitude", he nevertheless continually floats in that middle-spacc between life and 
death, "entre el grito y el silencio, entre la fiesta y el velorio" (is, 58) 1 "between a shout and a silence, 
between a fiesta and a wake" (L, 64). 
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consistent with the status he affords to the language and voice of poetry as the 
language that will return us to the origin; 12 an origin which is, precisely, not the 
maternal womb, not a geotemporal space, but the space and time buried in time itself 
What does this transformation into a completely poetic use of language suggest about 
the movement away from. any'literal Teference-to the womb? 
As Paz will say later, while it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether or 
not death is a "return to the life that precedes life", whether or not death is "the truest 
kind of life", it is nonetheless a characteristic of "our whole being" to "attempt to 
escape the opposites that torment [desgarrar: to tear (up); to shatter; griefl us" (Is, 
176; L, 196). The need to move increasingly away from a conception of life rooted in 
the physical characteristics of our (literal) birth responds to the "double significance" of 
solitude; that is, "solitude is both self-awareness, and ... 
it is longing to escape from 
oneself' (Is, 175; L, 195). Everything in PaZs language suggests this transformation: 
his reference to the foetus when speaking of aw& that emerges from the maternal 
womb; his use later, after references to a specific temporal succession, of a'we! in the 
approach and constant proximity of death - "A medida que crecemos" I "As we grow"; 
"Y mds tarde" I "And much later"; and then these questions: "LMorir serA volver allk a 
la vida de antes de la vida? " I "Is death a return, to the life before life? "; %Serd vivir de 
nuevo esa. vida prenatal en que reposo y movin-ýiento, dia y noche, tiempo y etemidad, 
dejan de oponerse? " I "Is it [death) to live again in this prenatal life in which rest and 
movement, day and night, time and eternity, are abandoned as objecting to each 
other? "; 13 "LMorir serA dejar de ser y, definitivamente, estar? " I "Is death [to die] itself 
12 1 will be exploring this in greater detail shortly. 
13 Again the literal translation is intentional. Paz constantly applies his local a' ments to larger rgu 
political and social exigencies. This application tends to come in the form of reflections on the 
interaction between political and social systems that seem completely incongruous with each other. 
For Paz, this incongruity is suggestive not only of the role revolution plays in the construction of 
internal political and social systems, but the i&-ay in which one particular system interacts, "ith 
another. As I have argued on several occasions throughout this text, postcolonial transformation is 
realised in cultural contact, in a contact between two or more peoples who do not object to their 
mutual caresses. 
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to cease to be and, definitively, to be? " In a conversation with Claude Fell, Paz says 
"Spanish has an advantage over French and English; We have estar and ser. "E'starin 
history" means to be surrounded by historical circumstances; "ser in history" means 
that one is, oneself, historical circumstances: that one is, oneself, changing. That is to 
say, man is not only an object or subject oThistory: he himself is history, heis the 
changes" ("Return to the Labyrinth of Solitude", L, 333). In Spanish ser is used to 
denote conditions that are permanent - one! s gender or nationality for example while 
estar is used to denote conditions that are not - one's occupation or health. In this 
sense, I am in history because I am surrounded by the ebb and flow of changing 
historical circumstances. But I am in history also because I am those very changes that 
only appear to operate on the periphery of my own existence. Whpn Paz asks "Lmorir 
seri dejar de ser y, definitivamente, estar? " he is asking whether or not death is ceasing 
to be what we permanently and usually are (ser) here in the geotemporal condition of 
existence and to become what we unusually are (estar) beyond this apparent 
permanence. Is death to end the existence that is permanent and to live, in death, the 
life that is temporary'? The 'we' in the proximity of death is not the 'we' that emerges 
from the maternal womb. Only after we become aware that we are beings unto death 
does death impel us to return, to leap back across life itself - that is, the life which 
appears permanent, this life here - to the life prior to rife. Modernity's temporality 
gives way to the temporality of death conceived as the return to the origin. As we will 
see, Pazs analysis of the Mexican Day of the Dead is not merely employed as a local 
detail in the adumbration of Mexican culture. The Mexican Day of the Dead 
foregrounds the importance of death's demand in understanding solitude, temporality 
and the impulse to return to a prenatal existence. Death's demand is precisely the 
demand to return to our origins, origins which are not the physical origins of the 
matemal womb but the very essence of undifferentiation. If we experienced this 
undifferentiation in the maternal womb, death will not drive us back to it but to the 
source of all undifferentiation: that source is announced by Paz in the figural and not 
the literal use of language. Expelled from the unity of our prenatal existence, we begin 
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an anguished leap into the between of separation, a leap which affords us no rest until 
our death, the death we earn in the labour of our anguish. 14 
Paz tells us that Mexico has an embedded history which is, almost always, lived 
silently by every-Mexican, a history that erupts in the images-of tbeý dead-and-their 
resurrection in memory during the time of the fiesta. For Paz, the fiesta is not 
primarily a recuperation of ancient economic practices, where the wastefulness of 
society generates health, where "wasting money and expending energy affirms the 
community's wealth in both" (is, 44; L, 50). 15 On the contrary, the fiesta is primarily 
"a sudden immersion in the forn&ss, in pure being" (Is, 46; L, 5 1), an immersion 
that is directly aligned to a "revolutionary explosion" (MO, 201), ýut one that must 
be read through Paz! s, notion of "revolt as resurrection" (1,94; 0E, 90). 16 The fiesta 
is a revolt precisely because, in the "revolutionary explosion" it generates, it returns 
Mexicans to the beginning and allows them to confront "the other Mexican" (MO, 
20 1): "The fiesta is a cosmic experiment ... reuniting contradictory elements and 
principles in order to bring about a renascence of life .... The 
fiesta is a return to a 
14 For a close analysis of the notion of carning one's death and of the process of living in the presence 
of one's own death in the context of mass death see Edith Wyschogrod's intriguing work Spirit in 
Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, andMan-Uade Alass Death. (New Haven: Yale U P., 1985). 
15 Paz aigucs that this particular interpretation was common among French sociologists in the 1940's 
and brings into focus PaZs desire to constantly reread Latin American culture in light of the European 
imagination that helped to create it. It should be pointed out that, given the increased interest in Latin 
America as a theoretical site for the arguments put form-ard by European writers (such as Bataille for 
example), we need to be constantly attentive to the fact that the perceptions many Latin American 
writers have of themselves are a reflection of their desire to asses and reassess their relationship to this 
European imagination. 
16 We must not lose sight of this particularly Pazian language: ýThe movement bom of [the French 
and American revolutions] runs through the twentieth century like a river that +atedly goes 
underground and resurfaces. As it flows, it changes; as it changes, it ceaselessly returns to its source" 
(OV, 145). For Paz any return is pregnant with change and indicates the vital importance the notion 
of beginning, which is always a rebeginning and a re-creation, is for his overall project. As Fuentes 
writes in Mysetf With Others: "The revolution", wrote my compatriot, the great poet Octavio Paz, "is a 
sudden immersion of Mexico in its own being. In the revolutionary explosion ... each Mexican ... finally recognizes, in a mortal embrace, the other Mexican. " Paz himself, Diego Rivera and Carlos 
Chdvez, Mariano Azuela and Jo-, d Clemente Orozco, Juan Rulfo and Rufino Tamayo: we all exist and 
work because of the revolutionary experience of our own country" (110,20 1). 
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remote and undifferentiated space, prenatal or presocial. It is a return that is also a 
beginning" (Is, 46; L, 51-52). 
The dialectic of solitude must be understood as the condition that impels us to 
return to the beginning, a return which is, precisely, the attempt to exceed ourselves, 
and as the very pd&ýibfflity of achieving that return. - In -the awareness of-our solitude 
lies the precondition that will allow us to "rend ourselves open" (Is, 47; L, 5j), allow 
us to tear ourselves from ourselves in order to apprehend ourselves. The dialectic 
of solitude thus foregrounds the ex-timate relation: to encounter themselves 
Mexicans must exceed themselves, must explode out of themselves into the intimate 
exteriority of an other which they themselves are. By immersing themselves in their 
"own ofigins", in the "womb from which they came"'17 the Mexicap "denies society 
as an organic system of differentiated forms and principles, but affirms it as a source 
of creative energy. It is a true "re-creation"" (is, 46; L, 52). The return to the 
beginning is never a simple restoration in the Heideggerian sense, but a rebeginning. 
The destructive element in the fiesta is the possibility for its "creative energy", a 
dialectic of creation and destruction which Fuentes is also keenly aware of "Burnt 
water, atl 11achinolli: the paradox of the creation is also the paradox of the 
destruction. The Mexican character never separates life from death, and this too is 
the sign of the burnt water that has presided over [Mexico's] destiny in birth and 
rebirth". 18 The dead origin then, whose rebirth, phoenix-like from the ashes of its 
17 "Se ha sumergido en si, en la entrafta misma de donde sali6". By no stretch of the imagination can 
lentrafla! - heart, entrails - be translated as VomV. The point I am making here will not be under- 
mined by Kemp% poor translation. 
18 At the beginning ofAgua Quemada [Burnt Water] Fuentes quotes these linýs from Paz's poem 
Vuella [Return]: 




For the purposes of this section it is important to offer the full stanza from which this extract has been 
taken: 
El %ricnto Wind 
en esquinaspolvosas - 'on the dusty comers 
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own being, reappears in the present-time of a now bursting under the pressure of its 
own solitude, of its creations and recreations. 
In 1990, Paz writes: 
No one in his rig&-mindcan Ihink that the crisis flW today brings 
chaos-to the-countries that -have -lived-under-the despotism of bureaucratic Communism will not spread to the rest of the world. 
We are living through a change of times: not a revolution but, in the 
long-standing and profoundest sense of the word, a revolt -a return 
to the origin, to the beginning. We are witnessing not the end of 
history 
... but a rebeginning. The resurrection of 
buried realities, the 
reappearance of what was forgotten and repressed .... (OV, 145). 
Revolt, the return that resurrects, is enacted beyond the physical violence that 
characterises the revolutionary movements throughout history and, most especially, 
throughout the modem age. These movements would never have fulfilled themselves 
in victory and defeat were it not for the language of revolt, the language which is not 
spoken primarily by violence or physical confrontation, but by "the other voice". 
While the social, religious, economic and political circumstances may have changed, 
the aspect which fuels the eruption of all revolutions and sustains their revolutionary 
fury has remained the same: the other voice. The poet is the individual alone who can 
hojea los peri6dicos 
Noticias de ayer 
mäs remotas 
que una tabilla cuneiforme hecha pcdazos 
Escrituras hendidas 
lenguajes en afticos 




No hay centro 
plaza de congregaci6n 
no hay eie 
dispersiön de los aflos 
desbandada de los liorizontes 
en cada puerta 
Marcaron a la ciudad 
en cada frente 
et signo $ 
turns the papers 
Yesterday's news 
more remote 
than a cuneiform tablet smashed to bits 
Cracked scriptures 
the signs were broken 




There is no centrc 
plaza of congregatign and consecration 
there is no axis 
the years dis'persed 
horizons disbanded 
on every door 
Tlicy have branded the city 
on every forehead 
(SP, 19 1; tr. Eliot Weinberger) 
the S sign 
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hear the other voice, the voice of the archaic and buried realities smothered by the 
language of modernity, the time of linearity, the voice of progress; all of which drive us 
towards a utopian, always promised tomorrow. 
Paz's critique of progress appears to miss a vital point about the relation between 
the past, the future and renewal characteristic of modernity, apoint-whichbea, On-Itis 
understanding of "revolt as resurrection". In an important study on the relatl , on 
between secularisation, progress and the value of the new as the relation which defines 
modernity, Gianni Vattimo writes that "from the beginning of the modem era ... art 
has 
found itself in the same ungrounded condition that science and technology only today 
explicitly recognize themselves to be in". 19 This "ungrounded position" is the result of 
secularisation - the transference of the value of the sacred to "the ýffirrnation of the 
realm of profane value" (101) - which jettisons the metaphysical grounds of truth and 
"the value of'usefulness for fife"' in the creation of works of art. Paz appears to think 
that art and science/technology are completely different activities in relation to history. 
It appears that poetry responds to history in a way in which science and technology do 
not. But, as Vattimo points out, "faith in progress", which Paz clearly aligns with the 
operative mechanisms of science and technology, is intimately allied to a vision of the 
future in the same way that "twentieth century artistic avant-garde movements, whose 
radically anti-historicist inspiration is most authentically expressed by Futurism and 
Dadaism ... 
is still accompanied by an appeal to the authentic, according to a model of 
thought characteristic of all modern Tuturism: the tension towards the future is seen as 
a tension aimed towards a renewal and return to a condition of originary authenticity" 
(100). What Vattimo is arguing is that maintaining a division between the arts and 
science/technology when speaking of modernity fails to appreciate the defining 
characteristic of this era; that is, "the era in which being modem becomes ... the 
fundamental value to which all other values refer" (99). If the'logic of progress', 
which affirms that "progress is just that process which leads towards a state of things 
19 Gianni Vattimo, The End ofAfodernity, tr. Jon R- Snyder (Cambridge: Polity Prm, 1988): 10 1. 
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in which further progress is possible, and nothing more" (10 1), appears to drain any 
value to be placed on the past and "historical resurrections" by creating a "dependence 
of the present on the future" (105), it accomplishes this by appealing to "the value of 
the new" as "originary authenticity". How then, can any appeal to renewal and return 
made by Paz not be compli6t with this Tutufism-which, as Vattimo sees it, is the 
defining characteristic of modernity? 
The real problem for Paz is the relationship between return and rebeginning pd the 
question is whether or not there is a more subtle relationship between his conception of 
modernity and 'the return of the repressed' that would require us to distinguish his 
reading of modernity from Vattimo's. In the first instance, Paz understands the return 
to origins to be gauged in relation to the present such that the retukn does not seek a 
time outside time in the conventional sense; that is, precisely, the time of "ofiginary 
authenticity". The time buried in or by time is the authentic time that underlies all 
temporal and historical process. This authenticity, however, has no meaning for Paz 
outside the demand the past places on us, a demand which we respond to in our critical 
reflections upon that past and, in the encounter with that 'something' which does not 
slip away, in our re-creation of ourselves and our cultureS. 20 In order to understand 
10 In his attempt to articulate the problem of applying the temi'modem', in its European context, to 
the countries of Central and South America, Paz argues that "People have never knowii the name of 
the age in which they live, and we are no exception to this rule. To call ourselves "postmodem" is 
merely a naive way of saying that we are extremely modem. And yet what has not been called into 
question is the linear concept of time and its identification with criticism, change, and progress - time 
opening to the future as the promised land. To call ourselves postmodem is to continue to be the 
prisoner of successive, linear, progressive time" (OV54-55). Years earlier, Paz had argued that 
"Criticism is, for me, theftee form of commitment ... 
for me criticism is creative. The significant 
difference between France and England on the one hand and Spain and Hispanic America on the 
other is that we had no eighteenth century. We had no Kant, Voltaire, Diderot, or Hume. Criticism 
made the modem world" (L, 350). Or again, "the key 
, 
concepts 9f the Modem Age - progress, 
evolution, revolution, freedom, democracy, science, technology - had their origin I 
in criticism" (OV, 
33). Andjust one more to push the point: "The Modem Age began with the critiýism of Christian 
Eternity and, accompanying it, the appearance of another kind of time. On the one hand the finite 
time of Christianity, with its beginning and its end, became the nearly infinite time of the evolution of 
nature and history, a time ever open to the future. On the other, modernity devalued Eternity: 
perfection was transported to a future that lay not in the next world but in this one. In Hegel's famous 
image, the rose of reason is crucified in the present. History, he said, is Calvary, a transformation of 
the Christian mystery into historical action. The road to the Absolute travels by means of time; it is 
time. Change and revolution are the embodiments of the human march toward the future and its 
paradises" (OV35-36). My intention in quoting these lengthy passages is to underscore two concerns: 
One PaZs and one my own. In the first, Paz is concerned to draw attention to the impact European 
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this relationship we must attend to the language and voice of poetry and, precisely, 
what the origin is as rebeginning. 
The language of poetry is not the poet's language since the poet does not command 
a laqguage that has been acquired through some pedagogic process. The language of 
poetry is not taught, -is not given over (communicated) from mentor to -student: the 
language of poetry is heard. The language of poetry is the language that no one 
acquires and that cannot be spoken outside the voice of the poet. The poet's voice is 
other because it has "heard, not outside but inside" itself the archaic voice and tfie 
archaic language of its own culture. As Paz has written in another context, 
the poet is a man whose very being becomes one with his words. 
Therefore, only the poet can make possible a new dialogue. The 
destiny of the poet, particularly in a period such as ours: is 'donner 
un sens plus pur aux mots de ]a tribu'. 21 This implies that words are 
rooted out of the common language and brought to birth in a poem 
... words are 
inseparable from men. Consequently, poetic activity 
cannot take place outside the poet, in the magic object represented 
by the poem; rather does it take man himself as the centre of its 
experience. Opposites are fused in man himself, not in the poem 
alone. The two are inseparable (SP, 17)'22 
modernism has had on conceptions of Latin America and Latin American modernity. Any 
reconccptualisation of the latter must, according to Paz, take this into consideration. However, and 
this is my concern, Paz upholds the value of criticism as a road to self-creation, suggesting that one 
limitation to self-awareness and self-identification in Latin America is the absence of a critical 
tradition, a tradition that is linked to linearity and, therefore, to a concept of time that is antithetical to 
the identification of Latin America with the time that, after colonisation and Enlightenment thinking, 
they were told to forget; that is, the time in which, according to Paz, the three times of the ternary 
system are reconciled- How then, can Paz uphold these two contradictory assertions? The answer to 
this rests finally in Paz's inability to reconcile two distinct desires in his writing, an inability I will 
deal with presently. 
21 To give a more pure meaning to the words of the tribe'. 
22 "Poetry and History", the short essay from which this extract 
- 
A-as taken, originally appeared in a 
translation by Samuel Beckett in the Anthology ofMexican Poetry, Thames and Hudson, 1959. With 
a similar tone, Paz has written that "Romanticism ... introduced a subjective clerr6t as the subject of 
the poem: the I of the poet, his very person .... The Romantic poem 
has as its subject the song, the 
singer: the poem, the poet" (OV, 24). Also recall Pa: es remarks on Whitman's Song ofAfyself (see 
above pg. 139, n. 4 ). What we are witnessing here is Paz's close relationship not only to 
Romanticism, but to linearity as well: The eventuality of the human, of the subjective I (eye) of poetry 
that sees the hidden. As Paz tells us: "We are now witnessing the breakdown of the two ideas that 
have constituted modernity since its birth: the vision of time as a linear, progressive succession toward 
a better future, and the notion of change as the best form of time's succession. Both these ideas were 
conjoined in our conception of history as a march toward progress: societies change continually, 
sometimes violently, but every change is an advance. ' Archetypal time ceased to be the past and a 
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This archaic voice is not "the voice from beyond the grave" but the voice that lies 
buried in the graves of a culture's history. In Mexico, Paz tells us, these graves are 
continually reopened in the Mexican! s attempt to breach the confines of solitude, an 
exhuming, as we have-seen, that is performed in the violence and turbulence of the 
Mexicanfiesta. In his 'Poetry and Hstory", -Paz writes that "the nature-of a-poemis 
analogous to that of a Fiesta which, besides being a date in a calendar, is also a break 
in the sequence of time and the irruption of a present which periodically returns, 
without yesterday or tomorrow. Every poem is a Fiesta, a precipitate of pure timell 
(SP, 15). We have already seen how Paz conceptualises the fiesta as a revolutionary 
explosion that brings Mexicans into contact with that other that they themselves are by 
bringing them out of their solitude. It should be clear now that pogtry as fiesta 
performs a similar revolutionary explosion: the poem is revolutionary because it is "a 
universe of opaque, corruptible words which can yet light up and bum whenever there 
are lips to touch them .... By exploiting language to the utmost the poet transcends 
it. 
By emphasizing history, he lays it bare and shows it for what it is - time" (SP, 16). 
That is, the pure time of the beginning resurrected now, in the present time of the 
revolutionary voice of poetry as fiesta. As a "cosmic experiment" that reunites 
"contradictory elements", the fiesta embodies a poetic process that "conceives of 
language as an animated universe traversed by a dual current of attraction and 
repulsion" (OK 158). But, as Paz writes, "If a poem is a Fiesta, it is one held out of 
season, in unfrequented places - an underground festivity" because the modem world 
has allowed history to dominate it; history, that is, as the succession of events that 
always say to us 'what will you do next' and thus forces us towards a future that will 
forever deny us (SP, 17). Clearly Paz believes that poetry and the fiesta break down 
the tyranny of history as linearity by giving us to pure time and, thereýy, bringing us 
chimerical Golden Age; and time outside time ... was dislodged by progress" (OV, 3). This drives to the heart of what is problematic in Pa2s arguments; namely, that he prioritises a mode of self- 
identification and self-recognition with a hidden and true self buried in a time outside or beyond the 
time of linearity, the latter of which he himself cannot escape. Given what I have already addressed 
in §1: Return To Opacity, it should be clear that Paz's language will need to be replaced. 
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into communion with ourselves, allowing us finally to "say No to all those powers 
which, not content with disposing of our fives, also want to rule our consciousness" 
through an affirmative "Yes which is greater than [the negation] itself' (SP, 18). Not 
only is the language of poetry revolutionary but revolt is poetic. As both revolutionary 
and poetic, the fiesta rettfms -Mexicans to an "undifferentiated-stawinTesponse to 
solitude: the fiesta is a revolt against this solitude, a means by which Mexicaný can hear 
the voice of the "Other Mexico, the submerged and the repressed, [which] reappears in 
the modem" (L, 287). 
Consequently, the fiesta is a unique expression of the notion of "revolt as 
resurrection" read through the "dialectic of solitude". The fiesta allows Mexicans to 
respond to the demands of the many pasts which it is impossible to, fully suppress. 
"We have any number of [pasts]", Paz tells us, "all alive and aU continually at war with 
one another within us .... How to live with all of them without 
being their prisoner? 
This is the question we ask ourselves without having yet arrived at an answer" (0E, 
153). Consequently, the voices of the past both suffocate the Mexican and aflow the 
language and voice of poetry, embodied in the fiesta-as-revolt, to liberate the Mexican 
through a moment of unification. Inundated by the voices of the past, poets, whose 
eyes have no lids, whose ears can refuse nothing, condemned by the chorus which tears 
along the inside of their psyche, release themselves into the world as the creative 
product of an otherwise destructive multitude. The voices of the past are legion and 
the language of poetry the product of their conquests, their resurrections into the 
diumal activities of a culture littered with the dead. And it is precisely this productive 
energy that allows that culture to constantly create itself anew. This re-creation is 
vitally important in understanding what Paz means by origins and the. return to and 
resurrection of the beginning: the beginning is a starting over which iSlalways an 
already begun. 
The other voice places demands on the poet, demands which are structured by an 
floriginal difference" spoken in the language of another time, a time now which is other 
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spoken in the other language and the other voice of poetry. As we have already seen, 
the source of all undifferentiation is announced by Paz in the figural and not the literal 
use of language: the language of the other voice, the poet's voice, a voice which is the 
poet's while it remains the voice of another. The poet arises out of separation speaking 
an unknown tongue; that is, a tongue wNch is familiar and yet -fureign. ý It is this 
duplicity that fosters the resurrection of the buried realities that refuse to pass;, away. 23 
From Paz then, we sense that the approach to the question of anonymity is made 
possible in the self-identifying language of poetry; that is, the language which gives us 
over to ourselves and to our culture by exposing us to what we are as another that we 
are, as our own shadow. It would appear that to begin to name the anonymous is to 
begin to hear the other voice and, in the process of this hearing, to, become a poet. 24 
23 While I think that there are monumental differences between Paz and Lyotard (or rather, Paz and 
Newman A la Lyotard), Paz! s essays nevertheless resonate with a similar frequency as those whom I 
have upheld through this text. Recall, for example, what Blanchot has written regarding the image. 
(See above, pg. I 11, n. 3 and pg. 114, n. 9). There are many problems with Paz! s arguments which I 
hope to expose and reach beyond in my analysis of Rulfb's work and the temporality it suggests. 
24 At the close of his introduction to "Ia dialdctica de la soledad", Paz writes: "What we ask of love 
... is that 
it give us a bit of true life, of true death. We do not ask it for happiness or rest [reposol, but 
for an instant, only an instant, of that full life in which opposites vanish, in which life and death, time 
and eternity are in agreement .... Creation and 
destruction are 6sed in the act of-love, and during a 
fraction of a second mankind catches a glimpse of a more perfect state of being" ýIs, 176-177; L, 196- 
197). The remainder of "El dialdctica de ]a soledad" is an articulation of modem eroticism in light of 
modem societies' attempts to conceal difference by erasing or subduing the dialect of solitude. I will 
have occasion to return to this later. (See below §0. ý Pos"neinent: In Lieu ofAn Ending). Here, 
however, it is important to keep in mind what I have argued earlier concerning the nature of intimacy 
contra Lcvinas; that is, that the desire for intimacy (and love) is a desire for the impossible, a desire 
founded upon separation as opacity. This dependency on separation suggests an alternative to Paz's 
affirmation of unification as well as a means of working beyond Levinas' restricted understanding of 
intimacy and love. 
156 
The Hme Of The Between 
The Place Over The Embers 
It's better not to go back to the village, 
the subverted paradise silent 
in the shatter of shrapnel. 
Ram6n L6pez Velarde; 5 
25 Paz begins his poem Vuelta with this extract from Velarde's El retorno malifico [Ill-starred 
Return]. As we will see, the connection between the image of the village, paradise and the intimation 
of revolution in the image of the shrapnel is important for my reading of Rulfo's Pedro P6raino 
inasmuch as that reading,, Aill differ from Pazs own praise for Rulfo's novel. In anticipation of that 
reading I have provided a complete representation of Velarde's poem: 
Mejor serd no rcgrcsar at pueblo, 
at eddn subvertido que se calla 
en la. mutilaci6n de la metralla. 
Better not to rerun to the village, to the ravaged 
Eden that lies silent after its mutilation by 
bombardment. 
Hasta los fresnos mancos, 
los dignitarios de cüpula oronda, 
han de rodar las quejas de la torre 
ascribillada en los vientosde fronda. 
Y la fusileria grabö en la cal 
de todas las paredes 
de la aldea espectral, 
negros y aciagos mapas, 
porque en ellos le), ese el lüjo prMgo 
al volver a su umbral 
en un anochecer de maleficio, 
a la luz de petr61co de una mecha, 
su esperanza deshecha. 
Cuando la tosca Ilave enmohecida 
tuerza la chirriante cerradura, 
en la afieja clausura 
del zaguän, los dos püdicos 
medallones de ycw, 
entomando los pärpados narcöticos, 
se mirarän y se dirän: «iQu6 es cso? » 
The lamentation of the tower, riddled by the 
winds of civil strifc, will blow as far as the 
maimed ash-trees, those proud cupola-ed 
dignitaries. 
Now the rifle shot has pitted in the whitewash 
of all the walls of the spectral village black and 
ill-omened maps, so that the Prodigal Son may 
read in them by the oily light of a wick as he 
returns home on some ill-starred night, the ruin 
of his hopes. 
When the clumsy, rusty key turns the raspy lock 
of the old hall door, the two chaste plaster 
medallions will raise their narcotic lids, look at 
one another and say Vhat is itT 
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Paz remains tied to the possibility of conjoining nature, that is, the cosmos and 
creative consciousness through the language and voice of poetry; a language and a 
voice which arises from the between in order tq bridge the gap that separates the past, 
present and future. For Paz, the time-before orburied within time is a time in-which 
there is no pause between the past, present and future because their union or 
reconciliation is immediate; that is, unmediated by the linearity of Modernity. This is 
Y yo entrard con pies achenedizos 
hasta el patio agorero 
en que hay un brocal ensimismado, 
con un cubo de cuero 
goteando su gota categ6rica, 
corno un estribillo plaffidero. 
Si el so] inexorable, alegre y t6! co, 
hace hervir a las fuentes catccümcnas 
en que baMbase rni suefio cr6nico; 
si se afana la horn-dga; 
si en los techos rcsuena y se faliga 
de los buches de t6rtola el reclamo 
que entre las telarafias zwnba y zumba; 
mi sed de amar serä como un argolla 
empotrada en la losa de una tumba. 
Las golondrinas nuevas, renovando 
con sus noveles picos alfareros 
los nidos tempraneros; 
bajo el (5palo insigne 
de los atardeccres monacales, 
el Iloro de recientes recentales 
por la ub6rrima ubre prohibida 
de la vaca, runüante y faraönica, 
que al pärvWo intinlida; 
campanario de tinibre novedoso; 
remozados altares; 
el amor amoroso 
de las parejas pares; 
noviazgos de muchachas 
freseas y humildes, como hurnildes coles, 
y que la mano dan por el postigo 
a la luz de draniäticos faroles; 
alguna seflorita 
que canta en algun piano 
alguna vieja aria; 
el gendarme que pita. 
... Y una intima tristeza reaccionaria. 
And I shall go with an intruder's step through to 
the prophetic inner court, where there is a 
brooding wcll-stone, with a leather bucket, 
dripping its categorical drops like the refrain of 
a funeral-dirge. I 
If the inexorable, cheerful, and restorative sun is 
making the water boil in the prentice fountains, 
where bathed my recurring dream; if the ant is 
hurrying, if the call from the doves'crops that 
throbs and throbs among the cobwebs echoes 
and dies on the rooftops, my thirst to love will 
be like a ring sealed into the slab of a tomb. 
The newly arrived swallows, restoring the early 
nests with beaks unused to working the clay, 
beneath the famous opal of monastic dusks, the 
]owing of ncw-born calves for the flolAing and 
forbidden udder of the ruminant and pharonic 
cow, who frightens the little one; the bcll-tower 
with its strange new peal; altars restored to 
youth; the tender love of couples two by two; the 
betrothals of fresh and modest girls, like modest 
cabbages; who stretch out a hand through the 
shutter by the light of dramatic lanterns; some 
young lady singing an old song at some piano; 
the policeman whistling ... 
And a scýret, 
revulsive sadness. 
(The Penguin Book of Spanish Verse, ed. & tr. 
J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin, 1956). 
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why Kemp's translation ofpausa as'gap'is an unfortunate one. 26 For Paz, the gap 
between times inscribed by linearity and progress must be bridged in the process of 
returning to the immediacy of a pause in which the reconciliation of the three times is 
enacted; reconciliation because Paz's conception of temporality places authentic time 
prior to the time of modernity, the time 6T linearity, prior to the succession of events 
that have dismembered authentic time into discrete segments. Poetry provides us with 




although tied to a specific soil and a specific historyý poetry has 
always been open, in each and every one of its manifestations, to a 
transhistorical beyond. I do not mean a religious beyond: I am 
speaking of the perception of the other side of reality. That 
perception is common to all men in all periods; it is an experience 
that seems to me to be prior to all religions and philosophies (OV, 
153-154). 
However, in order to inscribe a leap towards this "transhistorical beyond", a leap over 
He to the He before life, to the Outside, Paz needs to maintain the ternary time system 
the leap seeks to overcome: to leap we must first belong to linearity otherwise we 
would feel no driving need to exceed what did not appear as a limit, a confinement or 
an inauthenticity. And this is why Paz argues that the "poet knows that he is simply a 
link in a chain, a bridge between yesterday and tomorrow" (0 V, 116) because the poet 
has seen or, more precisely, has heard the voice of a hidden reality buried beneath the 
veil of the inauthentic temporality of Modernity. But it is precisely in this that Paz 
cannot reconcile his desire to disrupt linearity and his critical notion of the structure of 
authentic time - the pause - where the latter is theoretically grounded on the 
reconciliation of the first and last moments of linearity, To put it another way, Paz 
cannot reconcile his desire to uphold and affirm differences with his 
desire to conceive 
poetry as "living proof of the brotherhood of the stars and elementary particles, 
chemicals and consciousness ... a practical 
lesson in harmony and concord ...... In 
26 See above, page 144, n. 8. 
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order to affirm the persistence of the past in the present beyond linearity either the 
structure of authentic time must be rearticulated in order to set it off from linearity or 
the notion of authenticity must be abandoned in favour of an alternative conceptual 
network that would set temporality off from a notion which seems destined to fulfil 
linearity. The paradox-Paz confronts is poetry's attempt to-bridgethe gap between an 
intemalised conceptuality - the union of time - and an external order or reality'-- the 
cultural dynamics of a society grounded upon linearity, progress and advancement - on 
the bases of an immediacy formulated through the very mediation poetry (at least as 
Paz conceives it) would intuitively reject as inauthentic. 27 If the poet arises from the 
between and, through his or her language, mediates the relation between the past and 
the future in the now of the poem's creation, then we need a conceptual language that 
focuses attention on this point of mediation and not one, as in Paz, which attempts to 
bridge it. One of the most influential writers in twentieth century Latin American 
fiction who has accomplished this is Juan Rulfo whose Pedro P6ramo provides us with 
an alternative by which to affirm the persistence of the past beyond immediacy and 
linearity. 
*** 
One of the central themes that runs throughout El llano en llamas [Ae Burning 
Plain] and Pedro Pciramo which is important to our discussion as a whole is the theme 
of silence. This theme does not merely receive attention by Rulfo as an idea to be 
explored but becomes one of the literal manifestations of his unique use of language. 
In an attempt to produce silence in the text, Rulfo thematises silence as a guiding 
thread through which we as readers come to understand the complex relations his 
stories construct. In many respects Rulfo is able to produce an encou ' 
nter with silence 
not unlike that encounter Readings underscores in his reading of Herzý og's nere The 
Green Ants Dream, 28 and I am interested here in exploring how that encounter might 
27 As I argued before - see above pp. 51 and 56 - it is precisely the doubling effect in language which 
makes this paradox stand out. 
28 See above, pp. 29,33 - 37. 
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work to offer us an alternative to Pa2s conception of temporality. 
One immediate difference that stands out between Paz and Rulfa is their differing 
descriptions of how the dead make demands upon the living. In Paz, there is a sense 
that the dead allow us to reach back across the temporal existence of ordinary life to 
the unusual, mysterious time-of the beginning. - The dead give-us-over to the-life before 
life and therefore affirm us as beings inseparable from that life. In Rulfla's Pedro 
Nramo, on the other hand, the dead appear as a constant burden to the living, binding 
them to the infinite repetition of the life they have both lived. Consequently, there is 
no leap over life to authentic life, to authentic time: there is only this life, the life our 
death remakes. Hence, in both Paz and Rulfia there is a sense of a telluric world, but in 
Rulfo the burden of the dead implies the impossibility of death as re etition. While ,P 
referring to Jalisco, the province in Mexico where he was raised as a young boy and to 
which many of his stories refer, Rulfo has commented that 
En la actualidad los pequerios 
agricultores de Jalisco ya no tienen 
medios de vida. Viven en una fon-na 
muy raquitica. Se van a la costa o se van 
de braceros. Regresan en la 6poc-a de 
Iluvias a sembrar algýn terrenito alli. 
Pero los hijos, en cuanto pueden, se van 
... Los antepasados son algo que 
los 
ligan al lugar, a] pueblo. Ellos no 
quieren abandonar a sus muertos. 
Llevan sus muertos a cuestas 
(AA, 15) 
in reality the small farms of Jalisco do 
not have resources for life/the means for 
survival [ya no fienen medios de vida]. 
They live by very inadequate means. 
They go to the coast or they go as 
farmhands. They return by the time it 
rains to sow some little land there falgfin 
terrenito affil. But the children, as soon 
as they can, they go .... The ancestors are bound to that place, to the village. 29 
They do not want to leave behind/neglect 
[abandonar] their dead. They carry their 
dead as a need/burden [a cuestas]. 
Because the dead are bound to the village in which they lived, their descendants are 
also bound to it since they are unwilling to abandon the very thing which obliges them 
never to leave. Even when villagers do leave for economic reasons, Viey are always 
finding themselves back in the village whose dead will not let them go. 30 This sense of 
29 In Spanish, pueblo means bothvillage! and 'people'; even the language refuses to separate the two. 
30 Again, the connection between the cultures of rural Me-dco and parts of rural Canada is 
noteworthy. In particular, one might mention the case of the people of the small villages dotting the 
landscape of rural Newfoundland for whom a legendary past and a deep connection to their fishing 
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fatalism is embedded in Pedro Pdratno in the voices of the dead that permeate the 
walls of the empty houses and litter the streets of the small village of Comala, the 
village in and around which the novel's complex web of relations unfolds. Indeed, as 
Jos6 Carlos GonzMez Boixo argues in his introduction to Pedro Pdramo 
Muerte y vida son inseparables y como 
tal aparecen en P. P. Si, en definitiva, la 
temätiea de la novela viene a ser, 
simbölicamente, la exposiciön de lo 
problemätica que resulta la eýdstencia 
humana, ýsta encontrarä mi müxima 
expresidn en un mundo en el que no 
existenfronteras entre la viday la 
miterte. En este punto radica el 
pesirnismo mäs acentuado de Rulfo 
Death and life are inseparable and appear 
as such in Pedro P6ramo. If, 
definitively, the theme of the novel 
comes to be, symbolically, the 
explanation of the problematic that kurns 
out to be human existence [the human 
condition], this [ideal receives its 
maximum expression hi a world where 
there are nofromiers betweeit life and 
death. In this moment takes root the 
pessimism much accented by Rulfo 
(pp, 404 1; my emphasis). 
In response to these assertions, Rulfo has commented: 
Me obra no es de periodista ni de 
entägrafo, ni de sociblogo. 
Lo que hago es una frasposiciöii 
literaria de los hechos de mi conciencia. 
La traspociön no es deformaciön sino es 
el descubrimiento de formas especiales 
de sensibilidad 
My work is not journalism nor 
ethnography, nor sociology. 
nat I make is a literary transfer of the 
events of my consciewe. The transfer is 
not a deformation but the revelation of 
unique, perceptible forms. 31 
(AA ,, kl, 32-33). 
and mining towns has produced a vcry similar effect as it does in Rulf&s Mexico. Every year, dozens 
of people leave Newfoundland to find work in other parts of the country. And every year, they all 
return to reconnect with the town and the people who will not let them go. Much of this is worked out 
in their oral tradition and their mythic literature, both of which have been explored and capitalised 
upon in Harold Horwood's rich stories. See, for example, 7he White EsUmo, which is, in part, a 
translation of the Gilgamesh epic into terms appropriate to Newfoundland and Labrador. 
31 And those forms are historical forms embodied in or expressýd through wri Ling. Inaninteresting 
observation Rulfo says that "Some North American professors of literature have 36e to Jalisco 
looking for a landscape, people, some faces, but the people of Pedro P6ranzo donýt have faces and only 
through their words might one guess how they were, and as you might imagine, these professors 
found nothing. They spoke to my relatives who told them that lwas a liar, that they knew of no one 
with such names and that none of the things that I wrote about had happened there. It'sjustthatthe 
people from my province do not distinguish fiction from history. They think that the novel is a 
transposition of facts, that it should describc the region and the people of it. Literature is fiction and 
thus is a lie" (In, 17). 1 will be dealing with this relationship between fiction and history more closely 
later. 
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In this sense, Rulfo does not see himself as offering any pessimistic view of the world 
but, rather, in some sense to be offering a realist impression of that world. While this 
might be true, Boixo correctly highlights the sense in which Rulfb's characters, and 
especially the narrator of Pedro Pdramo, are either unable or unwilling to escape the 
demands of death as burden; burden, that -is, for those who are- dead-because they must 
remain tied to a world which is their world while, at the same time, it is no loliger their 
world, and burden to the living because the dead keep calling them back to theyillages 
the living can never really leave. Death is an orphanage and the voices that speak from 
the pages of Pedro Pdramo resonate with a fatalistic tone precisely in the demands of 
death as burden. A close reading of Pedro Pdramo will help to clarify this. 
At the behest of his dying mother Doloritas Preciado, the narratgr of the novel, Juan 
Preciado, journeys to Comala in search of his father, Pedro Piramo, a man he has 
never met. There are a number of telling descriptions in the first few pages of Juan 
Preciado'sjoumey. Juan Preciado tells us that he had not intended to keep his promise 
to his mother: "I didnt intend to keep my promise. But then I began to think about 
what she told me, until I couldn't stop thinking and even dreaming about it, and 
building a world around the hope that was that Seflor named Pedro Pdramo, the 
husband of my mother. That's why I came to Comala" (pp, 65; PP, 1; translation 
altered). In his edition of Pedro Pdramo, Boixo points out that in the initial fragment 
of the noVel32 Rulfo had used the preterite form of the verb Ir (to go), that is, fid, 
rather than vine, the preterite form of Venir (to come). The difference is subtle but 
significant: "Por esofid Comala" - "For this I went to Comala"; "Por eso vine Comala" 
- "For this I came to Comala". I am highlighting this here to draw attention to the 
temporality of Juan Preciado's narration. At the moment of narration, Juan Preciado 
has already arrived in Comala and, since he never actually leaves the Wlage by the end 
32 This first appeared under the title "Pedro PAramo: Un cuento" ["Pedro PAramo: A Story"] in las 
Letras Patfias, number 1, January-March, 1954, Mexico, pp. 104-108 and under the title "Los 
munnullos" l"Murmurs"I in Revista de la Universidad de Hexico, VIII, 10, June, 1954, pp. 6-7. See 
pp, 5 1. 
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of the novel, we are left with the impression that the entire novel is a memory or a 
dream passed on to us through Juan Preciado's narration, somewhat in the same sense 
that his mother passes on her desires to him when she requests that he return to 
Comala. In a way, Juan Preciado is only a surrogate of his mother's unfulfilled desire 
to return to Cbmala and-hmce is ruled by a desire that only becomes-hi-s by-a type of 
viral infection. This is why Juan Preciado says that when he saw Comala from the high 
plateau he 
expected it to look the way it did in my mother's memories. She was 
always sighing for Comala, she was homesick and wanted to come 
back, but she never did. Now I was coming back in her place, and I 
remembered what she told me: " Aere's a beautiful view when you 
gettoLosColimotes. You'll see agreenplain ... it's yellow when 
thecornisripe. You can see Comalafrom there. 7hebousesare 
all white, and at night it's all lighted tip. " Her voice was soft and 
secret, almost a whisper, as if she were talking to herself (pp, 65-66; 
PP, 2). 
In short, even before Juan Preciado enters Comala there is a strong sense that he is not 
in control of his own destiny, that Comala is at work paving a return for him. This 
seems to be clarified for us later when Juan Preciado dies. Just after he becomes aware 
of his own death and of the condition that led to it, Juan Preciado is asked by another 
newly deceased villager why he had come to Comala: 
'I told you at the beginning. They said that Pedro PAramo was my 
father, and I came to look for him. That was the illusion that 
brought me here. ' 
'Illusions are bad. It was an illusion that made me five longer than I 
should have. Thafs how I paid for trying to find my son, who was 
only another illusion' 
(pp, 128-129; PP, 58). 
Given that his reason for returning is to meet his father in fulfilmenf of his mother's 
dying wish and that, by the end of the novel, he has still to meet Ped? p Pfiramo, we are 
left with the distinct impression that Juan Preciado's return to his absent father is 
motivated by an author other than himself While this return might appear to conform 
to a Pazian notion of the resurrection and eventual unification between the present and 
the past, between a son and his father, the very absence of the father as a guiding mark 
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of the relation between Juan Preciado and Pedro PAramo conjoined with the absence of 
Juan Preciado's mother in her death suggests that Rulfb, or at least Pedro Pdraino, 
registers the conjunction between the past and the present in a different field than that 
of reconciflation; that is, the field of absence represented by Juan Preciado's death 
which is, itself, mofivated-by his mothees dying-vAsh to-haveimr son return to his 
origins, origins which, in the final analysis, are themselves absent. In the end, -absence 
is the guiding thread by means of which the relation between characters (and their 
desires) is inscribed in the novel. 
Pa2s own praise for Ruffib's novel is interesting in this regard. In his "Landscape 
and the Novel in Mexico" Paz writes that 
the theme of Juan Rulfb's novel Pedro Pciramo is the return to 
Paradise. Hence the hero [Paz means Pedro Piramo] is a dead man; 
it is only after death that we can return to the Eden where we were 
born. But Rulfb's main character returns to a garden that has burned 
to a cinder, to a lunar landscape. The theme of return becomes that 
of an implacable judgement: Pedro Piramo's journey home is a new 
version of the wanderings of a soul in Purgatory. The title is a 
(unconscious? ) symbol: Pedro: Peter, the founder, the rock, the 
origin, the father, the guardian, the keeper of the keys of Paradise, 
has died; PAramo (the Spanish word for wasteland) is his garden of 
long ago, now a desert plain, thirst and drought, the parched 
whispers of shadows and an eternal failure of communication. Our 
Lord's garden: Pedro's wasteland .... 
[Rulfb's] vision of this world is 
really a vision of wiother world' (JR, 65). 
Not surprisingly, Paz singles out the father, the voice of a history Juan Preciado has 
never known, a history and a time literally buried beneath the graves of Comalaýs past. 
For Paz, Pedro Pdramo symbolises the poetic voice because he offers Juan Preciado 
the possibility of a return. But what of this return? Where (and to when) does Juan 
Preciado return? Again Pazs Vuella is helpful here. 
At the close of his poem, Paz says: 
Camino hacia mi mismo I walk toward myself 
hacia la plazuela toward the plaza 
El espacio estA adentro Space is within 
no es un edin subverlido it is not a mibvertedparadise 
es un latido de tiempo it is a pulse-beat of 
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Los lugares son confluencias 
aleteo de presencias 
en un espacio instantäneo 
Silba el viento 
entre los fresnos 
surtidores 
luz y sonibra-casi liquidas 
--voces de agua bfillan fluyen se pierden 
me dejan en las manos 
un manojo de reflejos 
Carnino sin avanzar 
Nunca Ilegamos 
Nunca estamos en donde estamos 
Places are confluences 
flutters of beings 
in an instantaneous space 
Wind wMstles 
in the ash trees 
fountains 
almost liquid light and shadow 
voices of water 
shine flow are lost 
a bundle of reflections 
left in my hands 
I walk without m9ving forward 
We never arrive i. 
Never reach where we are 
No el pasado Not the past 
el presente es intocable the present is untouchable 
(SP, 193) 
Paz is clearly making a response to Velarde! s suggestion, in El reforno malifico, that 
the space of paradise embodied in the space of the village is subverted by the shrapnel 
of revolutionary violence. 33 Pa2s response is to suggest that the space of paradise is, 
in fact, in us as pure possibility once we have reconceptualised time beyond linearity: "I 
walk without moving forward" not because I make a regressive turn towards the past, 
but because both the past and the future conjoin in the "pulse-beat of time", the 
"instantaneous space" of the present. "The present is untouchable" because the space 
of the present, like the space of the village and of paradise, is a space of "confluences"; 
the resurrection and eventual unification between present and past, a son and his 
father; that is, the space where the three times are reconciled. 34 Interestingly, after his 
death, Juan Preciado is found in the village plaza, again suggesting some similarities to 
Paz! s conception of the return to the centre of one! s culture and oneself. Similarly, 
Rulfo's claim that his intention in writing Pe&-o AiramO was "to give life to a dead 
33 See above, pp. 158, n. 25. 
34 Recall those remarks I highlighted earlier: 'The poetry that is beginning now, without beginning, 
is seeking the intersection of times, the point of convergence ... the present is manifest in presence, 
and presence is the reconciliation of the three times. A poetry of reconciliation: the imagination made 
flesh in a now that has no dates" (OV, 57-58). See above, pp. 139-140 and the clarification made 
between the two different employments of the 'prescnt-instant' in Paz's arguments. 
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town" and that the conjunction between the living and the dead in Comala occurs in a 
"simultaneous time which is a no-time" appears, on the surface of things, to support 
Pa. Zs conceptualisation of the relation between time, memory, the voice of the past and 
so on. 35 However, contrary to Pa2s claims, Rulfo has said that the main character of 
the novel is, in fact, the Village-itself. '36 Turthermore, Pedro P6rwno disrupts this 
Pazian conception of return and rebeginning by placing Juan Preciado and, more 
importantly, his relation to the other characters in suspension. Juan Preciado'5 return 
to Comala is, in fact, a return to death as suspension. In Pedro Pciramo, death is the 
35 Again and again we must return to Vuella. Here the opening stanza is significant: 
Voces al doblar la esquina Voices at the comer's turn 
voces Voices 
entre los dedos del sol through the sun's spread hand 
casi lAquidas 
sombra y luz almost liquid 
shadow and light 
The carpenter whistles 
the iceman whistles 
three ash trees 
whistling in the plaza 
The invisible 
foliage of sounds growing 
rising up 
Time 
stretched to dry on the rooftops 
I am in Mixcoac 
Letters rot 
in the mailboxes 
The bougainvillea. 
against the Nvall's white lime 
flattened by the sun 
a stain of purple 
passionate calligraphy 
written by the sun 
I am walking back 
Silba el carpintero 
silba el nevero 
silban 
tres fresnos en la plazuela 
se cleva el invisible 
follaje de los sonidos 
Crcce 
Tiempo 
tendido a secar en las azoteas 
Estoy en Mixcoac 
En los buzones 
se pudren las cartas 
Sobre la cal del muro 
la mancha de la buganvilla 
aplastada por el sol 
escrita por el sol 
morada caligrafia pasional 
Camino hacia atris 
hacia lo que dejd 
o me dqJ6 
Memoria 
imninencia de precipicio 
balcön 
sobre el vaclo 
back to what I left 
or to what left me 
Memory 
edge of the abyss 
balcony 
over the void 
(SP, 185). 
36 SeeJR, 76 which originally appeared in Joseph Sonuners, "Los muertos; no tienen tiempo ni 
espacio (un didlogo con Juan Rulfo)" ["The Dead Have Neither Time Nor Place: A Dialogue With 
Juan Rulfb" I, in La narrativa de Juan Ruyo, ed. Joseph Sommers (Md. xico, 1974): 19. As we will see, 
the identity of the Nrillage - and its status as character - is constituted by the multiple voices that 
circulate around the absence of any unifying principle which could bind them together into a totality. 
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mediation point between damnation and salvation, hell and Eden, etemal suffering and 
etemal paradise. And this is why Comala is the real protagonist of the novel, since 
Pedro Pdramo gives form to the mediation point between this life and the next. In 
order to understand this mediation we must view the novel through the central 
mediator of the conjunction between the living and the dead in Ruffb's novel: 
Purgatory. Rulfo's decision to name the village Comala is pertinent here: 
The town of Comala is a progressive, fertile town. But the 
derivation of comal. -a comal is an earthenware utensil that is placed 
over the embers for the purpose of heating the tortillas -, and the 
heat that prevails in that town was what gave me the idea of the 
name. Comala: the place over the embers (JR, 72). 
The image of purgatory is central in bringing us to understand why Pedro P6ramo is a 
good example of the notion of separation I am developing. Purgatýry is a middle- 
space between absolute death - the death which knows no hope - and resurrection - the 
actualisation of hope in and through eternal life. 37 And given that Juan Preciado had 
arrived in Comala with an image of hope attached to the figure of his absent and 
unknown father and that he never actually meets Pedro Pdramo, it appears as though 
his hope, or at least the question of hope, remains suspended. As we will see, this 
suspension is central to what Pedro P6ramo achieves insofar as our discussion of 
separation is concerned and how that discussion leads us inevitably to the 
postponement upon which any response to the question of anonymity must be 
gauged. 38 
37 Given the appeal some might havc to link Paz and Rulfo on the question of there being any hope 
beyond the violence and suffering and general misery of existence, we need to stress that while Rulfo 
may not provide us with a fatalistic and pessimistic view of existence, we would go equally too far in 
the other direction to suggest that he is providing us with some pure hope. Rulfo seems rather more 
agnostic about the question of hope, fatalism and pessimism than some of his readers and critics. 
Paz's stress on the purple, passionate calligraphy - the passion of Christ, the great return, the return to 
make all returns possible - should not be equated with the stress Rulfo places on the simultaneity of 
life and death. 
38 Throughout this thesis we have been attending to the demands of the question; that is, the demand 
to suspend or interrupt every truth, every foundation, making everything shake and tremble like the 
ground upon which Juan Preciado walks. In this sense, the past persists not as an emblem of a 
beginning but as a question mark. This putting into question has clearly been philosophy's strength; 
in its better moments to suspend us over existence and over ourselves by placing both in question. 
And this is why Lyotard says that, in the face of the4vant-garde, philosophical work is opened 
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In an interesting misreading of his own work, Rulfo comments that "When Juan 
Preciado arrives in town with the muleteer he is already dead. Then, the town comes 
back to He once more. That has been my purpose, to give life to a dead town" (JR, 
75). Leal takes this reading as a starfing p6mt in-his discussion of the purgatory 
imagery that is emblematic of the novel's central theme. Leal argues correctlý that 
Rulfo "is not establishing a transition from life to death" (JR, 76), one that wopld place 
him more intimately alongside Paz inasmuch as Paz conceives the events of birth and 
death within a reconceptualisation of linearity that attempts to rework the transition 
between the two in terms of a reconciliation in which, as events in a linear, 
chronological chain, birth and death achieve their rightful coincidence in a union that is 
based upon the authentic time of the beginning. Rulfb's novel, on the other hand, does 
not conceptualise an outside to which consciousness must become aware; a before- 
time whose perception would constitute the marriage between and reconciliation of the 
putative oppositions that linearity has inscribed. "Furthermore", Leal argues, "the 
reader is not told that the personages are dead. Since [Rulfo's) purgatory is located on 
this earth and not in an imaginary space, he must deduce that fact himself.... When 
Juan Preciado arrives at Comala he finds a dead town; but he himself is already dead 
and is only remembering his arrival sometime later, in the grave" (JR, 76). The novel 
seems to support this reading, and a good deal of its success in producing a type of 
silence out of Rulfia's use of language is indebted, as we will see, to the relation Juan 
Preciado has with the dead vis-A-vis the inner dialogue of his memory. 
Approximately half-way through the novel, we become aware that Juan Preciado 
has died. Just before he dies, he tells us that "the heat-made we wake up. It was 
midnight .... I went out 
into the street for a little air, but the heat followed me out and 
towards opacity. But this strength, this force of the question, is common to literature as well. 
Philosophy and literature meet in the space of interruption and suspension opened by the question. To 
suspend all identification with a prior truth that we could call our own. To interrupt the One and 
unification with self and other by giving us over to a duplicity which knows few bounds: This is what 
it means to reflect according to opacity. 
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wouldn't go away. There wasdt any air. Only the silent, stupefied night, scorched by 
the August dog days" (pp, 125; PP, 55). Juan Preciado is telling us this from the grave 
which he shares with a woman named Dorotea, who explains to him that he has died of 
fright, the ffight instilled in him by the legion of voices that blow through the streets of 
Comala! s purgation. -- "Yotfre right Dorotea, it was the -voices-that killed me" (pp, 127; 
PP, 56). But even in the grave, Juan Preciado can find no rest from these indefatigable 
voices. At one point, Juan Preciado asks Dorotea if the voice he hears is hers, telling 
him the story of Pedro Pharno's late wife, Dofia Susanita. 
'I heard someone talking. A womaWs voice. I thought it was you. ' 
'A woman's voice? It must be the one who talks to herself Dofia 
Susanita. She's buried in the big tomb near us. The dampness must 
have reached her and she's turning in her sleep' (pp, 147; PP, 76). 
And near the end of the novel, approximately forty pages after she tells Juan Preciado 
this, forty pages during which we are made privy to certain relationships Pedro PAramo 
had with members of the village, including Dofia Susanita, Dorotea! s voice re-emerges 
abruptly and exclaims 
'I was there. I saw Dofia Susana dic. ' 
Vhat did you say, Dorotca? ' 
'What I just got through saying' (pp, 18 5; PP, 114). 
What I just got through saying: it is impossible for us to say with any certainty whether 
Dorotea means either the last forty pages orjust this one line about Dofia Susanita's 
death. The implication is that Juan Preciado is not the only narrator of the novel, that 
in fact he is narrated more than he actually narrates. Leal argues that "the narrative 
does not formally begin with the arrival of Juan Preciado at Cornala at the opening of 
the novel, but later with the conversation between Juan and DorotCA in their graves, 
where they are buried together. This interpretation helps the reader ýo account for the 
events that take place between the arrival of Juan in Comala and his death two days 
later" (JR, 8 1-82). Here I am not particularly interested in determining whether or not 
Juan Preciado's death actually occurred two days after he arrives at Comala. Rather, 
my concern is to establish the problem of taking Rulfo at his word in regards to some 
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of the remarks he makes about the novel and, more importantly, to suggest that the 
novel is itself much more concerned with the suspension of time, death and life in the 
interstitial space that Comala represents; a reading which has been occluded by an 
often myopic interest in the more factual details of Rulfo's Jalisco and the manner in 
which time and narrative are coproductive. The question-is-not really when Juan 
Preciado dies nor even establishing just who is or is not dead in the novel. Rather, the 
question is how the dead place such a burden on Juan Preciado that he cannot 4void 
being consumed by death itself. 
As Juan Preciado makes his way towards Comala he tells us that the August heat 
was making the road heave: "The road rose and fell: It rises orfalls according to 
whether you are going or coming. Ifyou are going away, it's uphill. But, ifyou are 
coming back, it's downhill" (pp, 65; PP, 1-2; translation altered). Incidental remarks it 
would seem. However, Juan Preciado enters Comala by walking downhill from the 
surrounding ridge that seems to enclose and isolate the village from the rest of the 
world: "After we crossed the ridge we started downhill again. We have left the hot air 
up there and go sinking39 into the pure heat without air. Everything appeared to be 
waiting for something" (pp, 67-68; PP, 3; translation altered). Juan Preciado's 
entrance to Comala is easier than his attempt to leave. At one point, after he enters 
Comala, Juan Preciado says that "Pens6 regresar. Senti allA la huella por donde habia 
venido, como una herida entre la negrura de los cerros" I "I intend to go back. I sense 
over there the track4O through which I have come, like a wound in the black hills" (Pp, 
39 Hundir - to sink. The sense here is that the valley below is like quick-sand swallowing Juan 
Prcciado and his companion. 
40 Kemp elects to translate'la huella'asgap', but there is no s6nse here that such a translation is 
warranted. Although I prefcr'gapý since it allows me to stress what I believe to tie important 
theoretical issues that arise from a close attention to the image of Comala in the novel, Rulfb's choice 
of 'la huella' instead of 'el. hucco' seems to suggest that 'gapý is not what he had in mind. Nonetheless, 
'la huella' not only means track but footstep, footprint and trace as well and I will be employing these 
nuances to support the argument that follows. It is also important to recall my earlier remarks 
regarding Blanchot's notion of distance and strangeness and Labanyi's problematic understanding of 
the trace of the voice in El ototlo del patriarca. (See above pg. I 11, n. 4, pg. 114, n. 9 and pp. 12 1 fl). 
As we, "ill see, the no-time of Milo's Comala provides us with a means of redirecting Labanyi's 
attention by allim-drig distance, understood as gap, as suspension and postponement. 
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113). Juan Preciado, of course, never leaves and this suggests that Comala has drawn 
him in and contained him, a condition which recalls Rulfo's remarks that the bond 
between the people and the village in which they live is unimpeachable and inseparable. 
What is important here is the manner in which Juan Preciado enters Comala and his 
subsequent inability to leave. Not onlybas Juan Preciado been ruled by-desires that are 
not his own, those desires lead him into the silent, empty scorching bowl of Comala, a 
village that is more purgatory than rural community, a village where people wait to be 
received into Heaven or plunged into the depths of Hell. 41 
I argued above that Juan Preciado makes his way into Comala through an important 
and decisive descent. Our own entrance to Comala is made through the conjunction of 
first and third person narrative that structures the dialogue betweeU the living and the 
dead in Comala itself. This structure allows Juan Preciado to share with us the 
otherwise private dialogue of his memory. "I was walking down the main street, past 
the empty houses with their broken doors and their weeds. What did what's-his-name 
call that weed? "Captain's wife, seffor. It's a pest that just waits till a house is empty, 
then it moves in. You'll see what it's like" (pp, 70-71; PP, 5). 42 Juan Preciado's 
memory, recalled to us as privileged voyeurs on his journey, produces a silent 
encounter between us and Juan Preciado - his memories and the voices he hears. In 
this sense, Pedro Airamo produces an encounter with silence: language frames silence 
in the encounter between characters and between us and the novel. The relation 
41 This impression seems confirmed for us when, on her arrival in Heaven, one of the characters, 
Dorotea, is told by a saint to "'Go to rest a little more in the earth, daughter, and try to be good that 
you will be less long in purgatory'" (pp, 129; PP, 59). Dorotea never makes it to heaven by the close 
of the novel: She waits permanently in Comala's suspension. % 
42 1 have used Kemp's translation here in order to draw attention to and caution the reader about a 
new translation of Pedro Phraino by Margaret Sayers Peden. In that translation the above passage has 
been translated as follows: "This was the hour I found myself walking down the main street. Nothing 
but abandoned houses, their empty doorways overgrowntAitli What had the stranger told me 
they were called? "La gobernadora, seftor. Creosote bush. A plague that takes over a person's house 
the minute he leaves. You'll sa' (Pedro Phrayno, tr. Margaret Sayers Peden (London: Serpent's Tail, 
1994): 7-8). There is no reason whatsoever for the translation of la capilana as la gobernadora and, 
furthermore, the sense of the anonymity of the stranger is better maintained in Kempýs translation. I 
%%ill return to Peden's translation in a moment. 
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between is therefore a relation of silence framed by language. Once again, as we began 
to detect in Readings, language gestures towards its own ineffability; the duplicity of 
its signs operung towards the silence of the referential object; that is, precisely, the 
object in its distance suspended, postponed - silent. 
Rulfo has remarked that this encounter with and centrality oftitencein his-own life 
are central motifs he hopes to open through the text. 
The practice of writing the short stories [in El Hano en llamas] 
disciplined me and made me see the need to disappear and to leave 
my characters the freedom to talk at will, which provoked, it would 
seem, a lack of structure. Yes, there is a structure in Pedro Pdramo, 
but it is a structure made of silences, of hanging threads, of cut 
scenes, where everything occurs in a simultaneous time which is a 
no-time (in, 16). 
This simultaneity is particularly exemplified in the structure of Peciro Pdramo. Rulfo 
divides his novel into 70 different segments, each of which has its own particular 
temporality. This allows Rulfo to produce a rush of discordant temporal and vocal 
segments which, at one point in particular, collide into each other. The result of this 
collision is a shattering of the apparent succession of dialogues, even where that 
succession is often reversed and turned in on itself. At the moment of collision, even 
this sense of linearity is broken and we are left with shards of voices flying off in all 
directions, shattering the night that surrounds Juan Preciado's confusion: 
'The village is full of echoes. Perhaps they got trapped in the 
hollows of the walls. When you walk you can sense other footsteps. 
You hear creaks. Laughter. A laughter now very old, as if tired43 of 
its own laugh'... 
This is what Damiana Cisneros was telling me as we roamed the 
village ( ... 
] 
'Did my mother tell you I was coming? ' 
Wo. What happened to your motherT 
'She died' 
'Died? What fromT 
'I don't know. Sorrow, perhaps. She was always sighing. ' 
'That's bad. Everytime you sigh, a little bit of your life goes out of 
you. Is that how she diedT 
43 Cansadas is feminine: Womens voices then. 
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'Yes. I thought you'd know. ' 
'How was I going to know? I haven't known anything for years 
now. ' 
'Then how did you know I was hereT 
--- 44 
'Are you alive, Damiana? Tell me, Damiana! ' 
Suddenly I found myself alone in those empty streets. The 
windows of the houses were open -to the night, with the weeds 
peering out of them. The walls were peeling, showing their rotted 
adobes. 
Damiana! Damiana Cisneros! ' 
And the echoes answered me: '... ana.. neros ... 
! 
... ana ... nerosP I could hear the dogs barking, as if I had wakened them. 
I saw a man cross the street: 
'You! ' 
'YouPhe called back in my own voice. 45 
And I could hear women gossiping, as if they were just around the 
comer. 
'Look who's coming. Isn't that Filoteo Ar6chiga? ' 
'It is he'[ ... ] 
(pp, 107-110; PP, 39-4 1; translation altered) 
The connection between Pedro Pdramo and El o1oho is significant here. In both, it is 
the collision of voices which actively dismantles any putative awareness of a unified 
identity or totality. But in Pedro Pdramo (in my opinion, the more successful of the 
two attempts at this form of narrative multiplicity) this dismantling of identity (this 
dismantling of consciousness in the temporality of Comala's no-tiffle)46 is prefigured in 
the silence of the speaking voice; or, rather, of the voice as essentially giving forth to 
sitence. 47 This is particularly evident in the visual discordance of the above reference 
44 The ellipsis is Rulfb's. Kemp betrays himself as intrusive translator when he translates Rulfb's 
sentence (which is almost not a sentence), with the words'Shc was silent'. Kemp invades the silence 
framed by the words around it, tries to penetrate the suspension and intcrruption of the dialogue 
which silence enacts, tries to fill the void with a language. Rulfo, on the other hand, knows the 
importance of the silence, of the gap between the vocal segments which suspends and postpones the 
voice to which the silence refers. 
45 Juan Preciado has become a resident in the Niflage represented by the echo of hisvoice. Here the 
echo is a double, a shadow that arises, as if it existed on its own; from within Comala itself, as if Juan 
Prcciado - or at least his double - has always been a resident who could never real ly leave. 1 
46 As weAill see, Comala's no-time, while it is based on the notion of simultaneity, disrupts any 
notion of the prcsent-instant as employed by Newman or Paz. Rather, we are given the temporality of 
death opened in the strange encounter with the cadaver, an encounter framed in the silence of the 
foreign words we speak in the presence of this foreign and absent body. 
41 This alone would make us flinch at the suggestion that direct speech is an expression of the true 
inner psychism of a subject. Comala's voices are only Comala's because they hm, e no home to go to. 
In this xN-ay they are voices that speak wandering orphaned words. Recall what I argued before 
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(the ellipsis as the gap of silence) and in the conjunction between and therefore 
simultaneity of mutually exclusive temporal periods. It is also interesting to note that 
Juan Preciado not only dies at midnight, that time which is a no-time between a past he 
has just lost and a future he will never gain, but in the process of doing so seems 
gradually to lose all connection to a life -set-off-firorn the life ýof the dead -town. The 
novel expresses this by conjoining what at other times had been discriminate temporal 
periods; that is, Pedro PArarno's time and Juan Preciado's time. In the example below, 
the dialogue occurs between Dorotea and Juan Preciado and therefore belongs within 
Juan Preciado's time, while the action at Pedro Pdrarno's hacienda belongs to the time 
appropriate to him, a time chronologically years prior to the time of his son, Juan 
Preciado. 
'When I sat down to die, [my soul] told me to get up again and keep 
on living, as if it still hoped for some miracle that would clean away 
my sins. "This is the end", I told it. "I caift go any farther. " I 
opened my mouth so it could leave, and it left. I felt something fall 
into my hands. It was the little thread of blood that had tied it to my 
heart. ' They pounded at the door but [Pedro PAramo] didn't answer 
(pp, 13 5; PP, 64). 
Here there is no longer any break between the different narrative times that appeared 
before, as if in his own death, Juan Preciado has become one with a history he never 
lived, thereby giving an expression of hope to Rulfo's story: Juan Preciado gains both a 
past and a future, if that future only means living in the fullness of death as return to 
this (newly acquired) history. However, while I think this is the case, the long 
quotation given above provides an interesting alternative. The man the women look at 
is simultaneously Filoteo Ar6chiga and Juan Preciado. Since their time is not the time 
of Juan Preciado, they in fact see Filoteo Ar6chiga. This suggests that Juan Preciado is 
not dead since the dead, by belonging to another time, see a differentiperson. And yet, 
it seems quite clear that Juan Preciado is dead. How then do we make sense of this 
apparent contradiction in the narrative? 
regarding language and intimacy. See above, pg. 6 1. 
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I want to suggest that what stands out here is that Juan Preciado and Ar6chiga 
collide at this point, or rather, the time of Juan Preciado collides with the time of 
Filoteo Ar6chiga, which is the time of Pedro Pdramo. This collision, this simultaneity 
cracks open the normal succession of events, breaks apart linearity, allowing the legion 
of voices trapped inside the walls of Camaws-purgation to pour out into the streets 
where Juan Preciado silently loses his mind. 48 In fict, what Juan Preciado reafly loses 
is a significant world; that is, a tangible, tactile reality, one that could assure him of the 
tý 
unity between the letter and the spirit, one in which he could pause in the unity iinplied 
by resurrection and the return to his paternal source. Instead, Juan Preciado (only) 
gains a world of suspension: an interrupted world: a world postponed. The only'real' 
object is an echo, a vapour; that is, a MiSt. 49 In this sense, the relation between the 
I 
living and the dead produces a simultaneity in which the reader encounters the 
48 Boixo remarks that when Juan Preciado hears the echo of his own voice (as we saw in the long 
quotation above) this testifies to "el proceso do degradaci6n fisica, y mental de Juan Preciado" I the 
process of physical and mental degradation in Juan Preciado (pp, 109, n. 97). To lose a world of 
perceptible and recognisable forms: This alone would be madness. Nonetheless, I do not want to 
stress this notion of madness too strongly, since I think it detracts from the effects Pedro P4raino 
produces by giving us an easy way out of the difficulty generated by the simultaneous vocality of the 
narrative. 
49 When Juan Preciado first looks over the plain from the high ridge he is crossing at the beginning 
of the novel he tells us that 
En la reverberaci6n del sol, la Ilanura parecia 
una laguna transparente, desheclia en vapores 
por donde se trastucia un korizonte gris. Y mäs 
allä, un lfnea de montafias. Y todovfa mäs allä, 
la mäs remota lejania (pp, 66). 
In the reverberation of the sun, the plain seemed 
like a transparent lake, undone in vapours 
where it revealed a grey horizon. And further 
on, a line of mountains. And yet further still, 
the most remote distance. 
Later, Juan Preciado's mother's voice emerges from the multitude and says to her son: "... Every 
morning at dawn the village trembles with the rumbling of the wagons. They come in from 
everywhere, loaded with saitpetrc, with corn, with hay. The wheels creak and creak, rattling the 
windows and waking up the village. That's the hour when the ovens are opened and the air smells of 
new-baked bread. And suddenly the sky might thunder. Rain falls. Perhaps spring is coming. You 
will learn there what 'perhaps' means, my son" (pp, 113; PP, 44, translation altered). Rulfo! s use of 
I language is important. Perhaps it will thunder. Perhaps it will rain. The'perhaps' is a type of 
suspension or interruption between seeing something and recognising what it is, a type offiata 
morgana, a mirage. The echoes are mirages. They are not real, but nonetheless apparent to the 
senses. The echoes are objects without substance. When we are confronted with the opacity of the 
gap between this life and the next, we can only speak a postponing language, a language of 'perhaps', 
of suspension and interruption. In Comala, language postpones unity of identification, breaking apart 
and duplicating referential objects (Filoteo Ardchiga and Juan Preciado for example; or, indeed, Juan 
Preciado and the echo of his own voice) by speaking in the manner of this 'perhaps'. 
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unreality of the world in the unreality of words, an unreality produced by the silence 
engendered in the simultaneity of past and present, the voice of the dead in the mind of 
the living; that is, in us as readers. 
After hearing Ihe voices that take us through the next three or four pages of the 
novel, Juan Prediado, tells us that, in the approach of-morning, 
The dawn dimmed my memories. 
From time to time I heard the sound of words, and noticed the 
difference. The words I had heard up till then didn't have any soundA 
they were sHent: words you could sense but not hear, like those in a 
dream (pp, 114-115; PP, 45). 
The impression throughout this section, especially in the simultaneity of the two times, 
and the conjunction between various voices which breaks apart linearity, is that these 
echoes, of which Juan Preciado is one, act as a recollective narrati6n which uses Juan 
Preciado as a conduit through which to voice itself Given that the novel ends with a 
recollection of Pedro PAramo's death, Comala comes to represent a no-time in which 
there is no exit from the simultaneity of death and life: the dead persist indefatigably in 
the present of the living - in the present of our reading. Consequently, the voices Juan 
Preciado hears are the multiple voices of Comala itself and not the voices of 
individuals. Listen to some of their names: Abundio (I abound), Preciado (the 
esteemed, the valuable), Piramo (bleak plateau). These are not names of real people: 
they are Comala! s names: Comala who abounds, Comala the esteemed, Comala the 
bleak plateau. Comala is the space of abounding subjectivities. When Juan Preciado 
remembers what his mother told hin-ý that 
«Allä me oiräs mejor. Estar6 mäs cerca 
de ti. Encontraräs mäs cercana la voz de 
mis recuerdos que la de mi muerte, si es 
que alguna vez la muerte ha tenido 
alguna voz. » 
You will hear me better there. I'll 
be nearer to you. You will be 
surrounded by the voice of my 
memories of my death, if,, 
sometimes the dead have some 
other voice 
(pp, 7 1) 
we could easily interpret this through a Pazian notion of the resurrection of that which 
does not pass away; that is, not Juan Preciado's mother herself but the life she 
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embodies, that is, the life of Comala, Comala! s life. This interpretation would bring us 
close but it would still cloud over Juan Preciado's response to his mother's posthumous 
existence made evident through her voice. When Juan Preciado meets Eduviges 
Dyada, his mother's close friend, she proceeds to tell him that his mother had only told 
her about her sons j ourney to Comala a day prior to his arrival there. 
"M madre - dije - mi madre ya "My mother. My mother is dead" 
muri6" "That is why her voice was so weak" 
ft "Entonces 6sa fue la causa de que su voz 
se oyera tan d6bil" 
(pp, 74). 
It seems as though, after her death, Doloritas Preciado's soul has returned to Comala; 
that is, precisely, her voice. This should not be misconstrued: Comala uses Juan 
Preciado to voice to us its mulliple personalities, its multiple voices. In this, we can 
clearly see that neither Pedro Pb-ramo nor Juan Preciado are the real protagonists in 
this novel. All along it has been Comala, the place over the embers, the place where 
silence is produced by the most clamorous conjunction of voices. 
In order to explore this notion of silence we must ask what is meant by the unreality 
of the world expressed in the unreality of words? In'Nos han dado la lierrd ['77iey 
Gave Us Me Land], Rulfo provides us with a clear example of the unreality of the 
world expressed through the unreality of words. The story describes thejourney a 
group of men take across an immense, barren plain. The plain has been given to them 
by the govenu-nent for the purposes of agricultural development but is, according to 
the principal character in the story, wholly bereft of any qualities that would make it 
good agricultural land. 50 When the government official arrives to hand over the land 
to these men, they voice their complaints about the laqd's inability to sustain 
agricultural development. However, their voice falls upon deaf ears, ýsince "the official 
50 As Leal tells us, RulfYs story refers directly to the long standing problem of land reform in Meaco 
and the attempt to return land to local farmers, especially after the end of the CArdenas presidency. 
Although land distribution did not end after Cdrdenas was overthrown by revolutionaries in 1940, the 
land distributed by those revolutionaries was barely suitable for agricultural development. "The old 
revolutionaries, now in positions of leadership, became the new owners of the most productive areas. 
The farmers were given land where water was not available" (JR, 29). 
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hadn't come to converse with us. He put the papers in our hands and told us, Motft 
be aftaid to have so much land just for yourselves... (11,12; BP, 13-14). As they walk 
across the parched earth, Melit6n, one of the four men, says "This is the land they've 
given us" (11,13; BP, 14). The main character disputes his fiiends remarks: "What land 
have they given uslJelit6n? There isnl enough-here forthe wind to blow up a dust 
cloud" (11,14; BP, 15). What the official has really given them is a linguistic 
document, a document of words that do not refer to any object in the world. And, 
what is more, the very land to which the document ostensibly refers, the land which is 
supposed to be agricultural land but which is, in fact, and and inhospitable, this land, in 
fact, robs these men of their ability to speak. "We don't say what we're thinking. For 
some time now we haven't felt like talking. Because of the heat. Somewhere else we'd 
talk with pleasure, but here it's difficult. You talk here and the words get hot in your 
mouth with the heat from outside, and they dry up on your tongue until they take your 
breath away" (11,9; BP, 12). The land given by the government for agricultural 
development is not only completely unsuitable for such development and therefore not 
the land referred to in the document, it strips and exhausts these men of their language, 
their ability to speak. The unreality of the land as agricultural land is expressed in the 
unreality of the language used in the document, a document that refers to no land 
whatsoever. The official has therefore not given them the land; he has given them a 
language - the document - that strips them of both land and speech. In this sense, 'Nos 
han dado la fierrd has no object, expresses no real object in the world, expresses no 
real (that is, significant) world. But neither does it express a fantastic world: 'Nos hal) 
dado la fierra', properly speaking, expresses nothing but its own unreality, its own lack 
ofexpression. It is the conjunction between these two 'objects' - the, land and the 
document - and the resulting exhaustion of speech that produces a silence central to 
Rulfo's Pedro P6ramo. This silence combined with the images of purgatory that litter 
El llano en llamas and Pedro Pdramo provide us with an alternative language to that 
given by Paz in his portrayal of the conjunction between the past and the present. In 
Rulfb, there is a very strong sense that language is powerless to adequately phrase our 
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identities. And yet, those identities are affinned in the duplicity of language. Silence 
then, bears mute witness, to use Readings' words, to language! s powerlessness. 
Comala, as purSatory subverts Paz's idealisation of Pedro P&amo as an expression 
of a return to paradise, albeit a paraMiseburnt to cinders. gheNery-fact -that itis burnt 
to cinders would, in fact, appeal to Paz given his claim that the poet constantly 
resurrects the culture in which he or she lives through their poetic voice and language). 
Comala as purgatory means that the village is neither subverted paradise (Velarde) nor 
the instantaneous time of reconciliation (Paz); neither hell5l nor the return to Eden. 
Rather, Comala is the middle-space between life and resurrection. Once Juan Preciado 
has returned to Comala, he will never achieve life nor, in his death, the possibility of 
resurrection, and our immersion in the text via the silence produced by the voice of the 
dead prevents us from achieving either as well; we are both left in the middle-space 
that Comala represents. Both Velarde and Paz seem to concentrate too intently on the 
question of paradise, its loss and the hope of returning to it, rather than the silence the 
impossibility of any such return produces: it is this silence which is productive. 
Pedro Pdramo concludes at Pedro PAramo's hacienda in la Media Luna - that is, the 
middle or half moon - where, years before, Pedro Piramo, is stabbed by his other son, 
Abundio Martinez, the very same Abundio that Juan Preciado met along the road to 
Comala at the beginning of the story. When Juan Preciado first meets Abundio 
Martinez he tells him he is looking for his father, Pedro PAramo, Abundio Martinez 
responds that "Yo tambi6n soy hijo de Pedro PArarno" I "I am also the son of Pedro 
Pdramo" (pp, 67; PP, ). But, at that moment, "una bandada de cuervos pas6 cruzando 
51 When the voice of Pedro Nramo speaks about his love for Susana Son Juan, it calls out iNithwords 
not unfamiliar to those traditions which have conceptualised hell as a place where the voi= of the 
dead can never reach the cars of their Father in Heaven: "Susana, you are miles and miles away, 
above all the clouds, far away above everything, hidden. Hidden in His immensity, behind His Divine 
Providence, where I can never find you or see you. VVbcre my words can never reach you" (pp, 77 PP, 
11). Aswith the protagonist of El acoso and Los pasosperdidos, Pedro Nramo cannot achieve a 
union with his lover. The difference here is that Pedro Nramo's voice cannot lead him to this unity, 
again giving us reason to be sceptical about Labanyi's arguments regarding speech. 
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el cielo vacio, haciendo cuar, cuar, cuar" I "a flock of crows flew across the empty sky 
crying caw, caw, caw" (pp, 67). 52 The road Juan Preciado travels is not the road to 
Damascus; that is, not a conversion experience. Nothing traverses the space of death 
to the space of resurrection; nothing is converted. Rather, everything is left in the 
between that separates. Comala-then, is-the-mediation point. ý-the -space that mediates 
the relation between the living and the dead. Contrary to Paz's conception of authentic 
time, Comala is not a space of immediacy: it is a no-time, a gap. In contradistinction 
to Paz's language of reconciliation and the paradox he encounters when he attempts to 
reconcile his own desires, when Rulfo leaves us in the gap that Comala represents he 
disowns linearity by abandoning eventuality. Simultaneity is therefore not the union of 
or reconciliation of the three times: it is a no-time. And this no-time is, properly 
speaking, an extension. That is, a no-time is a time that is both mine and not mine; a 
past and a present, not in union, but extending into and out of each other. The past 
extends out of me as much as I extend out of it. Simultaneity is not merely the past or 
the present in union at the moment of Some other time; the time buried within time 
itself Simultaneity as no-time is the extension of the past into the present, the present 
into the past. One of the differences between Paz and Rulfo then, is the solitary nature 
of the between which separates the past and the present. For Rulfo that solitude is 
more properly a sharing of what it is impossible to share, a being towards what one can 
never actually encompass in the time of on&s desire. Here then, a solitude of 
abandonment, of shared abandonment structured by the time of the between; that is, 
the between time of opacity and the ex-timate relation. Contrary to what Susan 
Sontag has recently said in her introduction to Peden's translation - that "This new 
translation is an important literary event" - Pedro P6ranio must not ýe seen as an 
event; that is, it does not conform to the notion of eventuality, of cothing after so many 
52 Boixo tells us in a note that "En este caso su importancia radica cn cl valor sinib6lico de Abundio, 
guia de Juan Preciado en su descenso al mundo de los mucrtos, donde encontrari su idenitidad I "In 
this case [we see] the radical importance in the symbolic value of Abundio, guiding Juan Preciado in 
his desoent to the world of the dead, where hewill encounter his identity" (pp, 67, n. 6). 
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other events, of helping to complete them or to set the story straight about things those 
other events had gotten wrong. And while Sontag feels a sense of satisfaction in the 
completion of what, she tells us, was Rulfla's wish before he died - "This new 
translation, which fulfils the wish Juan Rulfo expressed to me when I met him in 
Buenos Aires shortly before Ms -deat4 that Pedro-P&crmo appear in an acwrate and 
uncut English translation53 she fails to appreciate one of the driving forces of the 
novel: without any concrete beginning - Pedro Pdramo never really begins - nor any 
concrete ending - even after death the voices continue to carry on their dangling' 
conversations - Pedro Pdramo gives us over to a simultaneity that disrupts linear time. 
And that disruption gives us over to a between that is completely opaque. In that 
opacity we discover the possibility for our own self-creation, since it is only by being 
held apart from Pedro Piramo that Juan Preciado comes to recognise himself, a 
recognition, as Boixo points out, symbolically represented in the duplicity of 
identification inscribed in the relation between Juan Preciado and Abundio Martinez. 
The notion of simultaneity is therefore fundamental not only in understanding the 
temporality of Comala but in understanding the between of relation, since it embodies, 
once again, the dialectic of the ex-timate relation. While Iser has come close to this 
notion of simultaneity he fails to push it to its extreme because he remains tied to a 
notion of simultaneity that breaks apart linearity precisely because self-identifi cation is 
grounded in the copresence of the mutually exclusive made possible in and through 
53 Interestingly, there are significant problems with Pededs translation, not the least of which is her 
rendering of the closing lines. In the original we read: "Dio un golpe seco contra la tierra y se fue 
desmoronando como si fuera un mont6n de piedras" (pp, 195). While in Peden's translationwe are 
offered the following: "He [that is, Pedro PAramol fell to the groundRrith a thud, and lay there, 
collapsed like a pile of rocks" (Peden, 122). The original actually says: "He gave, a sharp blow against 
the earth and eroded as if he were a heap of stones". While Kemp% translation of El laberinto de la 
soledad has be seen to be lacking, here his translation is much closer to the origiiial: "He struck a 
feeble blow against the ground and then crumbled to pieces as if he were a heap of stones" (PP, 123). 
Tle difference is crucial. Pedro PAramo, after being stabbed by Abundio Martinez, futilely attempts to 
exert his control, his mastery over life and death. The futility of his attempt mirrors the whole 
thernatics around which the central character has been developed; the central character, that is, who 
must be seen to be Comala itself. No one 'survivee Comala because Comala is the distance, the 
between, the unending mediator between life and death, and no one can be merely alive or dead 
within Comala's walls. 
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absence; that is, the absence of the origin itself And it is in this absence that Pedro 
Pciramo stretches beyond Pazs attempt at reconciliation. In the end, absence prevails, 
guaranteed by the very opacity of the relation between. 
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§ 0: Postponement: In Lieu of An Ending 
These pages can end here, and nothing that follows what I have just written will make me add 
anything to it or take anything away from it. This remains, this will remain until thevery end. 
Whoever would obliterate it from me, in exchange for that end that I am seeking for in vain, would 
himself become the beginning of my own story, and he would be my victim. In darkness he would see 
me: my word would be his silence, and he would think he was holding s-way over the world, but that 
sovereignty would still be mine, his nothingness mine, and he too would know that there is no end for 
a man who wants to end alone. 
Maurice Blanchot 
death sentence 
"The pages of the book are doors. We go through them, driven by their impatience to regroup, to 
reach the end of the work, to be again transparent. 
"Ink fixes the memory of words to the paper. 
"Light is in their absence, which you read. " 
Reb Hati 
Distance is light, as long as you keep in mind that there are no limits. 
"We are distance. " 
Reb Mirshak 
Edmund Jab6s 
The Book of Questions 
Postponement: In Lieu ofAn Ending 
As I have tried to show throughout this thesis, one of the central issues that unfolds 
in the approach to anonymity through the between of relation is that of absence, an 
issue that is particularly well served by some exemplary Latin American fiction. In Paz 
and Rulfb, a vital distinction can lead us to a clearer idea of the tole of the between in 
this approach. In Paz, the time of the pause, -of reccmciliationjs-a time-of hesitation 
for a moveable object, a subject hesitating on the hridge that unites the three* times. In 
contradistinction, Rulfb's no-time is a gap between times which provides the condition 
for the simultaneity of the mutually exclusive. In this sense, simultaneity is not, as in 
Iser, a factor of the duplicity which is evidence of a hidden reality awaiting to be 
revealed through disguise and subterfuge. Rather, Rulfb's no-time is a time postponed, 
thereby bearing witness to the impossibility of locating either the tipe or the identity 
proper to the subject. In this sense, identity is always in circulation around an absent 
kernel of representational meaning we could call the unity of our being. Throughout 
this study I have referred to various conceptual relations on the basis of postponement 
or, rather, that these relations ultimately lead to the postponement of self, of other, of 
time itself The role of postponement in the approach to the question of anonymity is 
an important one since, as I have tried to show in Rulfo, the question, properly 
speaking, postpones: Rulfb's no-time is a question mark, a sign that only signifies the 
impossihility of an identity arriving, of an answer awaiting to be revealed by 
conscientious and rigorous scholastic labour. Such labour is always committed in the 
full presence of this impossibility. As a way of offering a concluding remark to the 
question of anonymity (which, as a question, must always remain suspended in the 
opacity which makes it possible as a question), I will now offer a more direct analysis 
of simultaneity and postponement vis-A-vis Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth. 's conjunction 
between language, time and history and Fuentesý reading of Denis Diderot and Nikolai 
Gogol. 
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Simultaneity, Language, History 
In her Sequel to History. - PostmoderiMun wid the Crisis of Represetitatioizal Time, 
Ermarth argues that "the term "event", like "text" or "se]P' or "historical", retains the 
essentialism that postmodernism challenges. In a postmodern process, every event 
may be a text, but no text-is single. It is the nature of the process, -the selies, the 
sequence that most interests me in this book and that can scarcely be called an" "event" 
in any traditional sense. The revision of sequence at the level of language is where the 
practical, embedded resolutions of postmodernism become available" (SH, 3). Ermarth 
conceives the practice of postmodernism "as an act of restoration" that gives back to 
language its "paratactic and serniotic value" (SH, 139). Far from being revolutionary - 
"that modernist concept" (SH, 139) - postmodernist fiction attempts "to restore the 
"play" of language at all levels of magnitude: from sentences to discursive boundaries" 
(SH, 139), Ermarth underscores this notion of play because she thinks that the 
"discursive, aleatory, paratactic and semiolic disposition" of language is best served by 
liberating language from the "narrow conceptions to which historical habits of thinking 
increasingly have confined it" (SM, 139-140). In short, Ermarth's attention to the 
relationship between language, time and history in the context of postmodernism turns 
towards the restoration of play in language as the element that would allow us to 
comprehend how language rather than history is the field within which we confront the 
simultaneity of dissimilar historical periods. It is in language that the past is kept 
"ready at hand", where "all times and spaces" are contained within a single universe, 
the universe of language (SH, 142). 
In another text which is intimately connected to Sequel, Ermarth makes a similar 
assertion insofar as her use of the term 'historical' is concerned. Ermarth argues in her 
t 
increasingly popular "Ph(r)ase Time: Chaos Theory and Postmodem keports on 
Knowledge" that postmodem narrative enacts "a very different treatment of 
perspective, a very different kind of sequence, than that available in historical, realistic, 
humanist time" (PT, 94). Near the end of this essay, En-narth argues that "the 
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experience of postmodern narrative temporality is, for habitual humanists, quite new. 
Growing multi-level awareness blocks the temporal mediations between here and 
there, now and then, that create historical time in narrative" (PT, 106). In both Sequel 
and "Ph(r)ase Time", Ermarth contrasts her understanding of the temporality opened 
by an attentiveness to the play in language, to the "formality of smtained interruption 
and ... an emphasis of the semi otic. wrpIu. vev of language and of linguistic systems" 
(PT, 105), with an understanding of historicity which roots historical time in 
t 
Newtonian science, realism and Renaissance and Reformation humanism. While I 
think Ermartb is correct in this contrast and its value for rethinking temporality, it 
nonetheless provides us with few suggestions concerning how historicity might be seen 
as a function of language, a conceptualisation which is important iq much of the fiction 
I have been paying attention to throughout this study. Ermarth is, perhaps, directly 
moving away from this very question. That is to say, that my use of the terrns'history' 
and 'historical' is not the use employed by Ermarth, though my usage remains 
consistant with that of the authors I have been exploring. In my own analyses I have 
implied, and at times directly inferred from the fiction I have employed, that the 
structure of history is completely bound to the duplicity of language. My concern has 
been similar in kind to Ermarth's insofar as we are both interested in underscoring the 
impossibility of achieving unity or a unified totality on the basis that the sign is singular 
and unique and corresponds directly to an individual, singular and unique referent. 
And we are both concerned, as I have tried to demonstrate in my analyses of voicing in 
relation to temporality, to address the question of time's intimate connection to 
language. There is, therefore, much to recommend in Ermarth's continuing interest in 
what is central to my present work. 
Nonetheless, my arguments throughout this study have led inevita6ly to the need to 
reconsider historicity beyond the notion of linearity which has been a hallmark of 
modernity (as emphasised by Vattimo's critique) and which has been the object of 
those reconsiderations of time and history offered by the Latin American authors I 
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have employed. In order to redirect our attention towards the structure of history in 
such a way that my own concerns as well as Ermarth's are maintained, I will set her 
arguments alongside Fuentes' reading of Diderot and Gogol since it is in this latter 
-reading that we get a sense of the relation between language and history which assists 
us in a reinterpretafion oThistory based on our previous investigations. 
Ermarth uses 'history' and 'historical timeto designate a process that the 
representational uses of language and time have been employed to support. Fo 
tr 
Ermarth this process is founded upon a conception of the neutrality of time, since the 
"convention of historical time ... 
is the neutral and homogeneous medium that acts as 
the critical common denominator for the mutually relevant measurements so critical to 
scientific and historical inquiry, to representational art and politics" (PT 9 
Conceiving language beyond the restrictions of this representational model, a model 
which not only draws an equivalence between signs and signifieds but also inscribes 
temporal processes within a movement that is always moving forward, allows us to 
recognise the ability of language to "collapse the dualism between words and things" 
(SH, 142). Given my brief analysis above regarding the position Fuentes'takes with 
respect to language, ' it would seem impossible to get any closer to the priority of 
language over history implied by Fuentes' claims. And yet, there are some very 
important diffierences between Ermarth's conception and the conception articulated in 
Fuentes' stories and essays. Insofar as Fuentes is concerned, a notion he openly admits 
adopting from Diderot, time is a factor of both presence and desire. "The critical 
concept can be presented, almost, like an equation: the greater the intensity of 
presence, the greater the intensity of time and the greater the sensation of the 
simultaneous" (MO, 77). "Two Centuries of Diderot" is an invaluable essay in 
understanding the relationship between language and history beyond'a mere 
denigration of thehistorical' conceived within the ordinary analysis of representational 
thinking because it prioritises a productive and affirmative notion of separation. What 
I See above, pp. 50-55. 
188 
Postponement: In Lieu of An Ending 
this means, as we will see in greater detail later, is that the relationship between 
language and history is intimate, precise and demanding, for the majority of Fuentes' 
texts come back to a question which is endemic to this relation and one that has 
concerned us throughout this thesis: How to overcome the separation between art and 
life, the past and the present, desire and-its 6-Vject? Whether Fuentes has ever-been 
anything like a late-modernist (as McHale at times has chosen to label him) or a 
postmodernist seems completely irrelevant to what is clearly important to bim-,, An 
examination of the separation between words and things, the past and the present 
desire and its object, and, of course, Latin America and the United States, For Fuentes 
this examination demands the response of a writing that always fails to fulfil itself, a 
writing that attempts to bridge the between of relation but ultimatqly confronts, as we 
saw in Pedro Pdramo, the unimpeachable and unrelenting gap of opacity as separation. 
This failure to bridge the gap of separation, of the no-time of Rulfo's Comala, is the 
power of a writing that, to be sure, employs language beyond its merely 
representational modalities, but a writing that is primarily concerned with the 
impossibility of its task: A postponed writing, a writing always in the process of 
arriving. What my study has been, in part, trying to demonstrate is that a number of 
key Latin American texts are emblematic of such writing because they self-consciously 
belong to a tradition always in the process of arriving, a tradition (to put it in more 
abstract terms) that arises out of opacity as the separation of the between of relation. 2 
Consequently, the impossibility of language emboddied in the duplicity of the 
serniotic system becomes writing's greatest power. In this impossibility the obligation 
to create, to tell a story, is transformed from author to reader. For Fuentes, this 
transference, which he sees enacted in Diderot's attempt to rescue time from the 
"demands of chronology" in turn bringing about the coincidence of time and desire in 
the only space that can fully oblige us, the space of literature, is intimately bound up in 
the separation that marks out the relation between desire and its object. Diderot's 
See above, pg. 44, n. I 
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response to this separation is the transference of the creative act to the reader, an act 
within which we are required to choose between a multiplicity of stories we could tell. 
"We choose to tell a story by sacrificing all the other stories we might tell. We do not 
have twenty mouths. We have only the comical, the humble, the superb possibilities of 
the mouth of fiction" (MO, -82-83). Given wliatl'have been arguing, a slight cbangein 
locution can serve to push the point: We do not have twenty tongues. We h ave only 
the comical, the humble, the superb possibilities of the tongue (and multiple voices) of i 
fiction. For Fuentes then, Diderot "writes novels with the purpose of uniting 
movement, time, and desire, which in reality are separated. 3 He writes to clear the 
obstacles enacted by chronology on the way to the fulfilment of our desires" (MO, 78- 
79). Because of the impossibility of uniting desire and its object, the demands of 
writing are the highest demands of all, for it is writing that makes response to this 
separation. 4 If we have any moral responsibility at all it is to the cause of freedom not 
only to choose one! s own destiny, but the time and place of that destiny, which, for 
Fuentes, is the time and place of desire. 5 This freedom is radicalised by language for it 
is in the duplicity of language that choice becomes possible. As Ermarth argues, 
""History" is consigned for better or worse to the sequences of language. Here and 
not in some "objective" universe, is moral responsibility really revived and reconceived. 
One then becomes responsible - because it is now profoundly important - for one's 
language: for what one reads and writes and imagines and dreams" (SH, 142). 6 
3 How to make ourselves present? This is the question Fucntes'argues is central to Diderot's attempt 
to unite time and desire. And Diderot answers Fuentes by saving: "We make ourselves present 
through movement. We overcome obstacles and obtain what we want because we move. It moves 
therefore it desires" (A10,77). 
4 As I have intimated before, I consider eroticism as being emblematic of sepaiation in the context of 
opacity and the between of relation but have had to curtail any detailed analysis of the erotic encounter 
in the interests of space. It may please the reader to know that Ermarth has give4 some consideration 
in Sequel to the erotic and that this is worth consulting in any appreciation of the broader implications 
I am offering here. See SH, 188ff. 
5 See "Luis Bufluel and the Cinema of Freedom", MO, 125-139 where Fuentes argues that, for 
Buffuel, "freedom is the activation of desire" (A10,133). 
6 Recall that for Lyotard the task of philosophy is to "reflect according to opacity", a task which 
erupts for the artist as for the philosopher in the responsibility to "bear witness that there is, to 
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History is only what is written and the putative separation between the past and the 
present is collapsed in an act of writing which never fulfils itself in the complete 
unification between the two. In this sense, the creative act that Ermarth attributes to 
language is central to articulating history. As Fuentes correctly points out in his 
reading of Garcia MArquez' Cietj ajo. v de. vokdad [One Hundred Yearv of Soliftide], 
"like More's Utopia, Macondo is an island of the imagination .... From this 
island Jos6 
Arcadio invents the world, points things out with his finger, then learns how tq t name 
things and, finally, how to forget them, and so is forced to rename, rewrite, remember" 
(MO, 191). What this means is that "the saga of Macondo and the Buendias ... 
includes the totality of the oral, legendary past and with it we are told that we cannot 
feel satisfied with the official., documented history of the times: that history is also the 
things that men and women have dreamed, imagined, desired, and named" ("0,192- 
193). 
What is vital to the relationship between language and history is the doubling effect 
in language itself, for it is this effect which splits apart and multiplies referential fields. 
If, as Ermarth correctly points out, "the term "sign" does not properly describe 
anything more than the site of a differential function" (SH, 143), then the sign of 
history inscribed in a system that is founded upon the separation between words and 
things is itself differential: Hivory become. v differetitial hi the dtfferewial sigim of 
Imiguage. Both language and historicity - that is, the structure of history - are 
therefore fields for the manifestation of this differentiation engendered by separation. 
Again, my usage is significantly different than Ermarth's since, as I pointed out above, 
Ermarth's analysis of history is grounded in the concept of neutrality and not that of 
linearity. Notwithstanding this difrerence, it is necessary to draw the readers attention 
to a number of key moments in Sequel where the problem of lineari seems to arise ty 
despite Ermarth's well argued attempts to avoid it. 
respond to the order to be", a response engendered by the separation of rclation, since it is this 
separation which allows us to abandon the principle of unity that subtends representational thinking. 
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In "Time As Rhythm", Ermarth argues that "a postmodern narrative submits to the 
sequential nature of language grudgingly and at everyjuncture keeps alive for readers 
an awareness of multiple pathways and constantly crossing themes" (SH, 53). In the 
first instance, if this "sequential nature" is not wholly linear then why does Ermarth 
emphasise, just one page later, that "in Jealmi. vy : --theTeader is 
confined to a present tense and thus to a continuous present that constantly erases past 
and future .... Gone are the linear coordinates that make possible the 
description of a 
stable [that is, neutral] world" (SH, 54)? Linearity appears as if in the service d 
neutrality and therefore cannot be passed over in favour of a term whose own 
independence relies upon the notion of linearity in the first place. 
Secondly, at the end of her study, Ermarth argues that Nicholas. Rowe's "description 
of the "intricate network of echoes" [in Nabokovs works] suggest how "timelessness", 
by which I take him to mean the absence of time conceived as history and project, is 
achieved by language. The temporal framework depends on the forward and backward 
action of consciousness constructing its "thematic antbemia", working cumulatively 
and by superimposition to create not the neutral medium of history but a medium 
where so-called "rational" perspectives are perpetually tilted and distorted... " (SH, 
202). The problem here is that we began with a conception of time that eschews past 
and future (and, therefore, presumably neutrality) only to end with a time that requires 
the forward and backward movement of consciousness in order to fulfil itself And 
then, to make things more problematic, we hear that this latter conception of time is 
grounded on a notion of timelessness guaranteed by language, presumably the very 
same language whose "sequential nature" it seems somehow impossible to avoid. How 
is time, we might ask, both asynchronous with sequence but dependent upon an 
awareness and direct involvement in the "sequential nature" of languAge? The 
importance of reconsidering linearity does not seem to escape Ermarth's text. But, 
more importantly, we also need to ask why Ermarth never questions the assumption 
that the "sequential nature" of language is not, in fact, undermined by the groundwork 
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upon which language is based; that is, the duplicity of the serniotic system as an 
operative mechanism in language itself9 What I have been, in part, exploring 
throughout this thesis is the question of this duplicity and its relevance to a 
reinterpretation of linearity, the latter of which is vital to our understanding of a good 
many Latin American authors. 
Because it is always in a state of constant revision, constantly being rewritien and 
renamed, history is not tied to the linear conception of time in which chronophileS7 
have taken reffige. And, by extension, our identities are always in a process of 
becoming through these revisions, changing as we change the history that, through 
writing and in time, will become us. While this seems a commonplace historical 
revisionism, it is based on a notion of the impossibility of achieving any teleological 
end to the succession of attempts to rewrite and rename. Those attempts are what are 
important and are made possible because of the opacity of the between. And, for 
Fuentes, what drives us Constantly towards these successive revisions is desire, need: 
"I need therefore I imagine" therefore I write (MO, 17). What Fuentes needs is an 
identification with his country and therefore with himself, an identification fulfilled in 
this impossible task called writing. And this is why Fuentes says that when he arrived 
in Mexico for the first time he discovered "the imaginary, imagined country, finally real 
but only real if I saw it from a distance that would assure me, becauve of the very act 
of. -veparatioij, that my desire for reunion with it would be forever urgent, aildonly real 
ff I wrote it" (MO, 17-18; my emphasis). Writing embodies the possibility of self- 
identification and self-recognition precisely through its embeddedness in opacity as 
separation. In this sense, we do not disown 'historical thinking' by giving up 
I 
Newtonian, progressive, linear time. Rather, we gain the power to w* rite history, the 
power to achieve freedom through an identification with our desires and our dreams. 
Fuentes' separation is, of course, not a geotemporal distance; it is the very separation 
which makes relation possible, a separation which language and especially writing 
71 have boffowed this term from Sequel. 
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embody. Therefore, no unity between signs and signifieds for Fuentes: Only the 
exacerbated desire whose impossibility engenders a writing through which 
identification is constantly postponed: "Time is movement, it is rhythm, it is an 
interrupted story, it is a postponed story; it is even, at times, a repeated story" (MO, 
83). 8 
In a revealing title to a collection of short stories - Lav dias enmascaradav [ýýe 
MaAed Day. -v] -Fuentes encapsulates the importance of the simultaneity of the past and 
the present in the context of the buried reality of Mexican culture. Not only are 
Mexicans hidden behind the masks of their solitude, as we saw in Paz, but so too is 
time. The breach of the mask occurs when the protagonists of Fuptes' stories (but 
also, as we have seen, Carpentier's and Garcia Mirque2s as well) breach the fagades of 
their own identities and enter into the simultaneity of identities and the simultaneity of 
times. Hence, it is vital to recognise that the protagonists in any of the stories we have 
been dealing with never move ftom outer obscurity to inner clarity, but always into 
duplicity: The duplicity of identity, of time, of Latin America itself. This duplicity is 
emblematic of the suspension and interruption that subtends those stories. What 
obtains then, when the individual looks inward is the postponement of identity and time 
in that duplicity which is simultaneity. 
Fuentes'essay on Nikolai Gogol is informative in charting the significance of this 
position. Fuentes writes that for Gogol time is constantly deferring itself, constantly 
frustrating our attempts to decipher it. Time thus "develops through time, a hidden 
time: a succession of masked days .... Time, almost 
by definition, flees, disguises itself, 
shrouds itself in fog; time is an impostor, a disguised being who always refuses to show 
8 The reference to rhythm again brings us back to Ermartlfs analysis of languagý, time and history. 
In Sequel Ermarth argues that in postmodem narrative rhythmic time replaces linear time. She goes 
on to say that "the emphasis on rhythm is consistent with an appreciation of language as speech. 
Writing without the activation of a reader is, as many have pointed out, just black marks on a page; 
and that enactment moves easily from silence through consciousness toward language voiced, toward 
language in play and in fullest life" (SH, 4748). What is important here is the sense in which 
rhythmic time is a function of language, 
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us his face .... Time is a constant postponement: a perpetually 
deferred identity" (MO, 
90). Any response to this refusal cannot transcend the limits of postponement. Or, if 
it can, Fuentes asks, why should it? "The art of Nikolai Gogol swirls around the 
problem of identities and identification which is postponed, or deceptive" and allows 
Gogol to reach "but one-identity, and that is his own identification -vvith -the problem of 
existence" (MO, 91). Fuentes argues that Gogol's response to the refusal dtime is to 
offer up the refusal of the author. That is, "the irony of the writer who postpones his 
own destiny and his own identity, in the same way that time and space ... 
do so, so that 
all these elements are transformed into the only reality that is truthful, worthy of our 
attention, or, at least handy: the reality of literature" (MO, 92). The postponement of 
identity, Aithin a time postponed means that closure is similarly deferred. Hence, in the 
postponement of identity lies the infinite possibilities of self-creation in and through 
fiction. But the creative act does not bring us into contact with an origin, with a pure 
and immediate reality. Quite the contrary, the creative act that erupts from the 
conditions of postponement, foreignness and orphanhood, conditions which are 
embedded in the very being of language itself can (only) offer the postponement of any 
immediate and pure identity. 
In his essay, Fuentes pays particular attention to a letter written by Gogol on the eve 
of 1834 where Gogol writes: "At my feet burns my past; above me, through the fog, 
shines the indecipherable future. Life of my soul, of my genius, I implore thee: Do not 
hide" (Affl, 89). Fuentes reads this letter alongside various passages from Gogol's 
Dead Soutv in order to expose what he sees as Gogol's own deferral; the deferral of his 
own identity and his own destiny in response to the "perpetually deferred identity" of 
time and, subsequently, of Russia in the face of its longing for a future in the fullness of 
its destiny. Fuentes writes that it is impossible to "separate in the letter, the vital 
statistics - the dates, the commonplace of good resolutions for the New Year ... from 
the writing; that is, firom imagination as applied to time, from the postponement of 
certitude" (MO, 91). For Fuentes then, Gogol responds to the "enigma of a national 
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destiny" with the "reality of literature", the writing of a letter in the presence of a time 
in constant deferral. The mask of time must, therefore, not be seen as an opaque 
border between what "I" truly is and what "I" pretends to be, but what "I", through 
pretence, is as another, The mask of time does not conceal a hidden and truer time. 
Rather, it exposes us tolidenfity and identification which in reaiityarezmstantly 
postponed: Masks reveal the duplicity of identity and do not refer us back toa prior 
possibility for our unification with our own true life. The act of writing embraces this 
revelation by disowning the authorial voice, giving both author and work over to the 
reader and, ultimately, to the plurality of its own voices. And this is why both Kafka 
and Gogol have said "I" has no life outside literature. As Fuentes maintains: "The life 
of Nikolai Gogol occupies this singular position in relation to his qwn work: It lacks 
any interest except if it is seen as the creation of Nikolai Gogol" (MO, 95). A creation 
which is a fiction: Life and art are co-productive and can in no way be separated. And 
it is only in this inseparability that we come not only to understand the "creation of 
Nikolai Cyogol" but that the space where that creation manifests itself is, precisely, the 
space of literature. This space has its own temporality, not the time outside time as in 
Paz, but the time of the between, the between time of separation in which the 
simultaneity of the mutually exclusive finds its own being. The between is never 
inscribed in a linear chain, a chronological order. When, for example, we encounter 
the past we are embracedwithin the ex-timate relation which exceeds chronology. 
This encounter occurs in the time between times, the no-time of opacity. In this sense, 
the past is not a home to return to and does not belong to us even while we identify 
with it. The past does not belong to us because we do not simply and 
t 
unproblematically belong to it. This mutual impossibility of belonging, of being 
k 
possessed by something we are intimately connected with goes beyond the obvious 
impossibility of returning to some pre-existing temporal -hi stori cal space. More 
fundamentally than this, the impossibility of belonging is the impossibility of the 
outside as such, as that to which we are intimately connected, an impossibility 
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embodied, as so many Latin American writers are aware, in this duplicitous and 
impossible thing called writing. 
Postponing Language and the Anonymous 
What I have tried to demonstrate throughout this thesis is tftat the question 'How to 
name the anonymousT exposes us, in the very attempt to approach it, to the condition 
which makes relation possible; that is, to opacity structured by extimacy. In order to 
understand the question of anonymity, what the question was asking of us, it was 
therefore necessary to understand something about relationality which, as I attempted 
to work through in the Interlude, inevitably leads to the duplicity embedded in the very 
language we use to approach anonymity's name. In order to identýfy with this name 
and the very question of naming this identification entails, we first need to appreciate 
the role duplicity plays in the whole process of identification and recognition. This 
appreciation is the result of our attempts to "reflect according to opacity"; that is, to 
reflect under the influence of opacity, to reflect in such a way as to be guided by the 
very multiplicity, duplicity and impossibility that identifies opacity itself And this is 
why the method I have employed is strict and precise, and why the question of 
temporality has always been an important one throughout this study. By definition, 
anonymity's name postpones itself and any writing seeking to name the anonymous 
must be prepared to mix and remix its own voices in the approach to the question of 
anonymity itself. ft is also for this reason that I began with an analysis of ineffability 
since, as I argued at the very beginning, the ineffable is itself ineffable; that is, it refuses 
itself, it postpones itself in any of our attempts to ground it ontologically. The only 
ground upon which to situate the ineffable is the ground of its haunting duplicity. To 
say that the anonymous is ineffable, that anonymity's name cannot bd spoken, "ithout 
giving a detailed accounting of what the impossibility of the ineffable is would get us 
no where. This accounting has lead us through the delineation of a set of concepts - 
absence, foreignness, the divorce between, the separation of relation, orphanhood - 
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which have been indispensable in the approach to anonymity. 
The divorce between words and things engenders foreignness and orphanhood 
which in turn open us toward the multiplicity of our identity and of our time. In the 
divorce between, in the separation which is opacity, we encounter the absence of any 
homeland to wYich we could return and the absence of any promised -land -we could 
hope to acquire as the seat of some prior identity. And yet, we are notwithoilt our 
names, our histories, our sense that we belong. In this sense, we are exited (as 
Carpentier was all to aware) within a foreign yet familiar world, a world we must 
therefore name through the broken language of an unknown tongue, a tonguekvhich 
speaks a language exiled to the space of opacity, a tongue at home in literature. In 
outlining the terms of ineffability I argued that the analysis of opa<1ty suggests that 
what is common for subjectless subjects is the radical unknowing at the heart of their 
encounter, an unknowing which is not reducible to language but which resides in 
excess of it. In short, that what is common for subjectless subjects is the absence 
around which "I" circulates and upon which language acquires its being. But, to speak 
towards absence is, in fact, to lose language in the speaking since language is subjected 
to the very encounter it seeks to unfold; that is, language is always subjected to 
opacity. To speak towards absence, tofigure absence in speaking towards it, we must 
speak the language beyond language, a language spoken by an unknown tongue, a 
language which is no longer fooled by the representational uses it has been forced to 
comply, with: A language that surrenders to its own foreignness, surrenders to the 
inescapable multiplicity of its referential codification and encounters the foreign within 
itself, its own opacity, its own intimate exteriority. What I have tried to show in my 
attention to various authors from Latin America is that not only fiction itself, but 
particularly a fiction which arises from the between of relation, a fictibn such as we 
encounter in Latin America, speaks in this unknown tongue and is one of the pre- 
eminent forms by which to give voice to absence. And, in the end, it is this voice that 
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